CENTCOM TEAM ASSESSES SECURITY OF CRITICAL ENERGY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 000177

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

NSC FOR JESSEE; DOE FOR KOLEVAR; STATE FOR PM/PPA, S/CT,
NEA/ARP, EB/ESC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2017
TAGS: EPET PTER ASEC KU OIL SECTOR
SUBJECT: CENTCOM TEAM ASSESSES SECURITY OF CRITICAL ENERGY
INFRASTRUCTURE

REF: KUWAIT 00150

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4 (b, d, g)


1. (C/NF) Summary: At the invitation of Kuwait National
Petroleum Company (KNPC),the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation
subsidiary responsible for all downstream oil operations, the
U.S. Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) facilitated
a CENTCOM-led multi-disciplinary vulnerability assessment of
the area in and around Kuwait's refineries and export
terminals in the Shuaiba-Ahmadi industrial zone from 1-4
February. (Comment: CENTCOM has significant assets and
personnel located in the port area, and any industrial or
terrorist incident at the refineries or port would directly
impact DOD forces in the surrounding area. End comment.)
The CENTCOM (CCJ3) team's preliminary findings indicate that
while Kuwait has made noteworthy improvements in the security
of its critical energy infrastructure, there are still
significant areas of concern that need to be addressed. The
assessment team noted recent improvements implemented by KNPC
including: construction of robust three-layer perimeter
fencing, installation of a comprehensive CCTV system,
utilization of thorough employee background checks, and
development of comprehensive emergency response plans.


2. (C/NF) Remaining deficiencies include: lack of
explosive detection equipment at gates, no armed quick
reaction force on site, inadequate employee access control
systems, insufficient detection and interdiction capability
in the maritime security zone, inadequate protection for
offshore facilities, and a lack of unified command. (Note:
Security responsibilities are divided between Interior
Ministry and KNPC security personnel who each report through
distinct chains of command. End note.) The team briefed its
preliminary findings to KNPC Deputy Managing Director Hussain
Ismail, his security managers, and his private security
consultant, after providing a separate brief to Embassy
personnel. Ismail was deeply engaged in the discussion of
the team's findings. He recognized that more work needs to
be done and seemed to take the team's major recommendations
on board, although he noted that some recommendations, such
as arming his private security personnel, were beyond his
area of control. Ismail requested a copy of the team's final
report, which should be completed by mid-March. End summary.

CENTCOM Invited to Assess Security of Refineries, Terminals
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3. (C/NF) A team from CENTCOM's Joint Security Office
Forward (CCJ3) was scheduled to visit Kuwait for a regular
country-wide force protection assessment in early February to
include the area around Shuaiba Navy Base (the U.S. sea port
of debarkation). Global Village Strategies Executive
Director John Bodinnar, the primary security consultant to
the Kuwait oil companies, persuaded Hussain Ismail, Deputy
Managing Director of KNPC, to request through Post NCIS
Resident Agency that the CENTCOM team also assess the
security in and around Kuwait's refineries and export
terminals in the Shuaiba-Ahmadi industrial zone. This zone
contains all three of Kuwait's refineries as well as its
primary export terminals for both crude and refined products.
Kuwait produces about 915,000 bpd of refined products
(750,000 bpd for export) and approximately 2.5 million bpd of
crude (1.7 million bpd for export). Bodinnar explained that
he hoped to use the CENTCOM assessment as leverage to
reinforce his security recommendations to KNPC. Since any
major incident at the refinery and/or export terminals would
likely have a direct impact on DOD forces and facilities at
Shuaiba Navy Base, CENTCOM agreed to conduct the assessment.
(Note: Because the request for this assessment went from KNPC
through its consultant to DOD, Kuwait Petroleum Corporation
Security Manager Ali Al-Obaid was not directly involved in
the assessment or the outbrief.)


4. (C/NF) The areas assessed by the 18-person CENTCOM team
from 1-4 February included: physical security,
communications and sensors, infrastructure and logistics,
safety and hazardous materials, medical response, plans and
training, and construction of facilities. The team noted a
number of recent improvements implemented by KNPC including:
construction of robust three-layer perimeter fencing,
installation of a comprehensive CCTV system, utilization of
thorough employee background checks, and development of
comprehensive emergency response plans. The team also noted
that KNPC was taking initial steps to create a more robust

KUWAIT 00000177 002 OF 002


maritime security force to complement the limited coverage
currently provided by the Kuwait Coast Guard.

Several Vulnerabilities Identified, Recommendations Made
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5. (C/NF) The team highlighted the following areas of
concern:
- No explosive detection measures employed at vehicle entry
gates
- No armed quick reaction force on site (By regulation, only
Ministry of Interior (MOI) personnel can be armed. Armed MOI
personnel are currently responsible for perimeter security,
but unarmed private security personnel cover security within
the facilities. In responding to any major security incident
inside the perimeter, KNPC security would have to call MOI
and wait for them to arrive on the scene.)
- Inadequate employee area access control (Once inside the
perimeter, all employees have unfettered access to all areas.)
- No designation of critical assets within the facilities
- Inadequate vehicle standoff around vital assets
- Not enough personnel trained in first aid
- No chemical/biological drills conducted since 2003
- Access badges easy to duplicate/counterfeit
- Only four boats to cover a maritime exclusion zone of 120
sq. miles
- No armed guards on sea isles and loading piers
- Limited capability to detect and interdict small boats and
other waterborne threats
- Divided security responsibilities, poor integration, and
separate chains of command and communication between KNPC and
MOI


6. (C/NF) The key recommendations were to:
- Expand the internal security force to include perimeter and
access control and give it lethal force capability
- Station armed personnel at sea isles and piers
- Identify and restrict access to critical areas
- Increase the number and frequency of maritime patrols
- Construct barrier systems to protect exposed pipelines
- Employ more trained medical personnel

Kuwait Petroleum Receptive, Eager for Final Report
-------------- --------------


7. (C/NF) At the KNPC outbrief on 4 February, Hussain
Ismail thanked the team for its work and engaged in active
discussion with both the team leader and team members about
specific points. He demonstrated awareness of many of the
deficiencies identified and seemed eager to take most of the
recommendations on board. Ismail noted, however, that he has
little control over the Ministry of Interior, and that there
was nothing he could do about arming KNPC security personnel
without authorization from the MOI. Ismail pointedly asked
the team leader if he thought that the waterside and offshore
facilities were the most critical area of vulnerability. The
team leader acknowledged this, but suggested that the sonar
system KNPC was considering would be ineffective due to water
depth and salinity. He said that KNPC should focus on
combating the threat from small boats rather than the threat
from swimmers. Ismail seemed surprised at the recommendation
that the two security forces be merged, believing that one
should serve as a deterrent and the other should respond to
incidents, but he accepted the team's arguments regarding the
importance of unified command and control. Ismail said he
looked forward to reading the team's final report in detail.
The team expects to deliver this report to the Embassy in 4-6
weeks. The Embassy will then determine the appropriate
deliverables to KNPC.

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For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s

Visit Kuwait's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/
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TUELLER