PRESIDENT KABILA'S DECEMBER 11 MEETING WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 001361

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2017
TAGS: MOPS PGOV PREF PREL KPKO CG
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT KABILA'S DECEMBER 11 MEETING WITH
AMBASSADOR AND AF SENIOR ADVISOR SHORTLEY

Classified By: DCM Samuel Brock. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) Summary. At President Kabila's request, Ambassador
William Garvelink and Tim Shortley, Senior Adviser for
Assistant Secretary Frazer for Conflict Resolution met with
Kabila in his residence on December 11, 2007. Kabila agreed
to stick to his agreement with President Museveni and to keep
the pressure on the LRA to leave Garamba or finalize a peace
agreement. Kabila noted that the Congolese now have a plan
to address the ex-FAR and Interhamwe and that the plan could
begin anytime. He acknowledged, however, that he required
U.S. assistance. Ambassador Garvelink stated that he will be
talking to General Ward on Thursday to discuss the arrival of
the U.S. military assessment team in January. Kabila
stressed that he needed a final answer on Nkunda,s
willingness to go into exile and asked for U.S. assistance to
obtain it. Kabila stressed that MONUC,s performance has
been lackluster in North Kivu and that promises of support
have not materialized. Kabila asked that the U.S. help him
answer the question: "what can MONUC do without going beyond
the red lines of their mandate, and how can they make sure
that the atrocities stop? Shortley stressed that alternative
military and political strategies must be urgently considered
and that the U.S. is prepared to facilitate a second meeting
with MONUC to purse new ideas. Kabila agreed that
alternative avenues should be considered and supported U.S.
efforts to reach out to Nkunda once they are identified and
agreed in principle between himself and Assistant Secretary
Frazer. End Summary.

Kabila Agrees to Press the LRA
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2. (C) President Kabila asked Shortley about his trip to
Juba and the current status of the LRA peace talks. Shortley
explained that recent information from LRA defectors
indicated that Kony had plans to break his troops into four
task forces to abduct up to 500 Congolese girls from the
Garamba area, begin new attacks in West Nile, Uganda, send an
advance team to the Central African Republic (CAR) to take up
a new base of operation and to pick-up arms buried in a cache
in southern Sudan. Shortley also noted that Kony has moved
70 miles west of Garamba with a small group. Kabila
confirmed that he has asked the LRA to leave Garamba by the
end of the month. Shortley explained that the current
Cessation of Hostilities agreement allows the LRA to remain
in Garamba through January 31, 2008 and that we agreed with
his efforts to pressure the LRA to leave Garamba or finalize
an agreement through the Juba peace process. Shortley said
that the U.S. acknowledged his willingness to allow LRA
defectors to transit through Dungu and Beni and appreciated
his help. Kabila agreed that if Kony is moving deeper into
Congo that he posed a more significant threat to Congolese
security and needed to be addressed. Kabila agreed to stick
to his current plan with Museveni, to keep the pressure on
the LRA publicly and ask that they leave before the end of
December. Kabila asked what Kony,s options were? Shortley
stated that Kony had no options and that he must agree to
peace through Juba and return to Uganda top face justice.
Kabila stated that he "wanted to see Kony,s back by the end
of the year." Kabila said that Congo and Uganda will hold a
bilateral meeting to review progress on the Arusha agreement
on December 14-15, 2007 to include discussing next steps on
the LRA.

Post Addis Ababa: Dealing with Ex-FAR, Interhamwe
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3. (C) Kabila asked Shortley for a read-out of the Heads of
State Summit of the Tri-Partite in Addis Ababa. Shortley
briefly stated that the meetings were successful and that
Congo benefited greatly from the conclusions. Shortley
stressed that both President Kagame and President Museveni
vented about continued delay in dealing with the
ex-FAR/Interhamwe and the LRA behind closed doors. Kabila
noted that the Congolese now have a plan to address the
ex-FAR and Interhamwe and that the plan could begin any time.
Kabila stated that sensitization and mobilization could
begin immediately, with the military component coming online
in March. Shortley noted that the U.S. was coordinating with
the Rwandans on their comments to the plan. He stressed that
the Congolese should offer to brief the Rwandans on the
details of the military plan as a way to keep them in the
loop. Shortley suggested that one option for meeting the

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initial demands of Addis is to hold a side-bar meeting in
Goma to brief the Rwandan delegate on next steps to deal with
FDLR. Shortley also highlighted that the Congolese need to
urgently move on the inter-communal dialogue.

U.S. Commitment to Train FARDC Troops
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4. (C) Kabila asked when the U.S. would begin fulfilling its
commitment to provide military training to the FARDC.
Shortley explained that Assistant Secretary Frazer was in the
process of issuing a letter to Present Kabila reaffirming
U.S. commitment to provide the military training and that we
expected to have the letter shortly. Shortley said the
assessment team would arrive in January and that training
would be in March. Ambassador Garvelink noted that he would
be talking to General Ward on Thursday to discuss the arrival
of the assessment team. Kabila was pleased to hear that the
U.S. was moving quickly on U.S. military assistance.
Shortley mentioned that the U.S. was also looking into the
possibility of supporting the deployment of a Military
Information Support Team (MIST) to eastern DRC to support the
development of a communication strategy, sensitization
programs and psychological operations against
ex-FAR/Interhamwe as well as NKunda. Kabila enthusiastically
agreed that the MIST was a good idea and looked forward to
more specific planning for the teams, arrival.

Nkunda: What Happens Between Now and Christmas?
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5. (C) On Nkunda, Kabila stated that their efforts have
always been just and flexible. Kabila stressed that the
current round of fighting began when Nkunda attacked DRC
positions in Nyanzale. Kabila said that the DRC retaliated
and there have been wins and losses since the new fighting
began, noting that Nkunda had reversed previous FARDC gains.
Kabila rhetorically asked what,s next? Kabila claimed since
the DRC now has a plan to deal with the FDLR, what else does
Nkunda need? Kabila mentioned that the inter-communal
dialogue had been delayed but that it would begin soon. He
asked Chief of Staff Tshibanda to follow up on the start of
the inter-communal dialogue process. Kabila stressed that we
need a final answer on Nkunda,s willingness to go into
exile. Shortley asked Kabila if the U.S. channel of
communication with Nkunda was still helpful? Kabila stated
emphatically that "you had a green light before and you have
a green light now to continue communication with Nkunda" to
help find a solution to the current crisis.

MONUC ) You let me down
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6. (C) Kabila groused about the poor performance of MONUC in
the fighting in the last few days saying that MONUC has not
done what it said it was going to do. He stressed that
MONUC,s promises of "logistics support to FARDC are just
bullshit". He continued and said that MONUC has also not
fully participated in the operations against Nkunda and that
MONUC is not living up to the mandate provided by the UNSC.
He emphatically stated that the "meetings with MONUC have
turned out to be just lip service." Kabila did not hide his
frustration stating that "Nkunda could have been addressed by
now with MONUC assistance and that MONUC has not been
helpful." Kabila stated that previous promises by MONUC for
air support have not been kept. Shortley stressed that it is
hard to blame MONUC for the losses in Mushake when FARDC
troops left the battlefield. Shortley also noted that MONUC
must be careful where it engages or it could be further
restrained by DPKO/New York. Kabila stated that MONUC must
be clear on what it will and what it won,t do. Kabila then
asked "what can MONUC do that will not take them beyond the
red lines of their mandate, and how can they make sure that
the atrocities stop? Shortley and Ambassador Garvelink
offered to sit with the President,s Chief of Staff and MONUC
SRSG and Force Commander to review its redlines and
boundaries. Kabila agreed that would be a good idea.


7. (C) Kabila mused that UN peacekeepers did not respond in
Rwanda and did not respond in Bosnia and asked if the UN
would stop the atrocities in the Congo. He noted that MONUC
has a much stronger mandate than the UN forces did during the
1994 genocide in Rwanda and asked what is preventing them
from stopping the killing. Shortley mentioned that there are

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significant rumors about Angolan, Zimbawean and Zambian
support for FARDC and asked if these were true. Kabila
indicated that these rumors are false, but, as a member of
SADC, he is pursuing their assistance in a number of critical
areas, including peace and security.

(C) Note: It appears that Kabila believes that MONUC should
be participating in the FARDC offensives against Nkunda.
Post speculates that there may be a misunderstanding of
Chapter VII engagement rules and will seek to help clarify
those rules of engagement with the President. MONUC has
worked hard to support the FARDC to include supplying and
transporting ammunition, MRE's and evacuating the wounded.
We are bemused by Kabila,s insistence that MONUC has not
provided logistics support knowing that without MONUC support
FARDC would not even be in North Kivu. End Note.

Alternative Proposal ) Any Good Ideas Out There?
-------------- ---

(C) 8. Shortley stressed that we are constantly navigating
between a military approach to Nkunda or attempting to have
meaningful dialogue without the ability to have meaningful
negotiations with the capacity to compromise on key issues.
Shortley asked Kabila if he was now willing to consider a
more comprehensive approach. Then Shortley proposed that
MONUC increase its presence in North Kivu and redeploy its
forces to occupy territory inside Nkunda,s positions. This
would meet Nkunda's request to provide protection to the
Tutsi population and allow him to disengage and send his men
to brassage. Kabila enthusiastically agreed with this idea
and stated that the Congolese themselves had proposed this
idea before and could not understand why MONUC had not
pursued it as a viable alternative to a protracted military
confrontation.

Recap
--------------


9. (C) Shortley and Kabila recapped the meeting by agreeing
on the following list of follow up items:

-- Washington will issue immediately the letter on U.S.
military assistance from Assistant Secretary Frazer.

-- Embassy Kinshasa will pass on a copy of the December 8
press release by the LRA spokesman.

-- Ambassador Garvelink and Shortley will hold two meetings
with MONUC to discuss (1) its mandate and redlines; and (2)
review potential alternatives to address the Nkunda
situation. Note: Garvelink and Shortley have already
discussed these two meetings with SRSG Swing who is
supportive. End Note.

-- Shortley would contact Nkunda after discussing the
alternative concept with Assistant Secretary Frazer, then
seeking the buy-in of the GDRC.

-- The U.S. will continue to work closely with the Rwandans
to ensure they were fully apprised of new developments.


10. (C) Kabila agreed that Shortley and Ambassador Garvelink
would meet with him again on Monday, December 17 to discuss
Shortley,s talks with Nkunda and the results of the Join
Monitoring Group in Goma, DRC.
GARVELINK