Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07KINSHASA1247
2007-11-02 10:35:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Kinshasa
Cable title:  

TRIPARTITE FUSION CELL -- WHAT NEXT?

Tags:  PINR MOPS KPKO UG RW BY CG 
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VZCZCXRO6385
PP RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #1247/01 3061035
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 021035Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7075
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 001247 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2017
TAGS: PINR MOPS KPKO UG RW BY CG
SUBJECT: TRIPARTITE FUSION CELL -- WHAT NEXT?

REF: A. KINSHASA 1175

B. E-MAIL FROM SIMON IVERSON TO EMBASSY OCTOBER 24
2007

Classified By: CDA S. Brock. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 001247

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2017
TAGS: PINR MOPS KPKO UG RW BY CG
SUBJECT: TRIPARTITE FUSION CELL -- WHAT NEXT?

REF: A. KINSHASA 1175

B. E-MAIL FROM SIMON IVERSON TO EMBASSY OCTOBER 24
2007

Classified By: CDA S. Brock. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).


1. (S) Summary. The Tripartite Plus Intelligence Fusion Cell
(TFC) has significant assets at its disposal, but they are
currently underutilized. Member states should be encouraged
to participate fully, or else be suspended from the project.
Additionally, the TFC should be brought into alignment with
other Department initiatives in order to enhance the efforts
of the Embassy to further US policy. Only when member states
follow their rhetoric with concrete action, and real
operational progress is made in providing and analyzing raw
intelligence, should the mandate of this intelligence
operation be expanded to include a Joint Planning Cell. End
summary.


2. (S) Charge d'Affaires and GPRO chief visited the
Tripartite-Plus Intelligence Fusion Cell (TFC) in Kisangani
on October 10. The visit offered the opportunity to assess
the TFC's operations and discuss the co-location of a new
Joint Planning Cell (JPC) as proposed at the Tripartite
Chiefs of Defense meeting in Lubumbashi in October 2007.
They also visited senior MONUC Eastern Division headquarters
officers (British and South Africans) in Kisangani, who
provided comments on the TFC.

Background
--------------


3. (S) The Tripartite-Plus Intelligence Fusion Cell (TFC)
based in Kisangani was meant to bring intelligence officers
from the DRC, Rwandan, Ugandan and Burundian governments
together to exchange raw intelligence and prepare analytical
fusion products pertaining to armed groups ("negative
forces") in Eastern DRC. The TFC is an outgrowth of the
DoS's ongoing Tripartite diplomatic initiatives and is the
only portion of this effort that is represented by a
permanent, standing body. AF/RSA is funding the TFC
contract, held by MPRI, at approximately USD 650,000 for FY08.


4. (S) As of late 2006, Embassy had been told that the
permanent TFC in Kisangani would disband in March 2007. TFC

members would go back to work in the TFC Focal Point Offices
(FPOs) in their respective capitals, with secure
communications linking them together and occasional meetings
to reinforce their efforts and abilities. This did not
occur, and the cell continues to operate in Kisangani in
relative isolation from the member states' home intelligence
services.


5. (S) A proposal was recently floated to significantly
expand the scope of the TFC by co-locating a Joint Operations
Planning Cell (JPC) (ref A) with the TFC in Kisangani, to
draw up military plans based on TFC products.

Observations From the Visit
--------------


6. (S) The permanent on-site American TFC "mentor" is a
retired U.S. Army intel officer, secret-cleared, fluent
French and Arabic speaker, with extensive war-zone and CI
experience as well as several defense attache tours. The
mentor sees his role as intelligence trainer, advisor, and
referee. He has clearly earned the respect of the Ugandan,
Rwandan and DRC participants, who are low-ranking but seemed
capable. The Burundians have not been present for several
months. There is also a Nigerian officer on-site from MONUC,
who acts as an observer; MONUC rules specifically ban TFC
personnel from entering MONUC property and forbid MONUC from
passing any information to the TFC.


7. (S) The FPOs in each regional capital were established in
March 2006, and simultaneously receive copies of all TFC
products, which most frequently come in the form of brief
spot reports, for relay to their own national intel agencies.
The TFC makes requests for information to the FPOs, keeps
track of the responses, and periodically sits down to compile
comprehensive analytical products (primarily order of battle
information).


8. (S) The TFC receives few formal submissions of raw
intelligence from any source. Most of what the TFC does pick
up is based on an ad hoc collection by the officers posted to

KINSHASA 00001247 002 OF 003


Kisangani, who informally canvass their own contacts and
colleagues. The TFC officers' DRC/Ugandan/Rwandan parent
services make almost no inputs to the FPOs, express little
interest in their work, and have never come to visit
Kisangani to address TFC matters. The FPOs themselves are
largely inactive. For example, the Kigali FPO has not
communicated anything substantive to the TFC in months and
the Kinshasa FPO only exists on paper. (Note: There is an
equipped computer room at the DRC National Security Council's
offices, but it appears to be opened and the computers turned
on only when American visitors request a visit to the site.
End note.)


9. (S) The TFC mentor told Charge and GPRO chief he has no
insight into what is happening with other aspects of the
overall Tripartite process and therefore cannot tailor its
work to meet the member states' needs. The TFC delegates
agreed that all participating states should send J2/Intel
officers from their militaries to be stationed at the TFC to
encourage a more operational focus.


10. (S) TFC delegates unanimously said the JPC (for military
operational planning) idea sounded good in theory, but
expanding the TFC to incorporate this new mission would never
work under current circumstances. MONUC officers agreed with
this assessment, noting there is no existing force to execute
these potential JPC plans, and no competent military
commander would agree to launch a military operation with
someone else's (TFC) intelligence.



11. (S) That said, MONUC officers complimented the TFC's
analytical products and the mentor noted that much of MONUC's
own powerpoint presentation summarizing the status of armed
groups in the region was based on the TFC's work. Local
MONUC personnel want to engage the TFC and share with it, but
are forbidden to do so due to UN concerns about getting
involved in "intelligence" issues. None of the TFC's
information makes its way into official USG reporting
channels, and the mentor is not contractually permitted to
report directly to the Embassy.

Recommendations
--------------


12. (S) Embassy recommends the following:


A. Department should assign supervision of this contract to
the Chief of Mission. This would include having the mentor
report directly to the Embassy.


B. Given this particular mentor's experience and talents, he
is at present being under-utilized. The scope of the
mentor's duties should be adjusted to involve him in other
activities of equal or greater value to the Mission, such as
attending other Tripartite gatherings at which the Embassy is
often not represented.


C. All foreign nationals having any involvement in the TFC
should be vetted in advance, to include GRPO traces. All TFC
activities involving intelligence officer skills training,
provision of equipment to foreign intelligence services, or
other permanent transfer of USG resources to foreign
intelligence entities should be coordinated in advance with
relevant in-country DNI representatives.


D. TFC analytical products (and raw information when
appropriate) should be provided directly to the Embassy and
disseminated via front channel USG communications.


E. The Department should engage with appropriate elements in
USUN New York to seek their help in breaking MONUC's
resistance to the TFC.


F. TFC member states who do not maintain steady attendance
at the Kisangani site should be suspended from the process.
TFC member states whose FPOs do not reply to requests for
information over an extended period of time should be
suspended from the process.

Comment
--------------


13. (S) Although it falls under the framework of the
Tripartite diplomatic initiative, by any reasonable
definition the TFC should be called a U.S. Intelligence

KINSHASA 00001247 003 OF 003


activity. For example, the mentor recently noted that he was
"teaching an intel class to ten new DRC intel officers" (ref
B). We have no idea who these people are or what they are
being taught. TFC activities have significant CI
implications and there are grave concerns regarding some of
these intelligence agency's human rights records. We have
also heard the TFC praised for at least offering a place
where intel officers from the four Tripartite-Plus countries
can sit together and talk. From our perspective, far greater
things could be achieved in this region with USD 650,000 and
a French-speaking retired U.S. military officer who possesses
some of the U.S. government's most highly sought professional
intelligence qualifications.


14. (S) Comment, continued. In light of the issues raised
here, Post believes that a robust discussion of the next
phase of TFC operations, to include representatives from the
Embassy, the Department, the military and the intel
communities, is essential. Post would also welcome the views
of the Embassies in Kigali, Kampala, and Bujumbura. All
elements relevant to the continued operation of the TFC --
including funding, location, mission, and increased
participation of all Tripartite member states -- should be
included. We have heard recently that additional funds may
have been located to continue the TFC through September 08,
possibly in connection with the calls for an expanded
mandate. Again, we firmly believe that a comprehensive
internal discussion on the issues raised here should be held
before approving an extension of the TFC project. End
comment.
BROCK