CHALLENGES TO MALAYSIA'S STATUS QUO: WINDS OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KUALA LUMPUR 001624

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/MTS AND INR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2017
TAGS: PGOV PINR KDEM KJUS MY
SUBJECT: CHALLENGES TO MALAYSIA'S STATUS QUO: WINDS OF
CHANGE OR JUST A STIFF BREEZE?

REF: A. KUALA LUMPUR 1613 - NOVEMBER 10 DEMONSTRATION


B. KUALA LUMPUR 1458 - LAWYERS TAKE TO STREETS

C. KUALA LUMPUR 1446 - VIDEO OF JUDGE-FIXING

Classified By: Political Section Chief Mark D. Clark for reasons 1.4 (b
and d).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) Subtle as well as more abrupt challenges to
Malaysia's political status quo have emerged over the past
few months, further signifying that times have changed since
Mahathir's era of tight control. The Sultans quietly
reasserted a claim to a measure of constitutional authority,
which they had lost under Mahathir. A respected civil
society organization, the Bar Council, publicly challenged
the Prime Minister Abdullah's government to tackle judicial
corruption and marched several thousand lawyers to Abdullah's
office to make the point. Opposition parties led by Anwar
Ibrahim defied Abdullah's personal warnings on November 10
took to the streets of Kuala Lumpur in tens of thousands to
petition the King over electoral reform. The government's
opposition to, and inability to stop, the two recent protests
have highlighted Abdullah's weakness compared with Mahathir,
as well as dented Abdullah's remaining credentials as a
reformer. Nevertheless, too much can be made of these recent
challenges to the government. The fundamentals of Malaysia's
race-based politics remain intact, with UMNO and the National
Front in possession of almost insurmountable powers of
incumbency. UMNO's internal response to Abdullah's actions
as leader in the face of such direct challenges will be one
important aspect to watch. At this point, Malaysia is
experiencing a stiff breeze, rather than a strong wind
shifting the power structure. End Summary.

Sultans Asserting their Constitutional Authority
-------------- ---


2. (C) Malaysia's nine hereditary sultans, who rotate the
king's crown among them every five years, over the past few
months have quietly reasserted a claim to a measure of
constitutional authority, which they all but lost under
Mahathir's administration. The Constitution calls for the
Prime Minister to consult the sultans, collectively the
Conference of Rulers, on certain government appointments,
including to the judiciary. Mahathir removed the Rulers'
power to veto legislation, removed their immunity,
established a special court to try them for civil and
criminal offences, and effectively turned the Rulers into a
rubber stamp.


3. (C) In August 2007, the Conference reportedly quietly
rejected the nominee proposed by PM Abdullah for the post of
Chief Judge of Malaya, the third highest judicial seat. In
October, the Sultan of Perak, a former Chief Justice, used
his opening address at the Bar Council conference to
criticize the corrupted state of the judiciary. Such open
criticism against the judiciary by a Malay ruler was unheard
of during Mahathir's era. In November, members of the
Conference of Rulers unanimously agreed to appoint Justice
Abdul Hamid as Acting Chief Justice, by some accounts
preempting a government letter addressed to the Conference of
Rulers that would have sought a short-term extension for
former Chief Justice Ahmad Fairuz, who is under a cloud of
criticism for a judge-fixing scandal. The government's
official line was that Fairuz' tenure was never a matter of
discussion with the Rulers. The issue of the Rulers and
judicial appointments has played out behind the scenes, but
nevertheless has become a focus of widespr
ead private discussion among political elites.

Bar Council Brings Protest to PM's Door
--------------


4. (C) In September, the Malaysian Bar Council, a respected
civil society organization, publicly challenged Abdullah's
government by sending several thousand marchers to the PM's
office, a display of public protest by lawyers unprecedented
since 1998. The "Walk for Justice" in the normally staid
administrative capital of Putrajaya demanded a royal
commission of inquiry be established to investigate alleged
judge-fixing documented in a video recording released by
Anwar Ibrahim, and more generally decried the corrupt state
of the judiciary. Nearly 2,000 lawyers participated, despite
senior officials' warnings and police roadblocks stopping

KUALA LUMP 00001624 002 OF 003


buses headed into Putrajaya, and marched without a permit,
ignoring police calls for them to disperse.


5. (C) Senior officials, like de facto Law Minister Nazri
Abdul Aziz, appeared at a loss over how to shut down or react
to the Bar Council protest, given the Council's respected
profile and the fact that it is not an opposition group per
se. As a reflection of the Bar Council's stature, and PM
Abdullah's more conciliatory style compared with Mahathir,
the Prime Minister still deigned to give the keynote address
at the Bar Council's October conference, and used the podium
to chastise the unrepentant Bar Council for its exaggeration
of the nation's problems and for its unseemly tactics of
marching in Putrajaya. The three-day event itself, however,
served to draw more public attention to the Bar Council's
criticism of the courts' lack of integrity.

Opposition Rally Calls PM's Bluff
--------------


6. (C) Major opposition parties, in a coalition together
with some civil society groups under the umbrella group
BERSIH, provided the most direct challenge to National
Coalition authority with their November 10 march to the
national palace. Police rejected a request for a permit on
the basis the assembly threatened law and order, thereby
making the BERSIH demonstration illegal. The Prime Minister
clearly warned organizers against going ahead with the
protest, issuing a personal challenge to the opposition in
front of thousands of delegates at the United Malays National
Organization (UMNO) annual assembly in Kuala Lumpur the
evening before the march. The Inspector General of Police,
influential PM son-in-law Khairy Jamaluddin and senior UMNO
leaders joined in public calls to stop the illegal
demonstration or face arrest.


7. (C) Ironically, many of the UMNO delegates who listened
to Abdullah's stern warning November 9 found themselves
hopelessly snarled in traffic the following day as Anwar
Ibrahim led some 20,000 to 35,000 demonstrators, drawn
foremost from the ranks of the Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS),
to the palace gates. There Anwar, flanked by leaders of the
opposition PAS and Democratic Action Party (DAP),handed over
to a palace official a petition to the King calling for
electoral reform, including fair access to the media.
November 10 constituted the largest political demonstration
in Malaysia since the 1998 street protests over the sacking
and arrest of former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim
(with the possible exception to protests against toll price
hikes in 2000). While the government-dominated mainstream
press played down the demonstration's significance, in
private circles and on-line the UMNO annual assembly, billed
as a pre-election ramp-up event, was completely eclipsed by
discussion of the protest and speculation of the opposition's
next steps.

Comment
--------------


8. (C) Abdullah has faced or allowed challenges to his
authority that his predecessor Mahathir in most of his years
in power would not have tolerated. As a matter of policy,
since assuming leadership some four years ago, Abdullah has
opened more space in the political environment. The
demonstrations over the past few months, and subtle push back
from the Rulers, however, do not represent conscious
political openings by Abdullah and the UMNO elite; they
reflect a government and a leader being jostled by external
forces. Abdullah's leadership profile, which appears
hands-off, low energy, and non-confrontational, all in sharp
contrast to his predecessor, means that the National Front
government is less able to defend the status quo as Mahathir
once did. The Bar Council and BERSIH demonstrations
represent a double cut: the inability of the government to
enforce its will and stop the two recent protests have
highlighted Abdullah's weakness, while the Prime Minister's
personal intervention in opposition to such exercises of
public assembly has further dented his credentials as a
reformer.


9. (C) Nevertheless, too much can be made of these recent
challenges to ruling National Front authority. While several
Sultans may enjoy strong reputations, the Rulers collectively
remain a national institution of marginal power and tenuous
credibility. The recent public demonstrations are not by
themselves a bellwether of widespread grassroots discontent

KUALA LUMP 00001624 003 OF 003


with the establishment. Rather than a spontaneous outpouring
of public protest, November 10 represented a well-planned
partisan political action primarily driven and supported by
the opposition parties, with Islamist PAS the largest
contributor and Anwar Ibrahim taking the billing as de facto
protest leader. November 10 stands as a tactical victory for
the opposition, but not a strategic one.


10. (C) The fundamentals of Malaysia's race-based political
structure remain intact, with the Malays firmly in the center
of gravity, UMNO as the only viable vehicle to bring together
a coalition with the other ethnic groups, and the National
Front in possession of almost insurmountable powers of
incumbency. UMNO's internal response to Abdullah's actions
as leader in the face of such direct challenges will be one
important aspect for us to watch. At this point, Malaysia is
experiencing a stiff breeze rather than a strong wind
shifting the power structure.
KEITH