CONCERNS ABOUT INSECURITY IN NORTH KIVU

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000846

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/2010
TAGS: PGOV MOPS KPKO KDEM CG RW
SUBJECT: CONCERNS ABOUT INSECURITY IN NORTH KIVU

REF: A. KINSHASA 792

B. USUN NEW YORK 557

C. THE HAGUE 1315

D. KINSHASA 841

Classified By: PolCouns DBrown, reasons 1.4 b/d


1. (C) Summary. Some MONUC civilian officials have
expressed growing concerns about the possibility of a
government offensive against renegade General Laurent Nkunda
in North Kivu. Two of its key officials believe that the
Kabila government has made a decision to mobilize for an
attack on Nkunda's forces, and fear not only the humanitarian
crisis that would result but the prospects of MONUC being
drawn into the fighting. Meanwhile Nkunda's political
organization is reportedly consolidating control of civilian
institutions in areas under his control. Some of the MONUC
information squares with other sources, as reported septels;
however, a reported Kabila order to launch an offensive most
certainly does not. Differing signals from different parts
of MONUC is a familiar pattern, and in this case is
indicative of the general level of concern focused on the
Kivus. End summary.


2. (C) Two key MONUC civilian officials privately expressed
to us their strong concerns about a renewal of fighting in
North Kivu between the Congolese army (FARDC) and the forces
of renegade General Laurent Nkunda. DSRSG Ross Mountain,
echoing the conclusions ("it is not a question of if
hostilities will break out, but when") of Under Secretary
General for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Marie Guehenno in
New York (ref B),expressed fears at a donors meeting July 9
of a FARDC attack on Nkunda in the coming weeks. MONUC's
acting political adviser Christian Manahl (protect) told
PolCouns July 11 that MONUC is receiving conflicting messages
on the situation in North Kivu. On the one hand, it is clear
that a military buildup is underway. Officially, the
Congolese military is telling MONUC that its objective is to
pressure, not attack, Nkunda and his forces. However, Manahl
asserted that the commander of MONUC's North Kivu Brigade was
told by FARDC Regional Military Commander Vainqueur Mayala
that the government has decided for the military option. He
indicated MONUC believes that this decision was made by
President Kabila himself.


3. (C) Manahl said MONUC has received information indicating
the 15th Integrated Brigade (IB) has been ordered from
Kisangani to North Kivu's western Walikale territory, an FDLR
stronghold, and the 2nd IB south from Beni in the north of
the province. Other FARDC elements have been ordered south
from Ituri. He said the deployment had been ordered to begin
July 15, and that the FARDC was attempting to deploy 10 tanks
and 10 armored personnel carriers to the province from
Kisangani, although it was not clear how they might be
transported. (Comment: These movements are not inconsistent
with what the government claims they are, reinforcement of
existing forces, or even with preparation for an offensive
against the FDLR. End comment.)


4. (C) Manahl emphasized that, over and above the
humanitarian concerns that would be raised by renewed combat,
MONUC fears being drawn into urban fighting in the provincial
capital of Goma, where forces loyal to Nkunda could threaten
the civilian population. Manahl also said MONUC fears
supporting FARDC anti-Nkunda operations which might include
FDLR elements.


5. (C) Manahl portrayed both scenarios as no-win situations
for MONUC. In the first, MONUC fears being drawn into urban
combat. Manahl said only battalions made up of government
loyalists had obeyed a recent order from Mayala to re-deploy
outside Goma, while its Nkunda elements had remained. In the
case of fighting in outlying areas between FARDC and Nkunda
forces, Manahl said MONUC feared FDLR elements could join in.
In that case, he said, "it's going to be a disaster." If
MONUC decided to hold back from supporting the FARDC in that
situation, Manahl said it would risk losing the support of
the Congolese government and population. "We will be
criticized whatever we do," Manahl said.


6. (C) As for Nkunda, Manahl said his political front, the
CNDP, is continuing to establish a parallel administration in
areas under his control. He said tax, police and
intelligence officials were now reporting to Nkunda in
certain areas of the province, and in at least one instance
were issuing their own tax receipts.

KINSHASA 00000846 002 OF 002




7. (C) Manahl said there are reports of Nkunda agents
recruiting fighters in North Kivu, as well as in Rwanda.
Recruits reportedly included demobilized Rwandan army
soldiers (Congolese as well as Rwandan),Congolese refugees
in Rwanda, and teenagers. He said UNHCR has informed Rwanda
of recruitment in its camps there, but received only denials
of involvement. (Note: Manahl did not indicate whether the
reports of recruitment were new. End note.)


8. (C) David Lewis (protect),a well-connected British
journalist who recently returned to the DRC on assignment for
The Economist, also raised the issue of a military option in
a July 8 conversation with PolCouns following several days of
interviews in North Kivu. He said Mayala told him in Goma
that he was publicly denying any offensive was in the works.
However Mayala said off the record that Kabila had given him
an order for an attack on Nkunda. Similar to Manahl's
account, Lewis told us Mayala had been present at a meeting
of senior commanders chaired by Kabila July 3 in Kisangani at
which the decision was made. Lewis also said he had
interviewed Nkunda, whom he found determined and even
fatalistic. "I have a cause," he told Lewis. Nkunda was
convinced the FARDC was preparing an attack.


9. (C) Additional complications may be in the offing.
Manahl reported that the International Criminal Court in The
Hague had issued a warrant for the arrest for Nkunda's chief
of operations Bosco Ntaganda for crimes committed while an
Ituri militia leader (ref C). Lewis said he had also learned
of the indictment, calling it "the worst-kept secret in
Kinshasa." He said he had received a call from the ICC
warning him off the story until the court officially
announced it.


10. (C) Comment: No one we have spoken with believes the
Congolese military has the capacity to sustain, let alone
win, an offensive against Nkunda or FDLR forces. Whatever
Kabila's inclinations regarding a military offensive, the
greater near term danger is that the buildup will create an
environment where an isolated incident could spark a larger
confrontation. Some of the information conveyed by the MONUC
officials is consistent with other information we have
received, including Kabila's own read-out recently provided
to P3-plus-2 Ambassadors (ref D),but some is not. Notably,
the reported Kabila order to launch an offensive clashes with
other reports, including Kabila's own statements. Differing
signals from different parts of MONUC is a familiar pattern,
and in this case most certainly reflects the widespread
concern focused on current tensions in the Kivu provinces.
End comment.
MEECE