UPDATE ON SHI'A-SUNNI RELATIONS IN KUWAIT: STABLE,

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 KUWAIT 000257

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/I, NEA/IR, AND NEA/ARP, NSC FOR RAMCHAND

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV KISL SOCI IZ KU KUWAIT IRAQ RELATIONS
SHI'A
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON SHI'A-SUNNI RELATIONS IN KUWAIT: STABLE,
DESPITE RHETORIC AND REGIONAL TENSIONS

REF: A. KUWAIT 146 - KUWAITI SHI'A MARK ASHOURA PEACEFULLY

B. 06 KUWAIT 4625 - KUWAITIS TELL PDAS JEFFREY
CONSULTATION KEY TO IRAN

C. 06 KUWAIT 4583 - MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD LEADER WARNS
OF IMPACT OF IRAQ

D. 06 KUWAIT 4498 - INFLUENTIAL AL-SABAH EXPRESSES
FRUSTRATION WITH PM/PARLIAMENT

E. 06 KUWAIT 4418 - SECTARIAN TENSION OVER BOOK
DISTRIBUTED BY SHI'A MINISTER

F. 06 KUWAIT 4377 - PARLIAMENT APPROVES ZAKAT LAW
DESPITE SHI'A OBJECTIONS

G. 06 KUWAIT 2883 - TWO MORE PRO-HIZBALLAH PROTESTS

H. 06 KUWAIT 2855 - 200 PROTEST OUTSIDE EMBASSY IN
SUPPORT OF NASRALLAH

I. 06 KUWAIT 661 - KUWAITI SHI'A AND SUNNIS CONDEMN
IRAQ SHRINE BOMBING

J. 05 KUWAIT 4633 - MOSQUE INCIDENT: LOCALIZED ACT
BLOWN OUT OF PROPORTION

K. 05 KUWAIT 4451 - SHI'A MOSQUE ATTACKED BY YOUTH
IN JAHRA

L. 00 KUWAIT 1913 - ACT OF VIGILANTE JUSTICE SPARKS
GOVERNMENT ACTION

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4 (b) and (
d)


1. (S/NF) Summary: Despite a recent surge in sectarian
rhetoric, the majority of our contacts insist there is no
near-term threat to Shi'a-Sunni relations in Kuwait. Most
Kuwaitis describe the overall relations between the two
communities as "very good," and say leaders on both sides and
the Government are "serious" about preventing any escalation
in sectarian tensions. Although complaining of
institutionalized discrimination, Kuwaiti Shi'a seem
relatively satisfied with their lot: a full portion of
Kuwait's bountiful economic pie and tacit acceptance that a
commensurate political influence will remain out of reach.
While some Kuwaiti Sunnis can be quick to express anti-Shi'a
views in private, public verbal sparring between conservative
Shi'a and Salafi Islamists in recent months provoked strong
condemnation from a broad spectrum of Kuwaitis. Leaders from
both communities have stressed the importance of maintaining
"national unity" and have undertaken a number of joint
efforts to defuse tensions. The Amir echoed the national
unity theme in recent public speeches, and the Government
acted quickly to prevent a provocative pro-Sunni Iraqi rally
organized by Salafi Islamists. These strong reactions
demonstrate both the importance Kuwaitis' place on preventing
sectarian confrontations in Kuwait and their dismay at the
sectarian violence playing out in Iraq.


2. (S/NF) Still, many Kuwaiti Sunnis fear Iranian-backed
Shi'a ascendancy in the region and some see the Shi'a in
Kuwait as a significant security threat. Salafi Islamists
share this view with many in the Ministry of Defense officer
core and some senior Government officials. Despite these
views, it is unlikely that Shi'a-Sunni tensions in Kuwait
will worsen significantly in the near future given the
country's wealth and the generally positive relations between
the two communities, including a long history of political
cooperation. Kuwaiti observers believe that calculus could
change in the event of a major sectarian-motivated terrorist
attack in the country or a military conflict between the U.S.
and Iran. Over time, however, the use of the "sectarian
card" by conservative Shi'a and Sunni politicians to achieve
short-term political gains and continued regional sectarian
tensions could undermine the generally positive relations
between the two communities in Kuwait. End summary.


3. (S/NF) This cable is based on more than 50 meetings with
Shi'a and Sunni leaders in Kuwait, numerous informal
conversations, local press reports over the last six months,
and past embassy reporting. It has been cleared by SIMO, the
Defense Attache, and the Office of Military
Cooperation-Kuwait, and represents a general consensus in the
Embassy on the current status of Shi'a-Sunni relations in
Kuwait.

Some Discrimination, But Generally Good Relations
-------------- --------------


4. (C/NF) Although the State does not publish exact figures,
it is generally estimated that roughly 300,000-350,000, or
30-35%, of Kuwait's one million citizens are Shi'a. There
are also an unknown number of non-Kuwaiti Shi'a living here,
including almost all of the estimated 60,000-80,000 person
Iranian expatriate community. (Comment: In this cable,

KUWAIT 00000257 002 OF 006

Ministers are Shi'a),and what they perceive to be a Sunni
bias in educational curricula. There are also very few Shi'a
in senior positions in the military and security services,
which tend to be dominated by tribal Sunnis.


5. (C/NF) Despite these complaints, most Shi'a say their
overall relations with the Sunni community are "very good"
and insist they are relatively unconcerned about the
potential spill-over effect of regional sectarian tensions.
The former Secretary General of the Islamic National
Consensus Movement, a moderate Shi'a political association,
told Poloff recently that the level of discrimination is
"acceptable" and that "(Kuwaiti) Shi'a understand reality and
accept that they will never rule the country." Other Shi'a
contacts have similarly admitted in private that while in the
long-term they want more equal rights they understand that
making such demands in the current context could prove
counterproductive. They also note that behind the scenes the
Shi'a "are slowly being given their rights," as former Shi'a
Minister of Commerce Dr. Yousef Al-Zalzalah told Poloff.


6. (C/NF) Where relations are most tense is with Salafi
Islamists, whose conservative interpretation of Islam brands
Shi'a as unbelievers. Kuwaiti Shi'a routinely complain that
Salafi influence in government ministries, particularly
Education and Islamic Affairs, is the primary reason for the
discrimination against them and the perpetuation of negative
stereotypes. While not always the case, Islamist contacts do
tend to espouse more anti-Shi'a rhetoric than the average
Sunni, and the vast majority of public clashes between the
two communities are between the more hard-line, conservative
Shi'a and Sunni leaders. Salafis also routinely use
sectarian issues as a way to bolster their Islamist
credentials and achieve short-term political gains, a
dangerous strategy if pursued over the long term as Shi'a
fear. The Salafis' strong animosity towards the Shi'a is
generally reflective of the views of Kuwait's tribes, which
are predominantly Sunni and conservative. When Kuwaiti Shi'a
express concern about long-term relations between the two
communities, they cite the influence of the Salafis and the
tribes, not external factors, as their greatest fear. Many
Sunnis express similar concerns about conservative, pro-Iran
Shi'a, who also tend to play the "sectarian card" for
political purposes. While these groups represent a minority
in both communities, they are very vocal and represent a
potential long-term threat to sectarian relations in Kuwait.

Rising Sectarian Rhetoric...
--------------


7. (SBU) Although overall relations are good, there has been
a noticeable increase in sectarian rhetoric in Kuwait over
the past several months, particularly in the media. In
October 2006, for example, one of Kuwait's most prominent and
controversial Shi'a clerics, Sayed Mohammed Baqer Al-Mohri,
publicly condemned well-known Sunni cleric Yousef Al-Qaradawi
for questioning Shi'a beliefs, provoking a strong reaction
from Kuwaiti Islamists. Later that month, Salafi MPs slammed
the Minister of State for National Assembly Affairs, a Shi'a,
for distributing a book advocating Shi'a views and demanded
it be withdrawn from circulation (ref E). In November,
Parliament passed a controversial zakat (religious tax) law
backed by Islamists, but strongly opposed by Kuwait's Shi'a
leaders, who argued that it was discriminatory and would
"adversely affect national unity" (ref F). In January 2007,
the Nations Invariables Grouping, a hard-line Salafi
political association, organized a rally in support of Iraq's
Sunnis, which the Ministry of Interior blocked from being
held. Several Salafi MPs protested, but most Sunni leaders
supported the Government's move.


8. (SBU) Later in January, the Secretary General of the
Nations Invariables Grouping warned Kuwaiti Shi'a that his
organization would monitor sermons delivered during Ashoura.
The Shi'a community strongly protested his comments. A week

KUWAIT 00000257 003 OF 006


later, Al-Mohri sparked another controversy by arguing during
a television interview that terrorist attacks by Shi'a
activists in Kuwait during the 1980s were motivated by
"patriotism." Although he later retracted his statements,
Islamists demanded the government prosecute Al-Mohri and
later filed a suit against him. Reports on alleged Shi'a
missionary activities in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and
Kuwait, including one front-page article in November
published in two local dailies under the headline "Shiite
'tidal wave' hits Kuwait," have contributed to Sunni fears of
rising Shi'a influence in the region.

...Provokes Strong Reaction
--------------


9. (SBU) Average Kuwaitis, both Sunni and Shi'a, have
reacted strongly to this recent rise in sectarian rhetoric.
Articles over the past month have warned against evoking
sectarian differences and stressed the importance of
maintaining "national unity." For example, on January 19,
Al-Rai Al-Aam (local Arabic daily) published an editorial by
Abdul Hussein Al-Sultan, the Secretary General of the Justice
and Peace Grouping, a moderate Shi'a political association,
in which he argued that all Kuwaitis should "shoulder the
historic responsibility of nipping sectarianism in the bud."
He concluded that sectarian disputes "tear us apart, and that
is what the real enemy of the nation, the Zionists, want."
Perhaps responding to Al-Sultan, Dr. Wael Al-Hasawi, the
Editor-in-Chief of Al-Furqan, the weekly publication of the
Salafi Movement, said "we support people who call for nipping
sectarian sedition in the bud" in a January 23 Al-Rai Al-Aam
op-ed.


10. (SBU) Al-Rai Al-Aam's January 22 editorial argued that
"sectarianism and factionalism are alien to our
society....and manifest utter backwardness." Former Shi'a MP
Dr. Abdul Mohsen Jamal, a member of the National Islamic
Alliance (NIA),a conservative, Iran-leaning Shi'a political
association, wrote January 22 that "the fact that five nights
(of Ashoura) have passed without incident is the best proof
of the awareness and cohesion of the Kuwaiti people." In a
January 25 article, Sunni Islamist Adel Al-Qasser praised
several Kuwaiti Shi'a leaders for attending the moderation
conference organized by the Ministry of Awqaf in Washington
in November. He said their presence confirmed that "we have
no option as Muslims but to focus on our similarities and
freeze all our sectarian disputes."


11. (SBU) Twenty-three "prominent women activists" issued a
statement on January 23 calling on MPs to "dissociate
themselves from sectarian affiliations and work to preserve
peaceful coexistence." They also "urged Kuwaitis to be
vigilant and resist any attempt to drag them into a sectarian
conflict that would threaten everyone." Six local NGOs
issued a similar statement on January 24, calling on Kuwaiti
organizations to "unite for the benefit of the nation." In a
national address January 29, the Amir joined the chorus
condemning sectarianism. He urged Kuwaitis to "learn the
lesson of Iraq" and "discard (their) differences," and
stressed the importance of "national unity." Shaykh Sabah
delivered a similar message during a speech to Parliament in
November in which he emphasized that "Kuwait does not belong
to one group or sect only."

Putting Words Into Action
--------------


12. (C/NF) Some Kuwaitis have sought to put this verbal
condemnation of sectarianism into action. According to
several contacts, a group of prominent Shi'a politicians and
intellectuals met with the Editors-in-Chief of Kuwait's
leading dailies prior to Ashoura and urged them not to
publish inflammatory articles. They also communicated their
intention to control "our own population" and prevent any
provocative sermons during Ashoura commemorations. Some of
the editorials cited above resulted from these meetings. In
addition, Shi'a MP Saleh Ashoura called publicly for Imams to
avoid sectarian rhetoric and stress national unity during
Ashoura. Local media later noted positively that Shi'a Imams
followed these guidelines and Kuwaiti Shi'a observed Ashoura
peacefully (ref A),though as in past years public marches
were banned. Shaykh Ahmed Hussein, a local Shi'a cleric,
told Poloff January 27 that there were "no problems at all"
this Ashoura, and Kuwaiti Shi'a did not feel any increased
tensions with the Sunni community. "If anything, this year
it's more open," Shaykh Ahmed said.


KUWAIT 00000257 004 OF 006



13. (C/NF) Salem Al-Nashi, the Official Spokesman of the
Salafi Islamic Grouping, a conservative Islamist political
association, told Poloff February 7 that a group of
conservative writers, established in 2001 but inactive for
the past several years, had begun meeting again to address
sectarian disputes, like the comments made by Al-Mohri.
Al-Nashi said the group included both Shi'a and Sunni
Islamists and described cooperation between them as "very
good."


14. (C/NF) The Government has also played an active role in
containing sectarian disputes, and most of our contacts
express confidence in the Kuwaiti leadership's ability to
keep tensions from escalating. Former Shi'a Oil Minister Ali
Al-Baghli told Poloffs January 31 that the Amir's son, Shaykh
Nasser Al-Ahmed, personally interceded in a dispute between
police and Shi'a worshippers who wanted to hold an impromptu
public march during Ashoura. According to Al-Baghli, Shaykh
Nasser met with Shi'a leaders at the scene and resolved
tensions. Al-Baghli praised Shaykh Nasser's intervention as
a "good gesture," which demonstrated the Government's
commitment to preventing sectarianism. He added that
Shi'a-Sunni relations were "better now under Shaykh Sabah,"
and claimed Shi'a were being treated more fairly and given
greater rights than before.


15. (C/NF) During a December 9 meeting with visiting PDAS
James Jeffrey (ref B),Dr. Bader Al-Nashi, the Secretary
General of the Islamic Constitutional Movement (ICM),the
political arm of the Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood, similarly
praised the Government for "maintaining a balance" between
the two communities and said that Shi'a-Sunni relations were
"relatively good." Dr. Ahmed Bishara, the Secretary General
of the National Democratic Movement (NDM),a liberal
political association, and a Sunni, told Poloff in November
that "the Al-Sabah have been very even-handed in dealing with
the Shi'a population, unlike other regimes in the region."
As a result, Bishara said he was "not at all concerned" about
Shi'a-Sunni relations in Kuwait. Al-Mohri told Poloff
January 22 that the Government was "very serious" about
preventing sectarianism in Kuwait and said he had "very
little concern" about tensions escalating.

Military/Salafis See Shi'a Threat
--------------


16. (S/NF) While the majority of Shi'a and Sunnis in Kuwait
tend to downplay sectarian discord, not everyone shares this
view. DATT contacts in Kuwait's military officer core,
particularly those in military intelligence, tend to view
Kuwait's Shi'a community as a serious threat and believe
their ultimate loyalty is "to the mullahs in Iran." (Note:
There are very few Shi'a in the Ministry of Defense's
intelligence branch and none in Kuwait State Security (KSS),
Kuwait's domestic and external intelligence agency. End
note.) MOD intel officers believe there are Shi'a "sleeper
cells" in Kuwait and argue that an Iranian-backed Shi'a
terrorist attack in Kuwait is "very likely." Some have also
privately told the DATT that they believe Lt. Gen. Ali
Al-Mumin, Kuwait's Ambassador-designate to Iraq and a Shi'a,
is an Iranian spy. (Note: Al-Mumin, the former highest
ranking Shi'a in Kuwait's military and the head of the
Humanitarian Operations Center, came under public attack
recently, accused of funneling Kuwaiti assistance to Iraqi
Shi'a. End note.) However, MOD intel officers do not
present any evidence to support their claims.


17. (S/NF) At least some members of the ruling family share
the view that some Kuwaiti Shi'a are secretly allied with
Iran. Shaykh Mohammed Abdullah Mubarak, an influential
younger Shaykh close to National Security Bureau President
Shaykh Ahmed Al-Fahd and former Kuwait State Security Chief
Shaykh Athbi Al-Fahd, told Poloff in November (ref C),"If
you don't know that Hizballah is active in Kuwait, then you
need to get a new job." He claimed "Kuwaiti Hizballah" was
"the same thing" as Hizballah in Lebanon with "the same
structure and the same funding." "In fact, Kuwaiti Hizballah
funds Hizballah in Lebanon," he said. According to Shaykh
Mohammed, Shi'a MPs Adnan Abdul Samad and Ahmed Lari are both
affiliated with "Kuwaiti Hizballah." (Comment: "Kuwaiti
Hizballah" is a pejorative term used primarily by Islamists
and Kuwait's intelligence services to discredit pro-Iran
Shi'a in Kuwait. Many contacts also use the term to refer to
the National Islamic Alliance (NIA),a conservative, pro-Iran
Shi'a political association, to which both Adnan Abdul Samad
and Ahmed Lari belong. Although we do not rule it out, we
have seen no evidence to suggest that there is a Hizballah

KUWAIT 00000257 005 OF 006


branch in Kuwait with direct organizational ties to Lebanese
Hizballah. End Comment.)


18. (S/NF) Senior MFA and other GOK officials have also
presented strongly anti-Shi'a views in private conversations
with Emboffs. The MFA Director for Asian Affairs, who has
responsibility for Iranian issues, described Kuwaiti Shi'a to
PolChief as "Iranians with Kuwaiti citizenship" and said he
believed the Iranians were pursuing a region-wide effort to
convert Sunnis to Shi'ism. Islamist MP Khudair Al-Enezi
described Shi'a to Poloffs as "backwards" during a February
12 meeting. As an example, he claimed Al-Mumin recently
exhumed his mother's body 15 years after her death in order
to bury her in Najaf, Iraq. Al-Enezi, who as his name
implies is from the Al-Enza tribe, also believed Kuwaiti
Shi'a were ultimately loyal to Iran, regardless of how long
they had lived in Kuwait. As noted, many Sunnis from tribal
backgrounds and hard-line Salafis tend to similarly view the
Shi'a in Kuwait as an Iranian fifth column.

Low Probability of Sectarian Violence in Kuwait
-------------- --


19. (S/NF) In spite of these views, there are substantial
reasons to believe that sectarian tensions in Kuwait will not
worsen significantly in the near future. Verbal denigration
between Kuwaiti Shi'a and Salafi leaders is not uncommon, and
while sectarian-motivated attacks have occurred in the past,
they are rare and have not provoked sectarian reprisals.
Kuwait weathered several terrorist attacks by Iranian-backed
Shi'a extremists during the 1980s, including an assassination
attempt on the Amir, without a major deterioration in
Shi'a-Sunni relations. Liberal Sunni political analyst Ahmed
Deyain told Poloff January 23 that "things are not much
different today" than they were then. Attacks on a Shi'a
husseiniya in April 2000 (ref L) and on a Shi'a mosque in
October 2005 (refs J and K) were isolated incidents, and were
quickly and satisfactorily addressed by the authorities.
There have not been any reported cases of sectarian-motivated
violence since then.


20. (C/NF) In addition, politically the two communities are
not evenly divided along sectarian lines. Shi'a and Sunni
groups united during last year's elections to push for reform
and fight corruption. In Parliament, three of the four Shi'a
MPs belong to the predominantly Sunni Popular Action Bloc;
the other Shi'a MP is part of the pro-Government Independent
Bloc, whose other 11 members are Sunni tribal MPs. At times,
Shi'a political associations have even allied with Islamists
to undermine the political influence of rival Shi'a groups,
highlighting the deep divisions -- partly due to religious
and political affiliations, and partly to personal rivalries
-- within Kuwait's Shi'a community. These divisions, rather
than Sunni opposition, were largely responsible for the low
number of Shi'a elected last June.


21. (C/NF) Even on regional issues, positions are not
defined by sectarian affiliation. After the February 2006
attack on the Shi'a shrine in Samara, Iraq, leaders from both
communities, including representatives from two conservative
Islamist political associations, attended a rally at a Shi'a
mosque during which they strongly condemned the bombing and
stressed the need for Muslim unity (ref I). During the
Israel-Hizballah conflict last summer, the Salafi Movement,
the Ummah Party (Salafi),the National Islamic Alliance
(Shi'a),and the Shi'a Clerics Congregation participated in a
rally in support of Lebanon. Prior to the rally, one Ummah
Party representative described the fatwas issued by some
Saudi clerics prohibiting Sunnis from participating in jihad
alongside Hizballah as "unforgettable crimes." Members of
both communities, and even some liberals, attended other
pro-Hizballah, anti-U.S./Israel demonstrations held last
summer (refs G and H).


22. (C/NF) Kuwaiti opinions on Iran cross sectarian lines as
well. Some Islamists support Iran's nuclear program as a
counterbalance to Israel and, according to several Shi'a
contacts, only a minority of Kuwaiti Shi'a support the
Iranian regime. Where Shi'a-Sunni views do tend to differ
sharply is on Iraq. While lamenting the violence, many Shi'a
contacts privately express satisfaction with the fact that
Iraq's Shi'a majority is finally in power. Many Sunni
contacts, on the other hand, express dismay at the course of
events in Iraq and echo King Abdullah of Jordan's fears of an
emerging "Shi'a crescent" in the region.


23. (C/NF) Another reason why sectarian relations in Kuwait

KUWAIT 00000257 006 OF 006


are unlikely to deteriorate significantly is the country's
wealth. As one astute Sunni political analyst told Poloff
recently, "Oil compensates for a multitude of differences."
With oil prices soaring and the economy booming, Kuwaitis are
less likely to engage in political activities of a sectarian
nature, provided they continue to have access to the
country's wealth. In fact, regional sectarian tensions seem
at times to influence Kuwaiti Shi'a to downplay their
sectarian identity and emphasize their commitment to the
country, rather than raise the sectarian flag. Al-Mohri told
Poloff that the prosperity of Kuwait's Shi'a community limits
their susceptibility to Iranian influence. "After all," he
said, "they are Kuwaiti first and don't want to lose their
privileges." Not only does Kuwait's prosperity tend to
produce a relatively moderate populace, many contacts argue
that it also makes it less likely that extremists in Kuwait
will do something to jeopardize their access to funding,
although this cannot be completely ruled out.

Where Problems Could Emerge
--------------


24. (C/NF) While the current situation appears relatively
stable, problems could emerge. Shi'a and Sunni leaders admit
that there are extremist elements on both sides that might do
something unpredictable. While downplaying the likelihood of
an attack by extremists, ICM Secretary General Dr. Bader
Al-Nashi warned Poloff in December that such an attack would
significantly increase sectarian tensQns (ref C). Some
contacts, however, argue that even were such an attack to
occur the Government could control the situation and the
leaders of both communities would act to prevent retaliation.
Some Kuwaitis also express concern that a conflict between
the U.S. and Iran could heighten sectarian tensions here,
particularly if Iran were to retaliate against Kuwait.
However, Dr. Sami Al-Faraj, the Director of the Kuwait Center
for Strategic Studies and a Sunni, told Poloff January 8 that
an Iranian attack on Kuwait, whether direct or indirect,
would "bring Shi'a and Sunnis together against Iran, not the
opposite." Over the long term, relations could deteriorate
iQconservative leaders from both communities continue to use
the "sectarian card" to achieve short-term political gains.

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