Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07KUALALUMPUR263
2007-02-13 08:13:00
SECRET
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Cable title:  

HONORARY CONSUL NOTES MALAYSIA AS SAFE HAVEN FOR

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER PINR MOPS ASEC TH MY 
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VZCZCXRO5716
PP RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHKL #0263/01 0440813
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 130813Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8502
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2260
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 2323
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 2273
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KUALA LUMPUR 000263 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2027
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR MOPS ASEC TH MY
SUBJECT: HONORARY CONSUL NOTES MALAYSIA AS SAFE HAVEN FOR
THAI INSURGENCY, RELEVANCE OF OLD GUARD

REF: A. 06 KUALA LUMPUR 1764 - NO TEARS FOR THAKSIN

B. 06 KUALA LUMPUR 1976 - SURAYUD'S VISIT

Classified By: Political Section Chief Mark D. Clark for reasons 1.4 (b
and d).

Summary
-------

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KUALA LUMPUR 000263

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2027
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR MOPS ASEC TH MY
SUBJECT: HONORARY CONSUL NOTES MALAYSIA AS SAFE HAVEN FOR
THAI INSURGENCY, RELEVANCE OF OLD GUARD

REF: A. 06 KUALA LUMPUR 1764 - NO TEARS FOR THAKSIN

B. 06 KUALA LUMPUR 1976 - SURAYUD'S VISIT

Classified By: Political Section Chief Mark D. Clark for reasons 1.4 (b
and d).

Summary
--------------


1. (S) The Honorary Thai Consul in Langkawi, Malaysian
businessman Shazryl Eskay Abdullah (protect throughout),
described Thai Malay separatist use of Malaysian territory as
a safe haven and insurgents' views of the conflict during a
February 5 meeting with polchief. Eskay, who was a leading
Malaysian facilitator of the dialogue with Thai insurgents
hosted by former Prime Minister Mahathir, argued that the
older generation insurgency leaders, mostly resident in
Malaysia, remained relevant as they provided needed support
services and safe haven to younger leaders. He identified
only one old guard leader as actively ordering attacks, and
estimated that criminal gangs and Thai security services were
responsible for 70 percent of the recent violence. He said
he did not see links yet between the Thai insurgents and
regional or international terrorists, but recognized the
potential and encouraged the U.S. to keep a close watch. He
also noted, however, that the insurgents received financial
assistance via Singapore from unknown sources. The now-ended
peace initiative by Mahathir produced a ten-page "peace
proposal" signed by old guard leaders, but which failed to
gain much response from Bangkok. Eskay believed that the
February 11-12 visit to Thailand by Prime Minister Abdullah
would result in the Malaysian external intelligence
organization (MEIO) taking up a "facilitation" role in
discussions between Thai intelligence and southern
insurgents, though Eskay was pessimistic as to the prospects.
Eskay shared a 12-page paper on the insurgency and Thai
Malay views, resulting from his interviews with numerous
separatist leaders, which he had submitted to MEIO February


1. End Summary.

Honorary Consul as Mediator with Separatists
-------------- -


2. (S) Polchief called on the Honorary Thai Consul in
Langkawi, Shazryl Eskay Abdullah, on February 5 as part of a
February 5-9 visit to Malaysian states along the border with
Thailand (septel). Eskay, a Malaysian businessman of mixed
Malaysian-Thai parentage, described his significant
"mediator" role in the 2005-2006 dialogue with Thai Malay
insurgents, which featured former Prime Minister Mahathir
Mohamad, and his frequent interaction with separatists on
both sides of the border. Eskay said he carried out his work
on the Thai insurgency largely independent of the Thai and
Malaysian governments, and maintained direct links with most
known Malay separatist leaders resident in Malaysia. To
bolster his credentials, he showed polchief video footage he
had recorded of various meetings with men he described as
elder separatist leaders and younger operators.

Old Guard Not Calling the Shots, but Still Relevant
-------------- --------------


3. (S) Eskay noted that most of the older generation of
Malay separatist leaders lived in Malaysia with the Malaysian
Government's knowledge and acquiescence. The older
generation included those affiliated with the United Pattani
Freedom Front (BERSATU),and the constituent groups the
National Revolutionary Front (BRN-Congress),the Pattani
Mujahiddin Movement (GMP),and the Pattani United Liberation
Organization (PULO). In addition, Eskay confirmed that
younger generation separatists, including those involved in
recent attacks in southern Thailand, frequently entered
Malaysia, particularly when the situation became "too hot"
and they required safe haven. The GOM was not always aware
of the identity and travel of younger separatists. With some
exceptions, the older generation did not direct the actions
of the younger insurgents. However, Eskay argued that the
relevance of the "old guard" should not be underestimated.
The older leaders, with well-established networks in
Malaysia, constituted the support service for the insurgents,
providing shelter and transportation, and arranging jobs,
including in Thai restaurants and on rubber estates. Because
the older generation provided needed safe haven services,

KUALA LUMP 00000263 002 OF 003


they remained influential and relevant to a potential peace
dialogue with Thailand's Malay south. (Comment: Many of our
other interlocutors dismissed the Mahathir-led dialogue
because it focused on the older Malaysia-based separatists
who no longer represent the insurgency on the ground. End
Comment.)

The Murky Business of Violence
--------------


4. (S) Like many other Malaysians we interviewed during our
trip to northern Malaysia, Eskay described the Malay
insurgency as splintered, with operations currently carried
out by very small cells, comprised of two or three persons.
"Brokers" would task the cells with orders and money. Often
times the affiliation of the brokers would not be clear to
the cells, opening the possibility that they represented
other parties, but cells would carry out "orders" nonetheless
both for monetary gain and for fear that they otherwise would
run afoul of other insurgents. The cell members generally
were technically unsophisticated and the brokers often
provided the improvised explosive devices to be planted and
detonated by the cells. Eskay crudely estimated that Malay
separatists accounted for only 30 percent of attacks in the
south with Thai army, policy and intelligence agency
factions, along with criminal gangs, responsible for the
balance. Eskay relayed that many insurgent leaders believed
deposed Prime Minister Thaksin and Thai Rak Thai party
advisor General Chavalit were funding much of the recent
violence. Insurgent members had denied association with New
Year's Eve bombings in Bangkok. They also disassociated
themselves from many of the attacks on schools. The
fracturing of the separatist movement and use of small cells
added to the complexity and the difficulty in identifying any
leaders for dialogue. Eskay named only one old guard leader,
BRN-Congress Vice President Abdullah bin Idris, as
responsible for ordering some of the ongoing attacks in
southern Thailand.

Safe Passage
--------------


5. (S) In addition to the Mahathir-led dialogue and frequent
informal meetings with Thai separatists, Eskay said he had
arranged meetings between Malaysian intelligence and various
insurgents operating in Thailand, meetings which included an
understanding of safe passage within Malaysia. Even on
Malaysian soil, Thai Malay militants did not feel safe from
possible assassination or kidnapping. On at least one
occasion, a Thai bounty hunter had bribed local Malaysian
police to abduct a separatist who was in Malaysia. Eskay had
intervened to release the target, whom the Malaysian police
officer had locked in trunk of his police car.

No International Terror Links...Yet
--------------


6. (S) Eskay stated that he had seen no evidence the Malay
separatists had linked up with external terrorist groups such
as Al Qaeda or Jemaah Islamiyah. He noted, however, that
some insurgents received funds from a bank in Singapore
(NFI),which passed through money changers in the Malaysian
border town of Padang Besar, Perlis state. Eskay did not
know the origin of the funds. Though there was in his view a
clear potential for a link-up with terrorist groups, Eskay
commented that Malaysian intelligence did not pay adequate
attention to this risk and he encouraged the U.S. to keep a
close watch on developments.

February 2006 "Peace Proposal"
--------------


7. (S) The Mahathir-led dialogue had resulted in a "peace
proposal" in February 2006, signed by old guard leaders of
BERSATU, BRN-Congress, GMP, and PULO, Eskay noted. This had
met with no substantive response from the Thai Government,
but might constitute a good starting point for future
dialogue. Eskay provided us with a copy of the ten-page
document, which demanded Thai Government actions in eight
areas, namely:

-- Improvements in "leadership," through appointment of a
Muslim Affairs Minister and a Muslim affairs coordinating

KUALA LUMP 00000263 003 OF 003


body.

-- Improved government communication and networking with
Malay Muslim communities.

-- Confidence-building measures, including establishing
ethnic Malay quotas for government service and security
forces in the south.

-- Steps to promote investment and economic development.

-- Improvements in the education infrastructure.

-- Amnesty, with individual cases approved by a Board of
Review.

-- Establishment of a tribunal to investigate and try cases
of human rights violations.

-- Establishment of a monitoring committee to ensure
implementation of the above steps.

Malaysian External Intelligence May Take the Lead
-------------- --------------


8. (S) Eskay said the Mahathir initiative was now over, and
the Malaysian Government had made clear that the phase of
"NGO involvement" in dialogue with Thai Malay separatists had
come to an end. The February 11-12 visit to Thailand by
Prime Minister Abdullah likely would confirm a role for the
Malaysian External Intelligence Organization (MEIO) as a
"facilitator" for future informal talks between Malay
separatists and Thai Government intelligence. Eskay
supported a Malaysian Government mediation role, but he was
pessimistic MEIO and its Thai counterparts would make
progress. Instead, Eskay anticipated continued violence.
The Honorary Thai Consul shared a 12-page "confidential"
paper on the insurgency and Thai Malay views, resulting from
his interviews with numerous separatist leaders, which he had
submitted to MEIO February 1. Eskay requested that we not
share the paper and February 2006 "peace proposal" with
others (we have forwarded the documents via classified email
to EAP/MTS and Embassy Bangkok).

Comment
--------------


9. (S) Eskay credibly appeared to have contacts with a large
pool of old guard leaders, insurgents, and sympathizers from
Thailand's Malay south. His views on the insurgency were the
most detailed we heard during five days of travel in northern
Malaysia and tracked well in many respects with information
and opinions from others. His belief in the usefulness of
engaging the old guard, however, contradicted the opinion of
Malaysian politicians, officials and police who generally
dismissed the old timers as irrelevant. Several Malaysians
volunteered they were suspicious of Eskay's contacts with
Malay separatists and alleged Eskay had been involved in
controversial business deals in the past (unrelated to
Thailand). Eskay informed us that he had lived some ten
years in the United States circa the 1980s.
LAFLEUR