FIGHTING, NOT TALKING - SOUTH THAI MILITANTS NO LONGER INTERESTED IN DIALOGUE, SAY FORMER MEDIATORS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 KUALA LUMPUR 000447

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP AND DS/ITA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2032
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR MOPS ASEC TH MY
SUBJECT: FIGHTING, NOT TALKING - SOUTH THAI MILITANTS NO LONGER INTERESTED IN DIALOGUE, SAY FORMER MEDIATORS

REF: A. KUALA LUMPUR 263 - MALAYSIA SAFE HAVEN FOR
INSURGENTS

B. KUALA LUMPUR 318 - CONCERNED BUT NOT ALARMED BY
VIOLENCE

KUALA LUMP 00000447 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: Acting Deputy Chief of Mission Mark D. Clark for reasons
1.4 (b and d).

Summary
--------------


1. (S) Southern Thai militants recently asserted they will
pursue more violence and reject talks, according to two
Malaysian mediators from the defunct Mahathir peace process.
The Honorary Thai Consul in Langkawi, Shazryl Eskay Abdullah
(protect throughout),joined by retired head of the Malaysian
Royal Police, Norian Mai (protect throughout),told A/DCM he
met with a group of seven young Thai Malay militant leaders
in late February and they explicitly ruled out dialogue with
the Thai government. Instead, in a hardening of their
position, the insurgents explained their intention to carry
out further violence in pursuit of their goal of secession
under the banner of Pattani Darussalam. Norian, who also
served as Malaysia's internal intelligence chief under
Mahathir, stated the Thai Malay insurgents were better
organized than previously thought. The militants were
benefiting from some Middle East funding, via Singapore and
Malaysia, possibly money solicited under false pretenses or
diverted from humanitarian projects. Eskay, fresh from
meetings with senior Malaysian officials, described a joint
Malaysian-Thailand decision to stand up respective committees
to work on the insurgency issue, with Malaysia's group headed
by retired military intelligence chief Lt. General Wan Abu
Bakar. Eskay and Norian appeared pessimistic the Malaysian
committee would be effective, while noting GOM doubts about
the longevity of the current Thai government. End Summary.

GOM Consults Former Mediators
--------------


2. (S) A/DCM and poloff met in Kuala Lumpur on March 6 with
the Honorary Thai Consul in Langkawi, Shazryl Eskay Abdullah,
and retired head of the Malaysian Royal Police, Norian Mai,
as a follow-up to our initial meeting with Eskay in early
February (ref A) that focused on the southern Thailand
insurgency. Both Malaysians had served as lead mediators in
the now defunct 2004-2006 peace process carried out under
former Prime Minister Mahathir's name. The two men explained
that the Malaysian government had not included them in a
formal way in the GOM's current approach to the southern
Thailand issue because of their association with Mahathir (a
frequent critic of PM Abdullah). Nevertheless, the GOM
consulted them, in particular because of their past
experience and their continued contacts with Thai Malay
militants, as well as old guard leaders. Eskay explained he
had completed two days of consultations in Putrajaya, which
included a March 6 meeting with the deputy chief of the
external intelligence agency, MEIO. Eskay said he was
scheduled to meet MEIO chief Fauzi on March 7.

Insurgents Will Fight for Malay/Muslim State
--------------


3. (S) Eskay and Norian stated that there had been a clear
hardening of position by the southern militants this year.
Eskay explained he had met in late February with a contact
group of seven young militant leaders somewhere along the
Kelantan state border with Thailand (an eighth member of this
group could not travel, while a ninth had been killed in
fighting earlier in February). Eskay carried out the meeting
with the knowledge of the Malaysian government, but without
the participation of Malaysian officials, and recorded the
encounter. In a departure from previous meetings, the young
leaders rejected any possibility of political dialogue.
Instead, they declared they had taken a vow to establish an
independent Muslim Malay state, Pattani Darussalam, and would
continue to carry out violence to achieve their aims. The
militants believed they could not trust Thai authorities and
that in any event the Thai security services and civil
authorities were so fractured that they had no confidence in
those who might sit across the table. Any major, seemingly
positive gestures by Bangkok to reach out to ethnic Malays
likely would be followed by fresh attacks by the militants in
order to destroy any good will. Given their disinterest in
dialogue, the militants might become increasingly difficult
to contact, Eskay stated.


4. (S) Eskay complained that the Thai government had widely
circulated in the Thai Malay communities the February 2006
"Peace Proposal for Southern Thailand" that resulted from the
Mahathir peace process (ref A). Bangkok had not responded to
the proposal. Thai authorities, however, employed this as
part of their psychological operations campaign to undermine
the insurgency with a document that implied a peace deal -
carrying the signatures of the old guard leaders - had been
agreed to, but was being undermined by the militants. This
further hurt Thai government credibility, in Eskay's view.

Militants Better Organized
--------------


5. (S) Norian commented that the militants employed a more
sophisticated organization than most observers realized. The
seven members of Eskay's contact group operated in concert,
but in different areas. Bombers and shooters who carried out
attacks seemed to come from a central pool, relying on local
cells to set up and guard the scenes of the attacks. Brokers
carried out a linkage role by conveying instructions and
money to the cells, with a standard fee schedule in place for
assisting in bombings and drive-by shootings. As if on cue,
women and children quickly gathered to protest arrests of
suspects by Thai authorities. Eskay believed it likely the
southern insurgents would try to destroy targets of more
economic importance in the south, as the militants sought to
create a situation of chaos and dependence upon the
insurgents themselves. Norian added that the violence is
very localized, and not as widespread as some media reports
suggest.

Militants Move Through Kelantan
--------------


6. (S) Eskay described Kelantan state as the primary
Malaysian transit and sanctuary area for southern Thai
militants (ref A). In response to our direct question, Eskay
and Norian said they had not seen indications of foreign
militants in southern Thailand or Kelantan.

Alleged Foreign Funding Takes Another Route
--------------


7. (S) The insurgents did benefit from some foreign funding,
Eskay and Norian noted while also suggesting that at least
some of the funds were collected for humanitarian purposes
and diverted to the insurgents. This funding generally did
not pass through Kelantan but rather through the states of
Perlis and Kedah. Building on remarks from early February
(ref A),Eskay said militants received some money via a
Singapore bank and he promised to supply us with more
information on the bank in subsequent communications. The
money reached southern Thailand through the informal,
traditional banking networks operated by money changers at
the border points of Padang Besar (Perlis) and Bukit Kayu
Hitam (Kedah). Some of the money went to ethnic Malay
political figures in southern Thailand, who then dispersed it
to militants. Eskay named Yala province political leader
Arifin (NFI) as one recipient who used the funding to support
the insurgency. As to the origin of foreign funding, Eskay
said some of the money came from the Middle East in response
to Thai Malay appeals to support humanitarian projects for
fellow Muslims. He pointed out that a number of the
militants had studied or visited the Middle East in past
years. Regarding foreign travel, several old guard leaders
based in Malaysia traveled overseas on Malaysian passports,
he explained.


8. (S) Note: An international journalist told us that Eskay
had informed him of a December 2006 visit to Dubai by old
guard separatists from the Pattani United Liberation
Organization (PULO) and the Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN),
during which they collected Arab donations. In early
February Eskay told us he did not believe the Thai insurgents
had linked up with external terrorist groups. End Note.

Ending Dual Citizenship Threatens Militants
--------------


9. (S) Norian and Eskay noted that a decision by Malaysia
and Thailand to end the practice of dual citizenship (by
employing biometric identification and requiring individuals
to choose one nationality) appeared to threaten the Thai
militants, who were angry at this decision by Malaysia.
Eskay said the GOM had not thought through the consequences
of this approach, which might spark a large influx of
southern Thais into Malaysia because many Thai Malays would
opt to leave for their southern neighbor if forced and able
to choose.

Abdullah in Bangkok Not Offered Mediation Role
-------------- -


10. (S) Norian and Eskay, speaking as private citizens but
coming out of meetings with senior GOM officials, said the
Malaysian government recognized its clear interest in seeing
an end to the violence in southern Thailand. While there
were sympathies for the plight of fellow Malays, secession
was a non-starter. Prime Minister Abdullah's mid-February
meeting in Bangkok, however, did not result in Thailand
offering any mediation role to Malaysia. In private
conversation with Eskay, Deputy Prime Minister Najib insisted
that Malaysia would need something official and in writing
from Thailand in order to engage in any process. Uncertainty
about the durability of the current Thai government factored
into Malaysia's interactions with Bangkok at this stage,
making Malaysians less enthusiastic for working on southern
Thailand issues, outside of border security.

Malaysia and Thailand Stand Up Security/Intel Committees
-------------- --------------


11. (S) On the margins of Abdullah's Bangkok visit, Malaysia
and Thailand did agree to stand up security-focused
committees tasked with examining bilateral approaches to
ending the insurgency, Eskay explained. Lt General (retired)
Wan Abu Bakar, former Chief of Defense Intelligence, headed
the Malaysian side, which included representatives from four
agencies: military intelligence, Police Special Branch, the
external intelligence agency (MEIO),and the National
Security Division of the Prime Minister's Office. General
Vaipot Srinual headed the Thai counterpart committee. Norian
and Eskay said the Malaysia committee had yet to meet and
they were not sure it would become an effective body.

Comment and Biographic Notes
--------------


12. (S) Eskay and Norian do not speak for the Malaysian
government and are "outsiders" to some extent by virtue of
their close association with Mahathir. Nevertheless, they
have significant interaction with Malaysia's most senior
officials dealing with southern Thailand. Their pessimistic
outlook on southern Thailand, and the likelihood the violence
will continue or escalate, tracks with the views of many
Malaysians in and out of government (ref B). Eskay credibly
appears to have met with hundreds of Thai insurgents and
sympathizers since 2004, and claims to have audio and video
recordings of many encounters. Eskay travels frequently to
southern Thailand, while Norian said he rarely crosses the
border. Eskay explained that to maintain the trust of Thai
militants he does not provide their full information (e.g.,
cell phone numbers, exact physical locations of militants) to
the GOM or Thai government.


13. (S) Though describing themselves as part of Mahathir's
inner circle of friends, Eskay and Norian claimed they are
not involved in party politics. They readily admitted to
being wealthy by virtue of their businesses. Eskay said he
sells diesel fuel to China and owns a large ranch in Kedah
state. Eskay and Norian are partners in some ventures,
including a fertilizer plant in southern Thailand. As the
child of a Malay-Thai marriage, Eskay speaks Thai and Malay,
as well as fluent English. He spent some 10 years studying
and working in Oklahoma and Texas, and speaks fondly of the
United States. According to the Royal Malaysian Police
website, Norian Mai served as Police Special Branch chief
from 1994 to 1997, and as Inspector General of Police from
1999 to 2002. We believe Washington possesses substantial
biographic information on Norian.
SHEAR