READOUT OF IRAN FM MOTTAKI VISIT TO KUWAIT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 001707

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/ARP, EB AND INR/I
ENERGY FOR MOLLY WILLIAMSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2017
TAGS: PREL EPET PBTS PINR KU KUWAIT IRAN RELATIONS
SUBJECT: READOUT OF IRAN FM MOTTAKI VISIT TO KUWAIT

REF: A. STATE 160447

B. KUWAIT 1697

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES ALAN G. MISENHEIMER FOR REASONS 1.4 (B
) AND (D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: On November 25, Iranian Foreign Minister
Manouchehr Mottaki visited Kuwait as part of his tour of
Arabian Gulf States. According to the Kuwaiti media, FM
Mottaki discussed the Kuwait-Iran maritime border, bilateral
energy issues, foreign relations, Iraq and the Iranian
nuclear program with his Kuwaiti counterparts. MFA officials
indicate that another motive for his visit was to repair
strained relations with Kuwait following an assault on a
Kuwaiti diplomat in Tehran on June 20, 2007. The MFA
reiterated to Poloff Kuwait's opposition to a both a
nuclear-armed Iran and a pre-emptive American military
strike, and noted that Kuwait remains committed to a
diplomatic solution. (Note: Poloff's discussions took place
before the release of the NIE announcement. Post will report
separately on Kuwait's reaction to the NIE. End Note) END
SUMMARY.

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PUBLIC FOCUS ON OIL, GAS AND TRADE
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2. (C) According to the Kuwaiti media, Iranian FM Mottaki
focused on resolving a decades-old maritime border dispute
with Kuwait during his visit on November 25. The dispute
originated in the 1960s when Iran and Kuwait awarded
overlapping concessions in the northern part of the offshore
Dorra gas field (known in Iran as Arash) to both the
Anglo-Iranian Petroleum Company (precursor of BP) and Royal
Dutch Shell. Recoverable gas reserves in the Dorra field
(approximately 70 km east of Kuwait's southern border) are
estimated at seven billion cubic feet. FM Mottaki stated to
the press that Iran hoped to have a finalized border
demarcation by the end of the year.


3. (C) Mottaki also reportedly discussed revitalizing a
non-binding energy MOU signed between the two countries in

2005. According to the deal, Iran would construct an
undersea pipeline and provide 300 million cubic feet of
natural gas per day to Kuwait over a period of 25 years. The
MOU had called for gas delivery to begin in 2007 but there
has been no movement toward contract-signing and no
indication that any serious pipeline construction plans are
underway. (Note: The Kuwaitis have repeatedly told Emboffs
that they do not consider Iran to be a reliable supplier.
Kuwait is actively pursuing plans to import LNG from Qatar
instead. End Note.)


4. (U) According to press reports, FM Mottaki highlighted his
country's close bilateral relationship with Kuwait and
thanked the Government of Kuwait (GOK) for supporting a
proposed Free Trade Agreement between Iran and its Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) neighbors. The media also reported
that Mottaki discussed an upcoming Kuwaiti-Iranian high
committee meeting, to be held in January 2008, with Kuwaiti
FM Shaykh Mohammed Sabah Al-Salem Al Sabah.


5. (U) On the subject of Iraq, FM Mottaki said that, "Iran
and Kuwait are important neighbors to Iraq, and they are keen
on preserving the security and stability of the region," and
that, "lack of security in Iraq harms Iran and Kuwait more
than others." Concerning the Iranian nuclear program, FM
Mottaki claimed that Iran had recently taken "transparent
steps over its nuclear activities," particularly concerning
the P-1 and P-2 centrifuge file, which he anticipated would
result in a favorable interim report by the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

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DIPLOMATIC FOCUS ON BILATERAL TENSIONS
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6. (C) On November 28, Poloff met with Rashed Al-Hajiri,
First Secretary with the MFA's Asia Bureau, concerning
Mottaki's visit. Al-Hajiri noted that Kuwaiti FM Mohammed Al
Sabah had spoken to Mottaki on the margins of the UN General
Assembly in September and specifically requested that Mottaki
visit Kuwait. Al-Hajiri said that relations between the two
countries have been strained since the assault on Kuwaiti
diplomat Mohammed Al-Zo'bi in Tehran on June 20, 2007. The
assault prompted outrage in the Kuwaiti media and among the
GOK leadership, which drew down its Tehran embassy staff in

KUWAIT 00001707 002 OF 003


response. FM Mohammed Al Sabah stated at the time that the
assault was tantamount to "aggression on Kuwait,
international law and Islamic values." Immediately after the
incident, MFA Undersecretary Khalid Suliman Al-Jarallah
summoned Iranian Ambassador Ali Jannati and handed him an
official memo of protest along with a demand for the results
of an Iranian investigation into the assault. Subsequent
Iranian threats to retaliate against any countries harboring
U.S. forces in the event of an American strike against Iran
have further dampened relations between the two countries.


7. (C) When asked about the reason for the assault, Al-Hajiri
speculated that the Iranian leadership may have ordered it as
a way of demonstrating its displeasure with Kuwait's strong
support for the USG. Al-Hajiri noted that the primary
purpose of Mottaki's visit was to seek a return to normal,
"cordial" diplomatic relations between Iran and Kuwait. He
said that the Minister's visit was successful in overcoming
this incident and restoring a "clear and transparent nature"
to bilateral relations.


8. (C) Al-Hajiri continued that Iran was a very important
country in the region, and that Kuwait views strong bilateral
relations with Iran as essential to its national interests.
According to Al-Hajiri, Kuwait believes that Iran should
focus on improving its domestic economy, further integrate
itself economically with its GCC neighbors and increase its
cooperation with the international community in general.


9. (C) Concerning Iran's nuclear program, Al-Hajiri said that
Kuwait supports Iran's right to develop nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes only, but that Kuwait is "totally against"
an Iranian nuclear weapons program. He said that GOK
interlocutors had expressed to Mottaki their fears concerning
Iran's nuclear program and asked the Government of Iran (GOI)
to cooperate with the IAEA and the international community on
this issue. The GOK's position is that escalation is not in
the region's interest, and a military confrontation with the
United States can only have negative consequences for the
entire region. Al-Hajiri said that Mottaki had assured his
GOK interlocutors that the Iranian nuclear program was
strictly peaceful.

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VIEW FROM THE GULF MONITORING GROUP
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10. (C) On November 29, Poloff met with Dr. Saad bin Tefla,
the former Kuwaiti Minister of Information and currently head
of the Gulf Monitoring Group, a Kuwaiti think tank dedicated
to local and regional issues. Poloff queried bin Tefla on
the objectives of FM Mottaki's visit and its overall degree
of success. Bin Tefla said that the visit served to
normalize relations with Kuwait in light of the assault
incident in Tehran. He noted that this rapprochement was
successful, and that FM Mottaki was also successful in
re-invigorating the long-standing maritime border dispute
with Kuwait.


11. (C) On Iran, bin Tefla said that the Gulf countries are
feeling increasingly apprehensive about Iran's growing
influence in the region and the possibility of a military
conflict between Iran and the United States. He noted that
the collapse of the Soviet Union, the demise of the Taliban
in Afghanistan and the elimination of Saddam Hussein's regime
in Iraq had given Iran a freer hand in the region. He
speculated that Iran's ultimate objectives are greater
regional and global influence, to be exercised by both itself
and via its regional proxies.


12. (C) Nevertheless, he said that Iran is feeling the
effects of increased international pressure concerning its
nuclear program and is now especially concerned that Russia
has apparently shifted its position on this issue. He
attributed Russia's change of heart to "weariness" of being
kept in the dark about Iran's nuclear program and
reservations about multiple states along its southern border
possessing nuclear weapons. He added that Russia had "no
more influence" over the GOI, and that the Russians are wary
of the GOI's ideology.


13. (C) Regarding the upcoming parliamentary elections in
Iran (Ref A),bin Tefla said he expected the hard-liners to
make further gains due to Iran's economy. Record oil prices
and several years of good agricultural harvests have
increased overall prosperity in Iran, according to bin Tefla,
which contrasts sharply with the leaner times under President

KUWAIT 00001707 003 OF 003


Khatami and his reform party. He noted that the Iranian
Council for the Protection of the Regime and the Guardians
Council vet parliamentary candidates in advance, and that
those whom the GOI supports receive funding via the 20% Shi'a
Islamic tax collected by government-approved religious
institutions.



14. (C) Concerning the GCC, bin Tefla noted that the Gulf
countries share apprehension about Iran's growing regional
influence and its potential for developing nuclear weapons.
He said that these countries share the opinion that a
military conflict would be disastrous for the region, and
that the most appropriate long-term strategy for dealing with
Iran is regime change. To this end, he anticipated increased
outreach from GCC countries to the USG to advocate for this
strategy. He observed, though, that the GCC is split in its
approach to Iran, and that the current GCC summit in Qatar
would help to clarify the various positions of the GCC
countries vis-a-vis Iran.

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COMMENT
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15. (C) This cable reflects meetings and exchanges with
Kuwaiti officials prior to the December 4 release of the NIE,
which is having a significant impact on GOK, and broader
Kuwaiti public, thinking on Iran. Post will report
separately on discussion of Mottaki's visit in pending
meetings with senior GOK officials, and on the impact of the
NIE in Kuwait. END COMMENT.

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For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s

Visit Kuwait's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/
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MISENHEIMER