SENIOR ADVISOR SHORTLEY'S NOVEMBER 3 MEETINGS IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 001260

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NSC FOR BLEO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2017
TAGS: MOPS PGOV PREL KPKO CG
SUBJECT: SENIOR ADVISOR SHORTLEY'S NOVEMBER 3 MEETINGS IN
KINSHASA

REF: A. KINSHASA 1251

B. KINSHASA 1252

Classified By: CDA Samuel Brock. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) Summary: Senior Advisor Tim Shortley met with close
advisors to the President of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (RDC) on November 3 to discuss Shortley's just-ended
trip to the eastern Congo, which included meetings with
senior officers of the Congolese Armed forces (FARDC),the UN
Mission in the Congo (MONUC),and Tutsi insurgent leader
Laurent Nkunda. Shortley and Kabila's chief of staff Raymond
Tshibanda discussed a draft unified U.S.-Congolese plan for

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dealing with Nkunda and the FDLR. They also formulated
talking points for Shortley's meetings over the following
days with Rwandan officials. We believe that Kabila did not
choose to receive Shortley because of the possible appearance
of Shortley "negotiating" with Nkunda with Kabila's approval;
this could damage Kabila's declining political support in the
east. Shortley also met with MONUC officials in Kinshasa,
including SRSG William Swing, Force Commander Babakar Gaye,
and UN SYG Special Envoy for eastern DRC Haile Menkerios.
Menkerios met earlier in the day with Kabila and Mbusa;
Menkerios plans to facilitate a GOR-GDRC meeting in Nairobi
later in the week to discuss President Kabila,s FDLR plan.
End summary.


2. (C) AF Senior Advisor for Conflict Resolution Tim
Shortley and Embassy Kinshasa Charge d'Affaires Sam Brock met
with Raymond Tshibanda, President Joseph Kabila,s Chief of
Staff, Marcellin Chissambo and Serafin Ngwej, presidential
advisors on November 3 in Tshibanda's private residence.

Shortley gives trip report
--------------


3. (C) Tshibanda opened by asking Shortley to provide the
main findings from his visit to North Kivu. Shortley did so
(per reftels). Tshibanda replied that the Government of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (GDRC) appreciates U.S. help
and would like to see the U.S. do more to solve the problem
of negative forces and Nkunda "once and for all." He
stressed that the FDLR and Nkunda are interlinked and the
GDRC had stated it wanted to address both at the Tri-Partite.
He said President Kabila knew where he wanted the country to
go and had a plan to get it there, stressing the President,s
outstanding leadership. Kabila also understood the need for
compromise and had shown he was willing to make sacrifices.


4. (C) Tshibanda stressed that President Kabila must manage
public opinion -- which is quickly turning against him in the
east -- and was looking for a speedy end to the Nkunda and
FDLR situation. He asked Shortley to go over highlights of
A/S Frazer,s draft plan to end Nkunda's insurgency as
discussed with President Kabila in Washington. Shortley,
Brock, Tshibanda, Chissambo, and Ngwej edited the document to
reflect the changing situation on the ground. Tshibanda
asked that elements of the Government's FDLR plan not
included in the U.S. plan be added to ensure that the plan is
comprehensive. (Note: Brock is updating the plan and will
forward it separately. End note). Tshibanda again
reiterated the importance of moving quickly.

Taking the message to the Rwandans
--------------


5. (C) Shortley and Tshibanda then reviewed talking points
for his visit to Kigali to demonstrate active U.S.
partnership with the RDC to address the FDLR and Nkunda
situation. The following points were agreed on:

-- The U.S. is actively supporting a Congo plan to deal with
the FDLR and Nkunda;
-- The GDRC has agreed to take simultaneous actions against
Nkunda and FDLR; and
-- The GDRC is compiling a map of FDLR locations and will
take out FDLR positions when opportunities permit.


6. (C) Tshibanda and Shortley also agreed on additional
points to press the Rwandans on their responsibilities
vis-a-vis the FDLR and Nkunda. The following points were
agreed on:

-- Ask Rwanda to press Nkunda to send his men to "brassage"

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and to go into exile;
-- Stress that Rwanda must increase is support for the return
of non-ex FAR and non interhamwe to Rwanda; and
-- Press Rwanda to take all necessary measures to prevent the
re-supply of Nkunda.


7. (C) After more than two hours, Tshibanda ended the
meeting. He asked Shortley to return in a few weeks to
discuss his contacts in Rwanda and to assess progress.
Shortley was non-committal but did not rule out a return
visit.


8. (C) Comment: Despite indications earlier in the day that
President Kabila would receive Shortley, the meeting never
materialized. After waiting several hours for the call to go
the president's office, Shortley and Brock were summoned
instead to Tshibanda's home. We conclude that Kabila was
wary of meeting with Shortley because the meeting might be
leaked to the press. As Shortley had met earlier in the week
with Nkunda, a meeting with Kabila would suggest that
Shortley was negotiating between them. Such a perception
could have political consequences for Kabila, whose support
in the east of the DRC is declining precipitously. End
comment.

Discussions with Haile Menkerios
--------------


9. (C) Following the meeting with the President,s staff,
Shortley and Brock went to MONUC Headquarters Kinshasa where
they briefed SRSG William Swing and UN SYG Special Envoy for
eastern DRC Haile Menkerios. Haile also briefed on his
meeting earlier in the day with Foreign Mbusa and President
Kabila. Haile stressed to the President that the DRC
requires both a political and a military strategy to deal
with Nkunda, and the FDLR, and a common strategy with Rwanda
to be successful. When Kabila stressed that Rwanda was
likely supporting Nkunda, Haile retorted "we have to assume
Rwanda is supporting Nkunda and that your people are
supporting FDLR -- and move on to solutions."


10. (C) The President asked Haile to play a useful role in
ensuring the UN prioritizes resources to successfully end the
reign of the FDLR in eastern DRC. President Kabila also
asked Haile to facilitate a GDRC and GOR bilateral meeting in
Nairobi on the margins of the Great Lakes Conference to allow
Mbusa and Murigande to agree on the final outline of the FDLR
plan. (Note: The President,s Chief of Staff, Advisors and
Menkerios asked Shortley to attend as well to demonstrate
U.S. commitment to the Congo,s FDLR plan. End note.)


11. (C) Shortley briefed Swing and Special Envoy Menkerios
on his visit to North Kivu and stressed that getting progress
on Nkunda depended on having a simultaneous strategy.
Special Envoy Menkerios agreed but SRSG Swing pushed back and
said that for the moment MONUC would stick to the sequential
strategy and only use a simultaneous strategy when
opportunities exist.

Haile)Shortley conversations continue
--------------


12. (C) Shortley and Special Envoy Menkerios departed
together on November 4 from Kinshasa to Goma. En route
Menkerios explained he will act as the SYG,s special envoy
on political issues dealing with the eastern DRC and that he
wanted to coordinate closely with the U.S. Menkerios said
that he was pleased to have company in such a difficult task.
He said that Special Envoy Chissano had been considered for
this post, but that the situation is too volatile and
requires immediate and intensive attention. He said a
coordinated UN-U.S. 60-90 day action plan was required
urgently.


13. (C) Menkerios believes that Kabila,s request for abrupt
U.S. and UN assistance has come after a reassessment of the
present military strategy (to include the impact of the
23,000 soldiers on the local population and the cost of war)
and continued low public opinion. Haile outlined four
scenarios driving Kabila,s fear: (1) Exposure of FARDC-FDLR
cooperation and loss of support from regional neighbors, the
U.S. and European nations; (2) Rwanda takes measures to
protect Nkunda in response to FARDC)FDLR cooperation and
extends Nkunda,s reach and reign; (3) Rwanda enters the DRC

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to protect its interests; and (4) a popular revolt (or a
coup) in response to the elected government's failure to
bring peace and stability to eastern DRC and Congo.


14. (U) Senior Advisor Shortley has/has cleared this
message.
BROCK