Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07KUWAIT1741
2007-12-17 23:35:00
SECRET
Embassy Kuwait
Cable title:
SCENESETTER FOR THE PRESIDENT'S JANUARY 11-12
how-toVZCZCXRO4800 PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK DE RUEHKU #1741/01 3512335 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 172335Z DEC 07 FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0447 INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 1088 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 001741
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
//////// C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - TEXT ////////
DEPT FOR WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON KCIP OVIP KU IZ IS EAID KPAO
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE PRESIDENT'S JANUARY 11-12
VISIT TO KUWAIT
KUWAIT 00001741 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: CDA Alan Misenheimer for reasons 1.4 b and d
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 001741
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
//////// C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - TEXT ////////
DEPT FOR WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON KCIP OVIP KU IZ IS EAID KPAO
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE PRESIDENT'S JANUARY 11-12
VISIT TO KUWAIT
KUWAIT 00001741 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: CDA Alan Misenheimer for reasons 1.4 b and d
1. (C) Mr. President, your January 11-12 visit to Kuwait
offers a timely opportunity to acknowledge the invaluable
cooperation of a key regional ally, and also to press the
Government of Kuwait (GOK) to do more on issues of vital
interest to the United States - especially Iraq and
counterterrorism. The Amir has repeatedly expressed to
us his appreciation for the First Lady's visit in October.
He will extend the utmost hospitality to you, including
the personal touch of hosting you in his home for a meal
following your official meeting. From the Kuwaiti public
as well, your arrival will evoke an outpouring of the
pro-U.S. sentiment that has remained strong here since
the U.S.-led liberation in 1991. That goodwill, derived
from a shared past, will be an important asset as you
drive home the need for stronger GOK performance to help
assure a better future for the region.
--------------
Domestic Malaise Overshadows Policy Decisions
--------------
2. (C) Despite record oil revenues and political
stability (women vote, Kuwait has had a functioning
constitutional democracy for more than 40 years, and
the ruling Sabah family has been in charge for more
than two centuries),the domestic political scene is
dispirited and dysfunctional. The Amir remains
well-regarded and faces no opposition; but the
Sabahs have lost the political initiative, and
querulous MPs smear cabinet ministers with impunity
while neglecting a large docket of urgently needed
legislation - including key counterterrorism measures,
tax reform, a new labor law and intellectual property
protection.
3. (C) This slow-rolling domestic "crisis" will not
destabilize the country; but it does make the Amir
all the more hesitant to take decisions - e.g.
attending Annapolis, or sending the first Arab
ambassador to Baghdad - that might draw parliamentary
criticism. The Amir has the power to dissolve
parliament and call new elections, and last week he
told Tony Blair "don't be surprised if I do it."
He may act during the three weeks between the
December 19-20 eid al-adha holiday and your arrival;
but it is more likely that Kuwait's internal malaise
will fester awhile longer before he decides the
time is right.
-------------- --------------
Iraq: GOK Backing Indispensable, But Much More Needed
-------------- --------------
4. (S) Admiral Fallon has described Kuwaiti support
for Operation Iraqi Freedom - including access to
airspace and ground bases, discounted fuel, and use
of airports and seaports to move materiel and
personnel in and out of Iraq - as "indispensable."
The estimated annual value of Kuwait's contributions
exceeds a billion dollars. During 2007 the GOK has
hosted visits from VP al-Hashemi, PM al-Maliki and
President Talabani. Nevertheless, the overriding
theme of GOK economic and political support for Iraq
is timidity. Despite naming retired General Ali
al-Moumin as its Ambassador-designate to Baghdad in
2004, the GOK continues to resist our urging to send
him to post. Similarly, Kuwait has pledged over 575
million dollars in aid, but so far disbursed little;
and despite a few major investments in Iraq's
telecom and banking sectors, the GOK has not
promoted merchant-to-merchant contact and still
bars Iraqi commercial exports from the Kuwaiti market.
The GOK needs an urgent change of course on these
issues. The time will also come to press Kuwait for
relief of Iraq's 11 billion dollars in pre-war debt;
but the need for parliamentary approval makes that
issue extremely tough for the GOK at present.
--------------
GOK Falling Short on CT Cooperation
--------------
5. (S) The Amir is likely to ask you explicitly for
at least two things: reassurance of a long-term U.S.
KUWAIT 00001741 002.2 OF 003
commitment to Kuwait's security, and the return of
the four Kuwaitis still detained in Guantanamo.
On the former, the Amir will hope to hear you affirm
positive statements by Secretary Gates and Admiral
Fallon during their fall 2007 visits. On the latter,
the Amir needs/needs to hear from you that his
government's inconsistent handling of the eight
previously transferred GTMO detainees precludes
further transfers at this time, and that his
government urgently needs to boost its CT
performance across the board.
6. (S) Despite the dramatic disclosure in early
2005 of domestic plotting by the "Peninsula Lions"
terrorist cell, the GOK has taken few steps to
strengthen counterterrorism cooperation with us.
It urgently needs to do so, particularly in the
areas of intelligence sharing, oversight of
Islamic charities, and the monitoring of
previously transferred Guantanamo detainees
(several of whom have traveled outside Kuwait
and are re-engaged in supporting terror).
Through financing, recruiting, and propaganda,
a small number of Kuwaiti nationals play a
significant role in facilitating al-Qaeda
operations in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq.
The leadership nevertheless continues to
indulge a reflexive preference for cooptation
and appeasement of local extremists and
terrorist facilitators in order to mute
domestic opinion.
7. (C) The GOK also needs to push ahead with
a long-delayed comprehensive terror finance
law and a law criminalizing affiliation with,
or support of, terrorist groups. Kuwait's
oil infrastructure represents an attractive
and relatively soft target for terrorists;
but the GOK, even after receiving
vulnerability assessments and technical
recommendations from us, has been slow to
embrace a U.S. offer of formal cooperation.
On a positive note, the GOK has launched a
somewhat promising Islamic Moderation
Initiative designed to discourage
extremism through standardized training
for imams and Islamic Studies teachers.
--------------
Treading Lightly on Iran
--------------
8. (S) On Iran, Kuwaiti leaders are
conflicted: they distrust Khamenei,
Ahmadi-Nejad and co., but also fear the
consequences of regional conflict. In
fact, the Defense Minister has launched
his own preemptive strike, publicly
stating several times that the GOK will
not allow an attack against Iran to be
launched from Kuwait. The Amir is
likely to express to you his anxiety
over the risk of fallout from Busheir,
only 90 miles from Kuwait City, and
seek your views on the NIE. Trade and
investment between Iran and Kuwait are
small. You should urge the Kuwaitis
to support international sanctions,
refrain from commercial ventures with
Iran, and to put the Iranian regime on
notice that its involvement in Iraq,
Syria, Lebanon and the Palestinian
Territories is unacceptable.
--------------
Supporting Middle East Peace
--------------
9. (S) The Kuwaiti leadership has
consistently supported regional peace
efforts, mainly through financial
support to the Palestinian Authority
(lingering ill will over Palestinian
support for Saddam's 1990 invasion
notwithstanding). The Amir and his
government remain unwilling to play
KUWAIT 00001741 003.2 OF 003
a more active role or meet with
Israelis, however, and the decision
to skip Annapolis put them on an
embarrassing regional short-list
with Libya and Iran. A 300 million
dollar pledge in Paris appears to
reflect a return to the GOK's
traditional approach: a willingness
to get out the checkbook when we ask,
but not necessarily to write the
check we sought. The Amir will be
keen for a briefing on your vision
for the way ahead, but not keen to
take on a bigger role.
--------------
Sustaining Friendship
--------------
10. (SBU) Your visit can have a
powerful impact in helping to
strengthen Kuwait's pro-Americanism
within the generation born since 1991.
There are favorable trends. Embassy
Kuwait handled 26,000 visa cases
this year, surpassing pre-9/11
levels for the first time. There
are currently over 2000 Kuwaitis
studying in the United States, an
all-time high and a 20 percent
increase over last year. Public
encouragement for Kuwaiti students
to pursue higher education in the
United States will go far toward
sustaining the current bilateral
friendship for years to come.
********************************************* *
For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s
Visit Kuwait's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/
********************************************* *
MISENHEIMER
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
//////// C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - TEXT ////////
DEPT FOR WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON KCIP OVIP KU IZ IS EAID KPAO
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE PRESIDENT'S JANUARY 11-12
VISIT TO KUWAIT
KUWAIT 00001741 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: CDA Alan Misenheimer for reasons 1.4 b and d
1. (C) Mr. President, your January 11-12 visit to Kuwait
offers a timely opportunity to acknowledge the invaluable
cooperation of a key regional ally, and also to press the
Government of Kuwait (GOK) to do more on issues of vital
interest to the United States - especially Iraq and
counterterrorism. The Amir has repeatedly expressed to
us his appreciation for the First Lady's visit in October.
He will extend the utmost hospitality to you, including
the personal touch of hosting you in his home for a meal
following your official meeting. From the Kuwaiti public
as well, your arrival will evoke an outpouring of the
pro-U.S. sentiment that has remained strong here since
the U.S.-led liberation in 1991. That goodwill, derived
from a shared past, will be an important asset as you
drive home the need for stronger GOK performance to help
assure a better future for the region.
--------------
Domestic Malaise Overshadows Policy Decisions
--------------
2. (C) Despite record oil revenues and political
stability (women vote, Kuwait has had a functioning
constitutional democracy for more than 40 years, and
the ruling Sabah family has been in charge for more
than two centuries),the domestic political scene is
dispirited and dysfunctional. The Amir remains
well-regarded and faces no opposition; but the
Sabahs have lost the political initiative, and
querulous MPs smear cabinet ministers with impunity
while neglecting a large docket of urgently needed
legislation - including key counterterrorism measures,
tax reform, a new labor law and intellectual property
protection.
3. (C) This slow-rolling domestic "crisis" will not
destabilize the country; but it does make the Amir
all the more hesitant to take decisions - e.g.
attending Annapolis, or sending the first Arab
ambassador to Baghdad - that might draw parliamentary
criticism. The Amir has the power to dissolve
parliament and call new elections, and last week he
told Tony Blair "don't be surprised if I do it."
He may act during the three weeks between the
December 19-20 eid al-adha holiday and your arrival;
but it is more likely that Kuwait's internal malaise
will fester awhile longer before he decides the
time is right.
-------------- --------------
Iraq: GOK Backing Indispensable, But Much More Needed
-------------- --------------
4. (S) Admiral Fallon has described Kuwaiti support
for Operation Iraqi Freedom - including access to
airspace and ground bases, discounted fuel, and use
of airports and seaports to move materiel and
personnel in and out of Iraq - as "indispensable."
The estimated annual value of Kuwait's contributions
exceeds a billion dollars. During 2007 the GOK has
hosted visits from VP al-Hashemi, PM al-Maliki and
President Talabani. Nevertheless, the overriding
theme of GOK economic and political support for Iraq
is timidity. Despite naming retired General Ali
al-Moumin as its Ambassador-designate to Baghdad in
2004, the GOK continues to resist our urging to send
him to post. Similarly, Kuwait has pledged over 575
million dollars in aid, but so far disbursed little;
and despite a few major investments in Iraq's
telecom and banking sectors, the GOK has not
promoted merchant-to-merchant contact and still
bars Iraqi commercial exports from the Kuwaiti market.
The GOK needs an urgent change of course on these
issues. The time will also come to press Kuwait for
relief of Iraq's 11 billion dollars in pre-war debt;
but the need for parliamentary approval makes that
issue extremely tough for the GOK at present.
--------------
GOK Falling Short on CT Cooperation
--------------
5. (S) The Amir is likely to ask you explicitly for
at least two things: reassurance of a long-term U.S.
KUWAIT 00001741 002.2 OF 003
commitment to Kuwait's security, and the return of
the four Kuwaitis still detained in Guantanamo.
On the former, the Amir will hope to hear you affirm
positive statements by Secretary Gates and Admiral
Fallon during their fall 2007 visits. On the latter,
the Amir needs/needs to hear from you that his
government's inconsistent handling of the eight
previously transferred GTMO detainees precludes
further transfers at this time, and that his
government urgently needs to boost its CT
performance across the board.
6. (S) Despite the dramatic disclosure in early
2005 of domestic plotting by the "Peninsula Lions"
terrorist cell, the GOK has taken few steps to
strengthen counterterrorism cooperation with us.
It urgently needs to do so, particularly in the
areas of intelligence sharing, oversight of
Islamic charities, and the monitoring of
previously transferred Guantanamo detainees
(several of whom have traveled outside Kuwait
and are re-engaged in supporting terror).
Through financing, recruiting, and propaganda,
a small number of Kuwaiti nationals play a
significant role in facilitating al-Qaeda
operations in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq.
The leadership nevertheless continues to
indulge a reflexive preference for cooptation
and appeasement of local extremists and
terrorist facilitators in order to mute
domestic opinion.
7. (C) The GOK also needs to push ahead with
a long-delayed comprehensive terror finance
law and a law criminalizing affiliation with,
or support of, terrorist groups. Kuwait's
oil infrastructure represents an attractive
and relatively soft target for terrorists;
but the GOK, even after receiving
vulnerability assessments and technical
recommendations from us, has been slow to
embrace a U.S. offer of formal cooperation.
On a positive note, the GOK has launched a
somewhat promising Islamic Moderation
Initiative designed to discourage
extremism through standardized training
for imams and Islamic Studies teachers.
--------------
Treading Lightly on Iran
--------------
8. (S) On Iran, Kuwaiti leaders are
conflicted: they distrust Khamenei,
Ahmadi-Nejad and co., but also fear the
consequences of regional conflict. In
fact, the Defense Minister has launched
his own preemptive strike, publicly
stating several times that the GOK will
not allow an attack against Iran to be
launched from Kuwait. The Amir is
likely to express to you his anxiety
over the risk of fallout from Busheir,
only 90 miles from Kuwait City, and
seek your views on the NIE. Trade and
investment between Iran and Kuwait are
small. You should urge the Kuwaitis
to support international sanctions,
refrain from commercial ventures with
Iran, and to put the Iranian regime on
notice that its involvement in Iraq,
Syria, Lebanon and the Palestinian
Territories is unacceptable.
--------------
Supporting Middle East Peace
--------------
9. (S) The Kuwaiti leadership has
consistently supported regional peace
efforts, mainly through financial
support to the Palestinian Authority
(lingering ill will over Palestinian
support for Saddam's 1990 invasion
notwithstanding). The Amir and his
government remain unwilling to play
KUWAIT 00001741 003.2 OF 003
a more active role or meet with
Israelis, however, and the decision
to skip Annapolis put them on an
embarrassing regional short-list
with Libya and Iran. A 300 million
dollar pledge in Paris appears to
reflect a return to the GOK's
traditional approach: a willingness
to get out the checkbook when we ask,
but not necessarily to write the
check we sought. The Amir will be
keen for a briefing on your vision
for the way ahead, but not keen to
take on a bigger role.
--------------
Sustaining Friendship
--------------
10. (SBU) Your visit can have a
powerful impact in helping to
strengthen Kuwait's pro-Americanism
within the generation born since 1991.
There are favorable trends. Embassy
Kuwait handled 26,000 visa cases
this year, surpassing pre-9/11
levels for the first time. There
are currently over 2000 Kuwaitis
studying in the United States, an
all-time high and a 20 percent
increase over last year. Public
encouragement for Kuwaiti students
to pursue higher education in the
United States will go far toward
sustaining the current bilateral
friendship for years to come.
********************************************* *
For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s
Visit Kuwait's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/
********************************************* *
MISENHEIMER