Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07KINSHASA1126
2007-09-19 16:22:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kinshasa
Cable title:
KABILA TO P-3 PLUS 2: ONLY OPTIONS FOR NKUNDA'S
VZCZCXRO3319 OO RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHRN DE RUEHKI #1126/01 2621622 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 191622Z SEP 07 FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6916 INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK PRIORITY RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0529
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KINSHASA 001126
SIPDIS
//CORRECTED COPY - CORRECTION IN THE SUBJECT LINE//
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL CG
SUBJECT: KABILA TO P-3 PLUS 2: ONLY OPTIONS FOR NKUNDA'S
FORCES ARE BRASSAGE OR DEMOBILIZE
KINSHASA 00001126 001.2 OF 004
Classified By: CDA: SBrock. Reason 1.4 (b, d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KINSHASA 001126
SIPDIS
//CORRECTED COPY - CORRECTION IN THE SUBJECT LINE//
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL CG
SUBJECT: KABILA TO P-3 PLUS 2: ONLY OPTIONS FOR NKUNDA'S
FORCES ARE BRASSAGE OR DEMOBILIZE
KINSHASA 00001126 001.2 OF 004
Classified By: CDA: SBrock. Reason 1.4 (b, d).
1. (C) Summary: President Joseph Kabila met September 13
with ambassadors/charges of the P-3 (France, UK, U.S.) plus 2
(Belgium and South Africa) countries in Kinshasa. SRSG
William Swing also participated. Swing had requested the
meeting on behalf of the P-3 plus 2 because of growing
concern over the Nkunda rebellion in the province of North
Kivu and the GDRC's step-up of military action to crush the
insurgents. In a "rehearsal" prior to the meeting with
Kabila, P-3 plus 2 reps had agreed to raise also Security
Sector reform (SSR) and humanitarian concerns in North Kivu.
Kabila was adamant that the Nkunda insurgency was a military
problem, albeit with political dimensions, but acknowledged
his approach to the problem would not necessarily be only
military in nature. He referred to a new plan to be table at
the Tripartite Plus meeting two days later in Kampala to
isolate Nkunda politically and diplomatically but did not
give details. He also criticized the ex-FAR (FDLR),
affirming they were a root cause of instability in North
Kivu. He asked P-3 plus 2 reps to help their governments to
re-evaluate the situation vis-a-vis Nkunda and to treat him
as other "criminals of war" had been treated. He criticized
donors for inaction, claiming the DRC had the "opposite of
donor fatigue" in that it was tired of unfulfilled promises
for development assistance. Defense Minister Diemu made
rambling, unconvincing remarks about inadequate preparation
for the upcoming international SSR round table. The meeting
was remarkable for at least two reasons: Kabila clearly has
rethought his strategy re Nkunda, demonstrating a new
willingness to try negotiation and eschew military action, at
least for now; and he has openly accused the FDLR for its
role in fomenting instability. End summary.
2. (C) The meeting with Kabila had been requested several
days before by Swing, with P-3 plus 2 concurrence, to discuss
the previous week's escalation of violence near Sake
resulting in MONUC intervention to separate FARDC and Nkunda
forces. The President's office called in Swing alone on
Tuesday. Swing reported that Kabila was surprised to find
just Swing, asking where the P-3 plus two ambassadors were.
Ambassadors were then called and asked to come immediately to
the President's office, only to be told upon arrival that the
President could not see them. The meeting was rescheduled
for Thursday. On Wednesday evening ambassadors met with
Swing to coordinate their demarche. At that meeting Swing
speculated Kabila wanted to ask ambassadors to ask Rwanda to
stop supporting Nkunda as he had heard that Kabila had asked
Mbeki to talk with the Rwandans. (Note: This was
corroborated during the Wednesday meeting by the South
African ambassador). Swing then asked ambassadors for
suggestions as to what issues the group should bring up with
Kabila. France asked that we raise Security Sector reform
(SSR). UK supported this and also suggested we raise issue
of the growing humanitarian crisis created by FARDC,s failed
attack against Nkunda last week.
3. (C) The September 13 meeting was chaired by Kabila; also
attending on the RDC side were Foreign Minister Mbusa,
Defense Minister Diemu, Interior Minister Kalume,
presidential advisor Ngwej, and acting protocol chief Mayuma.
The P-3 plus 2 delegation included the ambassadors of South
Africa, the UK and France, and the Belgian and U.S. charges.
Swing led off by commending the President and his team for
recent diplomatic initiatives vis-a-vis the DRC's regional
partners, mentioning visits involving Congolese officials and
counterparts from Angola, Congo Brazzaville, the Central
African Republic, South Africa, Rwanda and Uganda. He then
went to the heart of the matter: "Everyone is concerned
about the situation in the east, particularly the useless
suffering there, and we know that this is a great distraction
for you because you have so many other important matters to
deal with." He then commented on MONUC
disarmament/demobilization efforts in Ituri, which were
proceeding well, and on the fact that efforts to achieve
stability in South Kivu were also moving in the right
direction. Swing ended with a question: "How do you see
things and what can we do to better help you?"
Essentially a military problem
--------------
4. (C) Kabila responded quickly, skipping the usual opening
courtesies: Before offering solutions to a problem you must
identify the problem. The North Kivu problem had many
aspects: political, diplomatic, military and ethnic. It was
KINSHASA 00001126 002.2 OF 004
also important to refrain from globalizing the problem; the
problem is limited to North Kivu. Above all, this is a
military problem, although with time it has also become a
political issue. Nkunda's forces should go to "brassage"
(the integration program designed to bring rebel forces into
the regular Congolese army) but they have refused to do so.
It is an ethnic issue because the majority of Nkunda's forces
are Rwandaphone; they see things from a Rwandaphone
perspective.
Brassage or demobilization
--------------
5. (C) Kabila (continued): The word 'negotiation' frightens
us ("nous effraie"),it fills us with fear lest it become a
precedent. We did not negotiate with Chinyachinya (sp?),we
did not negotiate with Yakutuma (sp?),we did not negotiate
with Ngololo (sp?). There is no agreement with Nkunda, we
signed no agreements with him. The only options for Nkunda's
forces are brassage or demobilization. Our only condition
for Nkunda's forces is that they contribute to stability;
this is not possible when they are undertaking military
actions. Our message is clear: We want peace, with our
neighbors, and within our borders to have stability and
development. To that end we have launched a diplomatic
initiative that my foreign minister will talk to you about.
And in 48 hours we will take part in the Tripartite Plus
meeting, with three ministers and two governors on our
delegation.
The ex-FAR are also at the root of the problem
-------------- -
6. (C) Kabila (continued): There will always be political
conflicts. Even in Rwanda, with only two ethnic groups,
there was genocide. In this country, with 250 ethnic groups,
we take steps to calm tempers. We must be careful at the
upcoming inter-communal conference on the Kivus (he did not
give a date) to not legitimize tiny groups that are hiding
from the law. Louise Arbour, the UN High Commissioner for
Human Rights told me there was too much impunity in the DRC.
I say, therefore, we must punish. There is another great
problem. The ex-FAR (FDLR) are also at the root of the
problems in the Kivus. They have become refugees throughout
the region, even as far away as Gabon. We are clear about
this: they are approximately 6,000 in number and we must
disarm them and repatriate them. We must also deal with
Mai-Mai groups. The problem in the east is paralyzing the
entire country but our determination remains firm.
Ambassadors reply
--------------
7. (C) Kabila asked if there were comments or questions.
The French ambassador began: We want to help you as
partners, not teach you lessons. There are many serious
risks at the present time; these include greater ethnic
conflict, a growing humanitarian crisis, and increased
political polarization. We believe the current situation
must be dealt with in a global fashion. It is important for
the DRC to make known its intentions on the international
stage. With regard to the ex-FAR, the international
community can help. It is important to hold the
inter-communal dialogue as soon as possible. We must all
work to ensure that the gains in Ituri and South Kivu are
maintained. Security Sector reform (SSR) is needed urgently.
Again, regarding N. Kivu, the military aspect is important,
but a global approach is required.
8. (C) Kabila (continued): Our three-point plan for
demobilizing Nkunda's forces will be announced at the
Tripartite Plus meeting in Kampala in 48 hours. We know
about the humanitarian crisis. There are 600,000 IDP's;
there will be famine soon and I am sorely pressed to find a
solution. The international community is well aware of the
situation and must play a great role.
9. (C) UK ambassador (in English): Again, the humanitarian
crisis is of great concern. And I would reiterate that if a
military solution is pursued too strongly . . .
10. (C) Kabila (in English): Our approach is not only
military. The last round was not initiated by us but was
imposed on us. The military option is always an option. If
we don't take military action, they (Nkunda and his forces)
will stay there forever. What can we do? Leave them there
KINSHASA 00001126 003.2 OF 004
forever? He who wants peace prepares for war.
11. (C) South African ambassador: Some time ago you
cautioned the P3 plus 2 ambassadors not to press the alarm
button on Nkunda. Our level of engagement has not
necessarily been helpful. What are we doing we should not
do, and what should we do that we are not doing?
Donors can do better
--------------
12. (C) Kabila: Capitals could do much better in their
efforts to help us. Three things can be done:
- Evaluate the situation correctly:
Who is Nkunda?
What does he want?
What interests does he represent?
- Support fully plan we will present at Tripartite Plus.
- Help us to move full speed ahead with SSR.
Kabila (continued): I am under no illusions. MONUC will
leave one day. The important thing is not when MONUC leaves,
but how the Congo is when they leave. Returning to the
subject of Nkunda: Why do you not treat Nkunda as someone
wanted by the ICC?
13. (C) Kabila continued his comments about donors not
living up to expectations. Clearly frustrated, he observed
the GDRC had the "reverse of donor fatigue" and listed his
grievances: We started our reconstruction efforts in 2003.
We have presented plans and more plans. There is far too
much bureaucracy. The going is too slow. If we are on a
journey of 100 kilometers, we have thus far not walked even
50.
Security Sector reform round table
--------------
14. (C) U.S. charge noted that when policy-makers evaluate
situations in other countries they factor in press coverage
because in countries with a free press, reports about human
rights violations and humanitarian crises cannot be ignored.
He also thanked Kabila for his affirmation of the importance
of SSR, noting this was welcome news as several international
partners were concerned that SSR roundtable preparations were
behind schedule. Kabila asked Defense Minister Diemu to
reply. Diemu gave a rambling statement about
"misunderstandings," lack of cooperation from the Ministries
of Justice and the Interior (responsible for trying suspects
and the police forces, respectively),and assurances that the
round table would be a great success.
15. (C) Kabila then asked Mbusa to speak about the plan to
be unveiled shortly at the Tripartite Plus meeting in
Kampala. Mbusa stated that the four members of Tripartite
Plus, under U.S. facilitation, would meet soon. He was
vague, stating only that the President's "brassage or
demobilize" message to Nkunda was to be put before the
Tripartite Plus with a request for that forum's support. He
also asked ambassadors to urge that their capitals also
support "The Plan." He did not mention the plan's "three
points" as referred to earlier by Kabila. (Note: many
present at the meeting later expressed disappointment at
Mbusa's short and inchoate statement on the plan. End note.)
16. (C) Comment: After a short statement by Justice Minister
Kalume about sill uncertain plans for an inter-communal
dialogue in the Kivus (para 6),Kabila announced that he had
to leave to attend a press conference. P-3 plus 2
ambassadors and SYSG Swing (without U.S., because of other
commitments) met later in the day to discuss the meeting with
Kabila. They told U.S. charge that all agreed that two
things about the meeting with Kabila were particularly
important:
- (1) Kabila appears to have backed away, at least for now,
from a military offensive to take out Nkunda, opting instead
for a diplomatic effort to isolate him through the Tripartite
Plus and in European capitals. The Europe part of this
strategy includes a quick trip to London, Paris, Brussels and
Berlin by high-level advisors, including special advisors
Antoine Ghonda and Marcellin Tchishambo, and Chief of Staff
Raymond Tshibanda, who together left Kinshasa September 11.
Kabila himself will go to Brussels September 20 to meet with
Belgian and EU officials, as well as with Congolese
expatriates. He will then go on to New York for the UN
KINSHASA 00001126 004.2 OF 004
General Assembly.
- (2) For the first time Kabila has publicly criticized the
FDLR (ex-FAR),accusing them of undermining stability in the
east and demanding their demobilization and repatriation.
This may be in response to calls by Europeans and others to
take the wind out Nkunda's sails by eliminating his pretext
for fighting the FARDC, but Kabila may also be calling the
bluff of the same Europeans by challenging them to cooperate
in the anti-FLDR fight. (Note: It is no secret the FDLR
receives considerable financial and moral support from Hutus
living in Europe, some of whom are suspected of involvement
in the 1994 genocide. End note.)
17. (C) Comment continued: Kabila's forceful presentation
at the September 13 meeting (a performance he repeated
shortly afterwards at the press conference) suggests he is
growing into the job. He not only appeared to know
significantly more about the substance of the issues than he
did just a few months ago, he is also engaging on those
issues. Just as importantly, he appears to understand the
complexities and nuances of the issues and, based on changing
realities, can modify his position. Finally, we were
impressed with Kabila's verbal acumen, in both French and
English. For someone who was not educated in French, his
mastery of the language of Moliere is downright impressive.
And the English he learned while growing up in Tanzania is
idiomatic and articulate. End comment.
BROCK
SIPDIS
//CORRECTED COPY - CORRECTION IN THE SUBJECT LINE//
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL CG
SUBJECT: KABILA TO P-3 PLUS 2: ONLY OPTIONS FOR NKUNDA'S
FORCES ARE BRASSAGE OR DEMOBILIZE
KINSHASA 00001126 001.2 OF 004
Classified By: CDA: SBrock. Reason 1.4 (b, d).
1. (C) Summary: President Joseph Kabila met September 13
with ambassadors/charges of the P-3 (France, UK, U.S.) plus 2
(Belgium and South Africa) countries in Kinshasa. SRSG
William Swing also participated. Swing had requested the
meeting on behalf of the P-3 plus 2 because of growing
concern over the Nkunda rebellion in the province of North
Kivu and the GDRC's step-up of military action to crush the
insurgents. In a "rehearsal" prior to the meeting with
Kabila, P-3 plus 2 reps had agreed to raise also Security
Sector reform (SSR) and humanitarian concerns in North Kivu.
Kabila was adamant that the Nkunda insurgency was a military
problem, albeit with political dimensions, but acknowledged
his approach to the problem would not necessarily be only
military in nature. He referred to a new plan to be table at
the Tripartite Plus meeting two days later in Kampala to
isolate Nkunda politically and diplomatically but did not
give details. He also criticized the ex-FAR (FDLR),
affirming they were a root cause of instability in North
Kivu. He asked P-3 plus 2 reps to help their governments to
re-evaluate the situation vis-a-vis Nkunda and to treat him
as other "criminals of war" had been treated. He criticized
donors for inaction, claiming the DRC had the "opposite of
donor fatigue" in that it was tired of unfulfilled promises
for development assistance. Defense Minister Diemu made
rambling, unconvincing remarks about inadequate preparation
for the upcoming international SSR round table. The meeting
was remarkable for at least two reasons: Kabila clearly has
rethought his strategy re Nkunda, demonstrating a new
willingness to try negotiation and eschew military action, at
least for now; and he has openly accused the FDLR for its
role in fomenting instability. End summary.
2. (C) The meeting with Kabila had been requested several
days before by Swing, with P-3 plus 2 concurrence, to discuss
the previous week's escalation of violence near Sake
resulting in MONUC intervention to separate FARDC and Nkunda
forces. The President's office called in Swing alone on
Tuesday. Swing reported that Kabila was surprised to find
just Swing, asking where the P-3 plus two ambassadors were.
Ambassadors were then called and asked to come immediately to
the President's office, only to be told upon arrival that the
President could not see them. The meeting was rescheduled
for Thursday. On Wednesday evening ambassadors met with
Swing to coordinate their demarche. At that meeting Swing
speculated Kabila wanted to ask ambassadors to ask Rwanda to
stop supporting Nkunda as he had heard that Kabila had asked
Mbeki to talk with the Rwandans. (Note: This was
corroborated during the Wednesday meeting by the South
African ambassador). Swing then asked ambassadors for
suggestions as to what issues the group should bring up with
Kabila. France asked that we raise Security Sector reform
(SSR). UK supported this and also suggested we raise issue
of the growing humanitarian crisis created by FARDC,s failed
attack against Nkunda last week.
3. (C) The September 13 meeting was chaired by Kabila; also
attending on the RDC side were Foreign Minister Mbusa,
Defense Minister Diemu, Interior Minister Kalume,
presidential advisor Ngwej, and acting protocol chief Mayuma.
The P-3 plus 2 delegation included the ambassadors of South
Africa, the UK and France, and the Belgian and U.S. charges.
Swing led off by commending the President and his team for
recent diplomatic initiatives vis-a-vis the DRC's regional
partners, mentioning visits involving Congolese officials and
counterparts from Angola, Congo Brazzaville, the Central
African Republic, South Africa, Rwanda and Uganda. He then
went to the heart of the matter: "Everyone is concerned
about the situation in the east, particularly the useless
suffering there, and we know that this is a great distraction
for you because you have so many other important matters to
deal with." He then commented on MONUC
disarmament/demobilization efforts in Ituri, which were
proceeding well, and on the fact that efforts to achieve
stability in South Kivu were also moving in the right
direction. Swing ended with a question: "How do you see
things and what can we do to better help you?"
Essentially a military problem
--------------
4. (C) Kabila responded quickly, skipping the usual opening
courtesies: Before offering solutions to a problem you must
identify the problem. The North Kivu problem had many
aspects: political, diplomatic, military and ethnic. It was
KINSHASA 00001126 002.2 OF 004
also important to refrain from globalizing the problem; the
problem is limited to North Kivu. Above all, this is a
military problem, although with time it has also become a
political issue. Nkunda's forces should go to "brassage"
(the integration program designed to bring rebel forces into
the regular Congolese army) but they have refused to do so.
It is an ethnic issue because the majority of Nkunda's forces
are Rwandaphone; they see things from a Rwandaphone
perspective.
Brassage or demobilization
--------------
5. (C) Kabila (continued): The word 'negotiation' frightens
us ("nous effraie"),it fills us with fear lest it become a
precedent. We did not negotiate with Chinyachinya (sp?),we
did not negotiate with Yakutuma (sp?),we did not negotiate
with Ngololo (sp?). There is no agreement with Nkunda, we
signed no agreements with him. The only options for Nkunda's
forces are brassage or demobilization. Our only condition
for Nkunda's forces is that they contribute to stability;
this is not possible when they are undertaking military
actions. Our message is clear: We want peace, with our
neighbors, and within our borders to have stability and
development. To that end we have launched a diplomatic
initiative that my foreign minister will talk to you about.
And in 48 hours we will take part in the Tripartite Plus
meeting, with three ministers and two governors on our
delegation.
The ex-FAR are also at the root of the problem
-------------- -
6. (C) Kabila (continued): There will always be political
conflicts. Even in Rwanda, with only two ethnic groups,
there was genocide. In this country, with 250 ethnic groups,
we take steps to calm tempers. We must be careful at the
upcoming inter-communal conference on the Kivus (he did not
give a date) to not legitimize tiny groups that are hiding
from the law. Louise Arbour, the UN High Commissioner for
Human Rights told me there was too much impunity in the DRC.
I say, therefore, we must punish. There is another great
problem. The ex-FAR (FDLR) are also at the root of the
problems in the Kivus. They have become refugees throughout
the region, even as far away as Gabon. We are clear about
this: they are approximately 6,000 in number and we must
disarm them and repatriate them. We must also deal with
Mai-Mai groups. The problem in the east is paralyzing the
entire country but our determination remains firm.
Ambassadors reply
--------------
7. (C) Kabila asked if there were comments or questions.
The French ambassador began: We want to help you as
partners, not teach you lessons. There are many serious
risks at the present time; these include greater ethnic
conflict, a growing humanitarian crisis, and increased
political polarization. We believe the current situation
must be dealt with in a global fashion. It is important for
the DRC to make known its intentions on the international
stage. With regard to the ex-FAR, the international
community can help. It is important to hold the
inter-communal dialogue as soon as possible. We must all
work to ensure that the gains in Ituri and South Kivu are
maintained. Security Sector reform (SSR) is needed urgently.
Again, regarding N. Kivu, the military aspect is important,
but a global approach is required.
8. (C) Kabila (continued): Our three-point plan for
demobilizing Nkunda's forces will be announced at the
Tripartite Plus meeting in Kampala in 48 hours. We know
about the humanitarian crisis. There are 600,000 IDP's;
there will be famine soon and I am sorely pressed to find a
solution. The international community is well aware of the
situation and must play a great role.
9. (C) UK ambassador (in English): Again, the humanitarian
crisis is of great concern. And I would reiterate that if a
military solution is pursued too strongly . . .
10. (C) Kabila (in English): Our approach is not only
military. The last round was not initiated by us but was
imposed on us. The military option is always an option. If
we don't take military action, they (Nkunda and his forces)
will stay there forever. What can we do? Leave them there
KINSHASA 00001126 003.2 OF 004
forever? He who wants peace prepares for war.
11. (C) South African ambassador: Some time ago you
cautioned the P3 plus 2 ambassadors not to press the alarm
button on Nkunda. Our level of engagement has not
necessarily been helpful. What are we doing we should not
do, and what should we do that we are not doing?
Donors can do better
--------------
12. (C) Kabila: Capitals could do much better in their
efforts to help us. Three things can be done:
- Evaluate the situation correctly:
Who is Nkunda?
What does he want?
What interests does he represent?
- Support fully plan we will present at Tripartite Plus.
- Help us to move full speed ahead with SSR.
Kabila (continued): I am under no illusions. MONUC will
leave one day. The important thing is not when MONUC leaves,
but how the Congo is when they leave. Returning to the
subject of Nkunda: Why do you not treat Nkunda as someone
wanted by the ICC?
13. (C) Kabila continued his comments about donors not
living up to expectations. Clearly frustrated, he observed
the GDRC had the "reverse of donor fatigue" and listed his
grievances: We started our reconstruction efforts in 2003.
We have presented plans and more plans. There is far too
much bureaucracy. The going is too slow. If we are on a
journey of 100 kilometers, we have thus far not walked even
50.
Security Sector reform round table
--------------
14. (C) U.S. charge noted that when policy-makers evaluate
situations in other countries they factor in press coverage
because in countries with a free press, reports about human
rights violations and humanitarian crises cannot be ignored.
He also thanked Kabila for his affirmation of the importance
of SSR, noting this was welcome news as several international
partners were concerned that SSR roundtable preparations were
behind schedule. Kabila asked Defense Minister Diemu to
reply. Diemu gave a rambling statement about
"misunderstandings," lack of cooperation from the Ministries
of Justice and the Interior (responsible for trying suspects
and the police forces, respectively),and assurances that the
round table would be a great success.
15. (C) Kabila then asked Mbusa to speak about the plan to
be unveiled shortly at the Tripartite Plus meeting in
Kampala. Mbusa stated that the four members of Tripartite
Plus, under U.S. facilitation, would meet soon. He was
vague, stating only that the President's "brassage or
demobilize" message to Nkunda was to be put before the
Tripartite Plus with a request for that forum's support. He
also asked ambassadors to urge that their capitals also
support "The Plan." He did not mention the plan's "three
points" as referred to earlier by Kabila. (Note: many
present at the meeting later expressed disappointment at
Mbusa's short and inchoate statement on the plan. End note.)
16. (C) Comment: After a short statement by Justice Minister
Kalume about sill uncertain plans for an inter-communal
dialogue in the Kivus (para 6),Kabila announced that he had
to leave to attend a press conference. P-3 plus 2
ambassadors and SYSG Swing (without U.S., because of other
commitments) met later in the day to discuss the meeting with
Kabila. They told U.S. charge that all agreed that two
things about the meeting with Kabila were particularly
important:
- (1) Kabila appears to have backed away, at least for now,
from a military offensive to take out Nkunda, opting instead
for a diplomatic effort to isolate him through the Tripartite
Plus and in European capitals. The Europe part of this
strategy includes a quick trip to London, Paris, Brussels and
Berlin by high-level advisors, including special advisors
Antoine Ghonda and Marcellin Tchishambo, and Chief of Staff
Raymond Tshibanda, who together left Kinshasa September 11.
Kabila himself will go to Brussels September 20 to meet with
Belgian and EU officials, as well as with Congolese
expatriates. He will then go on to New York for the UN
KINSHASA 00001126 004.2 OF 004
General Assembly.
- (2) For the first time Kabila has publicly criticized the
FDLR (ex-FAR),accusing them of undermining stability in the
east and demanding their demobilization and repatriation.
This may be in response to calls by Europeans and others to
take the wind out Nkunda's sails by eliminating his pretext
for fighting the FARDC, but Kabila may also be calling the
bluff of the same Europeans by challenging them to cooperate
in the anti-FLDR fight. (Note: It is no secret the FDLR
receives considerable financial and moral support from Hutus
living in Europe, some of whom are suspected of involvement
in the 1994 genocide. End note.)
17. (C) Comment continued: Kabila's forceful presentation
at the September 13 meeting (a performance he repeated
shortly afterwards at the press conference) suggests he is
growing into the job. He not only appeared to know
significantly more about the substance of the issues than he
did just a few months ago, he is also engaging on those
issues. Just as importantly, he appears to understand the
complexities and nuances of the issues and, based on changing
realities, can modify his position. Finally, we were
impressed with Kabila's verbal acumen, in both French and
English. For someone who was not educated in French, his
mastery of the language of Moliere is downright impressive.
And the English he learned while growing up in Tanzania is
idiomatic and articulate. End comment.
BROCK