Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07KUALALUMPUR396
2007-03-02 09:20:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Cable title:  

BURMA: MALAYSIA NOT FOCUSED ON NEXT STEPS

Tags:  PREL PHUM UNSC BM MY 
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DE RUEHKL #0396/01 0610920
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 020920Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8650
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY
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RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 1550
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1003
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KUALA LUMPUR 000396 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

EAP/MLS FOR AARON COPE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2017
TAGS: PREL PHUM UNSC BM MY
SUBJECT: BURMA: MALAYSIA NOT FOCUSED ON NEXT STEPS

REF: A. STATE 20000

B. KUALA LUMPUR 70 - MALAYSIA OPPOSES
INTERNATIONALIZATION

C. KUALA LUMPUR 40 - MALAYSIA HESITANT ON BURMA

Classified By: Political Section Chief Mark D. Clark for reasons 1.4 (b
and d).

Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KUALA LUMPUR 000396

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

EAP/MLS FOR AARON COPE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2017
TAGS: PREL PHUM UNSC BM MY
SUBJECT: BURMA: MALAYSIA NOT FOCUSED ON NEXT STEPS

REF: A. STATE 20000

B. KUALA LUMPUR 70 - MALAYSIA OPPOSES
INTERNATIONALIZATION

C. KUALA LUMPUR 40 - MALAYSIA HESITANT ON BURMA

Classified By: Political Section Chief Mark D. Clark for reasons 1.4 (b
and d).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) Malaysia has "no new initiative" in mind for Burma
and appears unfocused on next steps, according to our
meetings with several Malaysian Foreign Ministry officials
and a prominent government-linked think tank. One official
in charge of UN matters questioned whether Malaysia would
actively support the appointment of a higher-powered special
envoy, believing Burma likely would stonewall such an
approach. Following the Cebu summits in January, Malaysia
did not push for Burma to respond to ASEAN overtures,
according to the senior official in charge of ASEAN affairs.
These conversations suggest Malaysia at this point is more
willing to disengage, rather than consider meaningful next
steps. End Summary.

MFA - Lack of New Thinking
--------------


2. (C) Malaysia has "no new initiative" in mind for Burma,
the Foreign Ministry's Under Secretary for Multilateral
Political Affairs Shahrul Ikram told polchief February 28 in
response to ref A demarche. Shahrul, whose responsibilities
cover Burma from a UN angle (not relative to ASEAN),
qualified this by saying that this did not rule out a new
ASEAN approach, which Shahrul understood Singapore backed,
implying that Malaysia was less interested. Regarding the
appointment of a strong special envoy, Shahrul cautioned that
the Burmese regime would stonewall an envoy seen as too
aggressive in pushing a democracy or a perceived Western
agenda, which would not allow the envoy to carry out his/her
full role. Consequently, Shahrul questioned whether his
government would actively support such a move. (Comment:
Other MFA officials dealing with Burma were unavailable or
unwilling to meet with us over the past two weeks despite
repeated requests. End Comment.)

Not Pressing for Burma's Response
--------------


3. (C) During a January 31 debrief of the Cebu summits

(prior to ref A demarche instructions),the Foreign
Ministry's Director General for ASEAN, Hussein Haniff,
expressed frustration with Burma, but signaled no Malaysian
intention to press the issue. Burma had not done enough in
response to previous ASEAN concerns, Hussein remarked, and
had not given ASEAN any ammunition to use in Burma's defense
against international criticism. He noted that ASEAN did not
want Burma to become a drag on community building and goals
of greater regional integration over the long-term. Hussein
implied that if Burma completed the drafting of its new
constitution and released political prisoners, these two
steps would constitute an "end state" that would satisfy
Malaysia and ASEAN. We reminded Hussein that the majority of
UNSC members voted in favor of the January Burma resolution
and that this issue would continue to generate a great deal
of U.S. and international concern. In response to polchief's
question, Hussein would not specify any actions or time frame
for ASEAN "constructive engagement" on Burma. Hussein
indicated that it was up to Burma to respond to ASEAN's
latest overtures and comments from Cebu, but ASEAN or at
least Malaysia was not pressing for a response.

KUALA LUMP 00000396 002 OF 002



"No Longer a Priority"
--------------


4. (C) Mohamed Jawhar bin Hassan, Chairman of the Institute
of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS, a prominent
government-linked think tank),meeting with polchief March 1,
was pessimistic that ASEAN or the UN could mount any
important new initiative on Burma that could have an impact
at this point. The conditions are not right, said Jawhar,
who serves as an unofficial advisor to the GOM on various
foreign policy issues. At this juncture ASEAN has both
limited leverage and limited interest in working on
democratic change in Burma. ASEAN and UN leverage is limited
by Burma's support from China and India, and if ASEAN pushed
too hard Burma would choose to leave the club. Thailand is
out of the game because of its own difficulties and lack of
democracy after the coup. Some other members, including
Malaysia, would not put much effort into such diplomacy,
particularly if it were couched primarily in terms of
promoting democracy, as their own democratic credentials
could come under scrutiny. "Myanmar is no longer a priority
for ASEAN," Jawhar concluded. At best, ASEAN members could
consistently make Burma "feel uncomfortable and inadequate"
within the grouping, biding time until the regional dynamic
changed.

Comment
--------------


5. (C) Malaysia's disappointment with Burma, as a stain on
ASEAN's reputation, has not translated into an eagerness to
focus on meaningful next steps. Instead, our conversations
suggest that Malaysia is more willing to disengage from the
Burma issue for the time being. The Embassy will continue to
encourage the Malaysian government to support international
and regional efforts to promote positive, democratic change
in Burma.
LAFLEUR