POLITICAL VIEWS FROM BOTH SIDES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 000381

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/29/2017
TAGS: PREL KPKO PGOV MOPS CG PO SF
SUBJECT: POLITICAL VIEWS FROM BOTH SIDES

REF: KINSHASA 375 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: PolCouns DBrown, reasons 1.4 b/d


1. (C) Summary: Following the March 22-23 violence,
political feelings are running high. Reflecting Prime
Minister Gizenga's views, his de facto chief of staff,
Minister Godefroid Mayobo, strongly reaffirmed the need for a
full trial of former Vice President Jean-Pierre Bemba. While
fully accepting the need for an unfettered opposition, Mayobo
asserted that Bemba had crossed a line. The Ambassador
underscored the need to calm political tensions to enable the
country to move forward, evoking the possibility of a Bemba
exile. From Bemba's party, MLC senior officials Francois
Mwamba and Thomas Luhaka pleaded for Bemba's life to be
protected and for his "temporary" exile. They also, however,
implicitly acknowledged that Bemba had often behaved
irresponsibly, and implied that they may be ready to cut
Bemba loose from his party. Our efforts with these and other
officials continue to be to reduce immediate political
tensions and help regain ground lost, moving toward a stable,
democratic state. End summary.

Trying to look beyond Bemba
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2. (C) The March 22-23 fighting essentially resulted in the
defeat of Kinshasa forces loyal to former Vice President
Bemba. While political tensions in the capital continue to
run high, the immediate focus for many of Kinshasa's
political class is on Bemba himself. It is widely known that
Bemba has sought refuge in a South African embassy compound,
but there is debate as to how he should be handled.
Government hard-liners argue only the arrest and trial of a
treasonous Bemba will do. Bemba does not seem to fully grasp
his situation and seems to be maneuvering for continuing
influence. For example, per several sources, Bemba has
asserted to contacts that he wants and intends to continue to
play a role in a "republican" opposition, but has also
threatened that if he is forced into exile, members of his
party would boycott parliament provoking a new political
crisis.


3. (C) The Ambassador and PolCouns met March 27 with PM
Gizenga's de facto chief of staff and primary political
advisor, Minister Godefroid Mayobo, and separately with MLC
Secretary General Francois Mwamba and senior party official

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Thomas Luhaka to review the current situation. Both meetings
were part of our general efforts to help move beyond the
crisis and restore an acceptable political process. In both
meetings, the Ambassador stressed that the fighting
represented a setback to the DRC democratic process, but that
the lost ground can be recuperated, depending on actions and
decisions taken by both sides.

Mayobo: Government of law
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4. (C) Gizenga and his inner circle are taking a hard line
on the trial option. His stand, articulated in terms of
principle: Bemba must face the consequences of his actions.
It also appears, however, that Gizenga is smarting from
Bemba's refusal to initiate any contact or even acknowledge
Gizenga's authority as prime minister since the elections.
Indeed, Bemba asserted to the visiting French Minister of
Cooperation by telephone on March 24 after the fighting that
he was the true winner of last year's presidential election,
in essence denying that Gizenga had a legitimate mandate.
Gizenga has also reportedly indicated to MONUC officials, and
possibly others, that he is convinced that Bemba tried to
assassinate him on Wednesday, May 21 (on the eve of the
fighting) in an incident that appears to have been an auto
accident, albeit one involving Bemba's brother.


5. (C) In his meeting with Mayobo, the Ambassador stressed
that the overriding objective of all concerned should be the
future of the DRC and the democratic process. While noting
that he was not judging Bemba's guilt or innocence, the
Ambassador stated that a trial or a long, drawn-out process
risked further polarizing a large number of people and
disrupting necessary reconciliation. He said that Bemba's
continuing presence in the country is the subject of
speculation and tension, even though at this point Bemba has
no political future. He made a point of distinguishing
Bemba's fate from the need to ensure that a responsible
opposition is able to operate freely.

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6. (C) Mayobo readily agreed that a republican opposition
should be allowed to operate freely, and indeed is part of a
healthy democracy. He returned several times, however, to a
legalistic argument. Bemba, he said, must be subject to the
law, like anyone else. He did not regard this as a political
question, but the consequences of Bemba's personal actions.
Citing intelligence received two days before the fighting,
Mayobo claimed that Bemba had a plan for violent action. He
stated that Bemba had never recognized the country's new
democratic institutions and went further to assert that Bemba
was in fact attempting to mount a parallel force with the
objective of making the country ungovernable.


7. (C) Mayobo stressed the challenge of building a
government of law while many continue to act with impunity.
He accepted that this was part of the landscape of the
Transition, but that it could no longer be tolerated. He
said the government risked losing credibility if it did not
take action. He stated it would be "catastrophic" if there
were no consequences to last week's violence. "If we can't
take Bemba to trial," he asked, "what will we tell the
victims?" He claimed that the population wants a trial and
that few now support Bemba. He held out the possibility of
an amnesty after trial, but emphasized: "Bemba has gone too
far."


8. (C) The Ambassador reiterated the importance of finding
ways to move forward that reinforce democracy. Mayobo said
that a trial of Bemba would not be a threat to the MLC or the
political opposition. The problem, he said, is Bemba and a
small group around him who are driven by personal ambition,
rather than a political position or point of view. He said
it was important for political parties to distance themselves
from Bemba's actions. The Ambassador stressed calming the
political atmosphere and minimizing future confrontation to
create the most favorable conditions to put the democratic
process back on track.

MLC: Opposition under threat
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9. (C) Meeting later the same day with the Ambassador, MLC
Secretary General Mwamba and Executive Secretary Luhaka made

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it clear they felt that Bemba's "temporary" departure from
the country is needed. During the course of the
conversation, both implied that they were prepared to cut
their ties to Bemba, and limited their appeals for Bemba to
ensuring his physical safety. Mwamba, however, portrayed
last week's violence as part of a larger effort to threaten
the MLC and the opposition in general. Alleging looting and
searches of MLC residences and offices and threatening phone
calls to party members, he expressed strong concern that
Kabila and his allies were attempting to eliminate the
opposition. He said that he was hoping for a signal of
government intentions, citing passage of legislation to
reform the justice system as an example. He also raised the
need to integrate troops of Kabila's large Republican Guard,
which operates outside the regular military command structure.


10. (C) Luhaka said the country is facing a moment of truth.
He claimed the government was attempting to decapitate the
opposition by its moves against Bemba. He asserted that,
unlike the government, the MLC had denounced the March 22-23
violence. He expressed concern that the government had shut
down Bemba-owned and -allied broadcast stations. He called
for sanctions against those responsible for looting.


11. (C) The Ambassador stated emphatically that tensions
between Bemba and Kabila last week did not justify the
subsequent fighting. He stressed that the key issue now is
democracy and the future of the country. While readily
agreeing with MLC assertions that a healthy democracy needs a
vibrant and "republican" opposition, the Ambassador
emphasized that such opposition also needs to be responsible,
and on that score Bemba had often failed over an extended
period of time. He noted that Bemba had made many errors and
engaged in provocations that did not correspond to actions of
a responsible, republican opposition. He cited appeals to
hate that had been broadcast by Bemba-owned stations. He
noted Bemba had on numerous occasions failed to live up to
agreements reached, often brokered by the international
community, and his maintenance of a de facto private army was
simply unacceptable. The Ambassador agreed that Bemba alone
was not responsible for the violence, but did bear
substantial responsibility for it. He noted that press

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interviews Bemba was continuing to give despite promises to
the contrary to his South African hosts were exacerbating
tensions and did not help resolution of his situation.


12. (C) The Ambassador noted reported agreement in the
National Assembly regarding allocation of committee officers
and membership brokered by Assembly President Vital Kamerhe.
These appeared to give the MLC significant influence, and the
deal had been achieved by constructive negotiation. Mwamba
and Luhaka both agreed, and spoke favorably of Kamerhe, and
concurred that this was the kind of spirit of political
dialogue that should carry forward. The two focused on a new
pending proposed law regarding the official status of a
political opposition, and the Ambassador agreed the subject
would be an important signal for the future. The Ambassador
charged, however, that for constructive dialogue to move
forward, Mwamba and Luhaka and their party had some important
decisions to make, and they should send some strong signals
to the government, Congolese people, and international
community that the MLC is ready to play the role of
responsible political opposition. He also noted that the
MLC's own interests would be served by seeking to bolster the
influence of constructive interlocutors such as Kamerhe, and
thus demonstrate political dialogue can yield positive and
concrete results.


13. (C) The Ambassador emphasized he was not proposing
particular solutions to the questions raised by last week's
violence. But he stated that the preferred solutions would
be those that were most favorable to recuperating lost ground
and moving the democratic process forward.

Comment
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14. (C) Neither the government nor the MLC has taken any
responsibility for the actions of last week. It is difficult
not to sympathize with the view that there should be some
sort of legal sanction applied to Bemba. On the other hand,
as Mayobo acknowledged, the Congolese justice system is
essentially non-functional, and is certainly not viewed as
impartial. Moreover, a trial of Bemba would effectively give
the government a free pass for its actions last week and
allow Bemba a pulpit to tie his ambitions to the political
opposition itself. Fundamentally, the political calculus at
this time may simply not be robust enough to deal with the
pressures a trial would impose on a young democracy wounded
by last week's violence. We do not believe Bemba has any
political future in the DRC, at least not any time soon, even
if Bemba himself has not yet realized this. Ideally, an
understanding if not formal agreement will develop that will
remove Bemba from the political equation while providing
effective penalties that signal the limits to impunity for
all sides. End comment.
MEECE