INDIA'S MAOIST MENACE GROWS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 KOLKATA 000144

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PTER SOCI PHUM ECON IN NP
SUBJECT: INDIA'S MAOIST MENACE GROWS

REF: A) KOLKATA 000109, B) KOLKATA 000074, C) CHENNAI 000083, D)MUMBAI 001286,
E) MUMBAI 001253, F) NEW DELHI 001297, G) 05 NEW DELHI 001274

KOLKATA 00000144 001.2 OF 005



1. (SBU) Summary. Recent large scale attacks by Maoist
insurgents in Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and other states
reflect growing Maoist strength and organization in India.
Mostly operating under the banner of the Communist Party of
India - Maoist (CPI-Maoist),India's Maoists now maintain a
significant presence in approximately 25% of the districts in
nine states extending from the Nepal border in the North to the
state of Karnataka in the South. The common link between
Maoists in the different states remains an ideology of violent
struggle against corrupt local governments unable (or unwilling)
to address fundamental social needs. The distinction between
Maoists as a political movement versus a criminal extortion
rackets is blurred, but they remain a serious security threat.
The GOI has called high-level meetings in response to the recent
surge in Maoist attacks on law enforcement officials and
politicians, but still lacks a clear strategy.


2. (SBU) Summary Continued. While coordination between Nepali
and Indian Maoists has been limited, significant links exist.
Senior Nepali Maoist leaders such as Communist Party of Nepal
(Maoist) (CPNM) Politburo Members Chandra Prakesh Gajurel and
Mohan Baidya and over 200 other CPNM cadres have been arrested
in India. The two organizations have issued joint press
releases expressing mutual solidarity and according to
Kolkata-based Nepali diplomats and law enforcement officials in
Bihar, have shared weapons, some training and support. In
addition, recent attacks along the Indo-Nepal border suggest
increasing spillover from Nepal into India.


3. (SBU) Summary Continued. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has
characterized the Maoist insurgency as India's greatest internal
security threat. The lack of GOI awareness and response should
not be taken as the measure of the threat. Rather, it reflects
the GOI's inability to recognize and address the underlying
social issues that fuel the insurgency. India remains a country
with almost 600 million people living on less than USD 2 a day
and successive Indian governments have failed to take their
concerns into account or devise genuine poverty reduction
programs. Unlike Islamic terrorists, outside forces cannot be
conveniently blamed for the existence of the Maoist terror. End
Summary.


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Background: The Naxalite/Maoist Movement in India
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4. (SBU) In May 1967, Charu Mazumdar, launched an armed
struggle on behalf of landless peasants near the town of
Naxalbari in West Bengal's Darjeeling district, the town's name
gave rise to the term "Naxalite." The Naxalbari uprising
revived a tradition of revolutionary activities going back to
the struggle for independence from British Rule. Naxalites at
the time argued that this revolutionary tradition - for which
Bengal was especially known - had been corrupted by the
revisionist Communist Party of India (CPI) and its offshoot the
Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPM). Mazumdar went on to
engineer a split in the CPM by forming the CPI
(Marxist-Leninist) (CPI-ML) in 1969 (Note: The CPI-ML renounced
violent revolution in 1971 and was recognized by the Election
Commission of India as a legal political party in 1974. CPI-ML
has been active recently in the protests against acquisition of
rural land for industrial development. However, CPI-ML still
retains ties to Naxalite cadres. In some ways the relationship
between the CPI-ML and the Naxalites parallels that between the
Irish Republican Army and the Sinn Fein political party in
Northern Ireland. End Note.)


5. (SBU) The Naxalite movement was crushed in the early 1970s
by the then Congress government of Siddharth Shankar Ray in West
Bengal and Charu Mazumdar died in police custody in Calcutta in

1972. Over 10,000 Naxalites were killed, and thousands more
jailed. The CPI (ML) underwent further splits, and several
small groups broke off from the CPI(ML). Today the Naxalites'
common goal is peasant revolution, abolition of class
hierarchies, and the expansion of "liberated zones." Naxalites
typically operate in tribal forest areas, both to advance the
cause of marginalized tribes and to take advantage of the
inhospitable terrain to evade law enforcement, but they

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eventually hope to expand their activities throughout the
countryside. In the revolution's final phase, Naxalites hope to
take over the cities before bringing down the government in New
Delhi.


6. (SBU) The dominant Naxalite groups before September 2004
were the People's War (PW) and the Maoist Community Center
(MCC). The PW, formed in Andhra Pradesh in 1975, was originally
known as the People's War Group but shortened its name to
People's War earlier that year after merging with the CPI -ML
(Party Unity) faction. The MCC was founded in the early 1970s
in Jharkhand by Naxalites escaping from West Bengal. Much of
the conflict between these two groups derived from turf battles
rather than ideological differences. They merged on September
21, 2004 to form what is presently known as the Communist Party
of India - Maoist (CPI-Maoist). As such, "Naxalites" and
"Maoists" are both now general terms applied to ultra Left-wing
political groups that carry out armed attacks against symbols of
state authority to attain political objectives and the terms are
used interchangeably. Maoists/ Naxalites trace their ideology
to Mao Zedong's theory of peasant insurrection, subscribing to
the notion that "power flows from the barrel of a gun," and seek
to establish "liberated zones of deprived and alienated sections
of the population."

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"The Red Corridor"
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7. (SBU) According to April 2006 GOI estimates, at present, 160
out of 602 districts in Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand,
Bihar, Orissa, Maharashtra, West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh and
Madhya Pradesh are affected by Maoists. These districts contain
about 450 police which reported incidents of violence between
2004 and 2006. There are another 50-odd districts where Maoist
groups have extended their influence/activity, but statistics of
attacks have not been submitted in these areas. These districts
fall in the above nine states as well as Karnataka, Kerala and
Tamil Nadu. In all, Maoist activities have been reported from
1,200 police stations in India. Nearly 6,000 people have been
killed in Maoist violence in India during the past twenty years.
According to the Indian government, more than 3,000 of these
deaths occurred between 2002 and March 2006.


8. (SBU) The Dantewara district in southern Chhattisgarh has
become India's hub for Maoist violence. Escalating combat
between government, insurgent, and tribal counter-insurgent
forces has killed 542 persons since the beginning of 2006, which
is in excess of casualties in Jammu and Kashmir. The state
government has a two-pronged offensive underway to combat the
Maoists. First, the state is attempting to transform its police
force into a paramilitary unit. All state police officers are
being put through a six week program at Chhattisgarh's Jungle
Warfare Training College in Bastar District. Second, the state
has provided support and encouragement to a grassroots
counter-insurgency known locally as Salwa Judum. This movement
pits the Maoists against the very people they purport to protect
and puts the so-called Maoist revolutionaries in a difficult
situation, and one to which they have responded very violently.
The Maoists are now killing local tribal people and villagers
who they suspect might be aligned with Salwa Judum. As a
result, southern Chhattisgarh is home to at least twenty-seven
Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps, as tribal people flee
or are forcibly removed from their forest villages by both
Maoist and counter-insurgent forces. Based upon interviews of
GOC officials IDP numbers are estimated to be in excess of
60,000.


9. (SBU) In Eastern India, Jharkhand, Bihar, Orissa and West
Bengal are the most affected states. The CPI (Maoist) runs
virtual parallel governments in many parts of Jharkhand, and
holds "Jan Adaalats" (Peoples' Courts) in Orissa, Bihar and
Jharkhand to settle both civil and criminal disputes in remote
villages. These "courts" impose penalties ranging from simple
monetary fines to mutilation and death. Local district
government authorities, security persons and lately some CPM
leaders in southern districts of West Bengal are the primary
targets of CPI (Maoist) assassinations. (Comment: In West
Bengal, the CPM and more traditional Naxalites like the CPM-ML
are seen by Maoists as corrupted by the establishment and as
ideological competitors for the sympathies of the masses. End
Comment). In some districts, Maoists have replaced the local

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administration and police and government officials do not enter.
The Maoists define these areas as "liberated zones." These
Maoist-dominated areas are usually geographically remote and
mired in poverty. Many have suffered from traditional neglect
by the government and have been ruled by quasi feudal landed
elites, who have traditionally exploited the general population.
The presence of Maoists makes it difficult for government
authorities to establish or re-establish a presence.


10. (SBU) Media reports quoting GOI intelligence sources say
that the Maoists are well funded ($350 million a year). Their
sources of funding include: extortion, kidnapping for ransom,
collection of "taxes" from NGO's and other conducting
development programs or those transporting agricultural/minor
forest produce and minerals through their territory. Bank
robberies and looting of stores are also common tactics. The
GOI puts the total estimated number of hardcore underground
Maoist members in the affected states at 9,300 - a significant
increase from 2004 (2,165 recruited) and 2003 (831 recruited).
However, media estimates put the figure significantly higher at
around 30,000. Top leaders include CPI (Maoist) General
Secretary Ganapathi, Pramod Mishra, Uma Shankar, Nathuni Mistry

SIPDIS
and Kishen. Nathuni Mistry has been in a Jharkhand jail since

2003.

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"No More Hit and Run . . . Hit Them Precisely and With Impunity"
-- CPI (Maoist) 9th Congress
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11. (SBU) In January-February 2007, the Maoists held a "9th
Unity Congress" (the first since 1970 during the old Naxalbari
period) somewhere in the forest area along the Orissa-Jharkhand
border. An official statement, signed by CPI (Maoists) General
Secretary Ganapathi and released on February 19 announced the

SIPDIS
intention to conduct a more aggressive campaign by conducting
people's war throughout the country, changing the name of the
Maoist Peoples Liberation Guerrilla Army to the People's
Liberation Army (PLA),deepening its mass base, and waging a
militant mass movement against the "neo-liberal policies of
globalization, liberalization and privatization pursued by
ruling classes on the dictates of imperialists." Journalist
contacts reported that Ganapathi, while addressing the hardcore
Maoist leaders from across the country, said, "No more hit and
run. Now, the time has come to spread into the towns, identify
specific targets and attack them with precision." (See 9th
Congress Press release at
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india /maoist/docume
nts/papers/19feb07.htm)


12. (U) The Indian Home Ministry Report for 2006-2007 confirmed
the more aggressive tactics, noting that Maoists have resorted
to "tactical counter offensive campaigns." Following the
Maoist's 9th Congress, there has a been a demonstrable increase
in violence in the states of Bihar and Jharkhand. In April,
approximately 100 Maoists blew up schools being used as barracks
for the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF),and an undisclosed
number of Maoists killed two Railway Protection Force (RPF)
soldiers on the Howrah-Mokama train. Near the Nepali border on
March 31, approximately 200 Maoists, possibly with support from
Nepal, attacked a police station, bank and government office in
the town of Riga (Reftel A).


13. (SBU) On March 4, CPI (Maoist) militants in Jharkhand shot
and killed Member of Parliament Sunil Mahto from Jamshedpur
(Reftel B). Mahto was a member of the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha
(JMM) party, a state party with a large base among the poor and
tribal sectors. The CPI-Maoists have also threatened the
Deputy Chief Minister of Jharkhand, Sudhir Mahto, and two
members of the Jharkhand Legislative Assembly/ According to
media reports, the Maoist letter to Sudhir Mahto said: "Stop
spreading wrong information about us, otherwise you will face
the music . . . we feel it is right to challenge your
statements and warn you against letting loose a barrage of lies
cooked up on the diktats of corporate houses, native and
foreign, and the landed gentry in order to cover the failures of
your government." The Maoists also warned the Deputy Chief
Minister to stop supporting village defense committees, or "face
the ire" of the Maoists. (Note: South Asia Intelligence Review
(SAIR) offers additional details on recent Maoist activities in

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Bihar and Jharkhand at
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/Archives/5 _5.htm#assessment2
End Note.)

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The GOI Response - Bureaucracy and Inertia
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14. (SBU) In June 2005, the Union Ministry of Home Affairs
organized a meeting of the Chief Secretaries and Directors
General of Police of 13 States in Hyderabad and decided to
create a joint task force of State police departments to counter
Maoist activities in the six most-affected states: Andhra
Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Bihar, Orissa and Maharashtra.
The GOI budgeted 510 million dollars for the task force, but
so far only roughly 220 million dollars has been utilized.


15. (SBU) Karnataka has targeted suspected Naxalite leaders
while taking steps (albeit limited ones) directed at the root
causes of the Naxalite problem. In 2005, a top leader belonging
to the Karnataka State Committee of the People's War Group (PWG)
was killed by police and another was apprehended. In districts
with forest reserves where Naxalites operate, district
commissioners have initiated special development programs
enabling tribal communities to harvest forest products (e.g.
wood, honey, and beeswax) in an effort to provide livelihoods.
Police sources say that Naxalites continue to operate along
Karnataka's borders with Andhra Pradesh and Kerala.


16. (SBU) The government of Andhra Pradesh, however, has had
considerable success in quelling the insurgency with an
aggressive campaign against the Naxalites, which it commenced in
2005 after the Naxalites withdrew from peace negotiations
(Reftel C). A senior police official said that the Naxalites
are no longer able to move about in large groups but must do so
in groups of two to three persons. He added that while the
Naxalites are still a threat, their ability to conduct
large-scale attacks in Andhra Pradesh has been diminished. The
police official reports good cooperation with the authorities in
the neighboring state of Chhattisgarh but said that Naxalite
movement on the Andhra Pradesh-Orissa border remains a major
concern. (Note: Due to the effectiveness of the "Greyhound"
paramilitary units in Andhra Pradesh the Maoists followed the
path of least resistance to Chhattisgarh, where the vast
majority of India's attacks now take place. From Jan 2006
through April 19, 2007, according to the South Asia Terrorism
Portal, Chhattisgarh has had 480 Naxalite related deaths. End
note).


17. (SBU) A High-Level Coordination Center, headed by the Union
Home Secretary with Chief Secretaries and police chiefs of
Maoist affected states as members, meets regularly and reviews
and coordinates steps taken by the states to counter Maoist
activities. The GOI in September 2006 created an Empowered
Group of Ministers under the leadership of the Home Minister and
selected Chief Ministers of Maoist-affected states to "closely
monitor the spread of Naxalism and evolve effective strategies
to deal with the problem." In addition, an Inter-ministerial
Group headed by the Additional Home Secretary was created to
monitor the progress on land reforms, tribal peoples'
resettlement and rehabilitation, and review progress on
development and infrastructure creation in tribal areas. A
Standing Committee of Chief Ministers has also been created to
maximize and improve the outputs of the various state action
plans for anti-Maoist/Naxalite operations. A Naxal Management
Division, headed by an Additional Home Secretary, is responsible
for monitoring state action plans as well.


18. (SBU) Comment: The generally poor response to the
Maoist/Naxalite menace is a result of weak Center-State and
State-State relations in India. Operational effectiveness is
lowered by the continuing inability of state law enforcement
bodies to coordinate effectively with each other, and also by
apparent disagreement over the best approach to take. Some
states appear willing to talks with the Maoists, while others
take a tougher stance. The GOI has publicly stated a
"zero-tolerance" approach towards Maoist groups, but this policy
is still not being implemented uniformly across the states. End
Comment.

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Links With Nepal

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19. (SBU) The success of the Maoist movement in Nepal serves to
inspire and possibly embolden Indian Maoists (Reftel G). While
coordination between Nepali and Indian Maoists is limited, links
between the two organizations clearly exist. Over the last few
years, several key Nepali Maoists have been arrested while in
India to include CPNM Politburo Member Chandra Prakash Gajurel,
Standing Committee Member Mohan Baidya, Central Committee Member
and General Secretary of the All Nepal Peasant Organization
Chitra Bahadur Shrestha and over 200 other CPNM members. In
August 2006, the two Maoist groups issued a joint press release
stating, "The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) and the
Communist Party of India (Maoist) jointly re-assert their firm
commitment to proletarian internationalism, mutual fraternal
relations." In discussions with Kolkata ConGen, a Kolkata-based
Nepali diplomat said that he was aware of instances of Indian
Maoists operating in Nepal, with their Nepali counterparts. A
senior Bihar police official corroborated those comments, adding
that movement by both groups across the porous border was common
and that several Nepali Maoists were detained in Bihar jails. A
more disturbing sign of possible Nepali Maoist activity in India
was the previously noted March 31 attack on the Bihar border
town of Riga. A group of approximately 200 Maoists, reportedly
operating out of Nepal, assaulted a bank, police station and
local government office, killing a security person and injuring
six people. (Reftel A).

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Comment
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20. (SBU) The inability of the GOI to come to grips with Maoism
and its persistence and spread is a reflection of the exclusion
of a large percentage of the Indian population from development
and governance. While much has been written regarding this
phenomenon, experts have identified some basic causes. Due to
Indian cultural biases, upper caste Hindus continue to relegate
low caste, tribal and religious minority groups to perpetual
inferiority and oppose efforts to introduce a more egalitarian
social structure. In addition, the Indian ruling elite has a
strong urban focus and has deliberately sidestepped the rural
poor to favor the urban middle class. Endemic corruption also
plays a role, as government officials managing programs aimed at
addressing rural poverty often embezzle the funds, leaving only
paper programs on the ground. A recent Nicholas Kristof cover
story in the New York Times described his tour through rural
India, where he found that villagers were not provided health
care, education or basic health services, although the
government funds programs in all these areas.


21. (SBU) Speaking to a gathering of Chief Ministers in April
2006, Prime Minister Singh emphasized that the Maoists
constituted the most serious threat to India's internal
security. The GOI and states' failure to respond to the Maoist
insurgency should not be perceived to diminish the seriousness
of the threat. Rather, the lack of a coherent
counter-insurgency effort against the Maoists and the general
lack of awareness about the insurgency further contribute to the
danger in providing more time for the Maoists to extend their
influence, which they have been doing in states such as
Maharashtra and Uttar Pradesh. For some of the reasons
enumerated above, Indian officials appear reluctant and
incapable of confronting the Maoists and the fundamental issues
that feed the insurgency: poverty, corruption and weak
development. Outside the pockets benefiting from India's
embrace of globalization remains a vast hinterland untouched by
economic growth, with approximately 600 million people living on
USD 2 a day or less. Unlike Islamic terror attacks, which
receive wide coverage by the media and public officials, Maoist
attacks elicit a muted reaction. The GOI can easily blame
Islamic threats on Pakistan or other outside influences. The
Maoist problem offers no such easy answers. To truly combat
Maoism, the GOI would have make a critical assessment of the
deplorable social conditions experienced by over two thirds of
India's population, and that is an area where the Indian
government does not want to go.


22. (U) This cable was coordinated with Amconsulate Mumbai,
Amconsulate Chennai, and Embassy New Delhi.
JARDINE