Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07KUWAIT1022
2007-06-30 12:19:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Kuwait
Cable title:  

BLUE LANTERN: UPDATE ON POSSIBLE TRANSFER OF

Tags:  ETTC KOMC KU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0002
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKU #1022 1811219
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 301219Z JUN 07
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9490
INFO RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T KUWAIT 001022 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR PM/DTCC BLUE LANTERN COORDINATOR, NEA/ARP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/26/2017
TAGS: ETTC KOMC KU
SUBJECT: BLUE LANTERN: UPDATE ON POSSIBLE TRANSFER OF
U.S.-ORIGIN TECHNOLOGY FROM KUWAIT TO CHINA

REF: A. KUWAIT 577

B. STATE 1607

Classified By: A/DCM Tim Lenderking for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T KUWAIT 001022

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR PM/DTCC BLUE LANTERN COORDINATOR, NEA/ARP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/26/2017
TAGS: ETTC KOMC KU
SUBJECT: BLUE LANTERN: UPDATE ON POSSIBLE TRANSFER OF
U.S.-ORIGIN TECHNOLOGY FROM KUWAIT TO CHINA

REF: A. KUWAIT 577

B. STATE 1607

Classified By: A/DCM Tim Lenderking for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S/NF) Following up on April 18 assurances from the
Ministry of Defense (MOD) to investigate the case of a
possible release of sensitive U.S.-origin Advanced Tactical
Communications System (ATCS) technology to Chinese company
Norinco (reftels),Econoff met again with Assistant Director
of Foreign Military Sales Colonel Haider Abdullatif on June

25. Col. Haider explained that the MOD had concluded its
investigation and determined that no ATCS documentation or
technology was transferred to Norinco by the MOD or by KDL
(Kuwait Dynamics Limited),the contractor responsible for
connecting the ATCS to the Norinco PLZ-45 artillery system.
He said KDL only participated in the installation of
electrical connections and peripherals and was not
responsible for actual integration of the ATCS with the
PLZ-45. Col. Haider assured Econoff that the MOD takes
licensing and defense technology transfer issues seriously
and would never deliver any sensitive documentation or
information to unauthorized parties.


2. (S/NF) On June 26, Post received a diplomatic note from
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated June 18, which stated:
(quote) We would like to affirm that the Ministry of Defense
did not provide or deliver any information or documents to
any other parties related to this subject. (unquote) Enclosed
was a letter dated May 27 from ITT Corporation's Kuwait
Country Manager to the MOD which states:

- ITT is fully aware of the business relationships between
Norinco and KDL for the Chinese Gun Program. This includes
the prime contractor role that KDL has for the two battalions
of 105mm howitzers that are to be deployed for KMOD
- ITT had asked KDL to fill out the appropriate TAA
(technical assistance agreement) paperwork over two years ago
and KDL did not comply, until just recently. Based on the
fact that this recent application occurred after the official
notification of possible TAA violations, ITT will not be
working with KDL in reference to its radio systems.
- After ITT received a complaint from one of the USA agencies
concerning the situation of possible TAA violations, ITT
informed KMOD both verbally and in writing.
- ITT wants to stress the importance of KMOD implementing the
appropriate radio handling procedures as were discussed at
the above-stated meeting so that this TAA situation will
never happen again.
- ITT stands ready to assist KMOD in any manner to make this
TAA work out successfully in the near term.

********************************************* *
For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s

Visit Kuwait's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/
********************************************* *

LeBaron