MILITARY ATTACHES DISCUSS CONGOLESE SECURITY SECTOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L KINSHASA 001103

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR BLEO, BPITTMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/13/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KPKO CG
SUBJECT: MILITARY ATTACHES DISCUSS CONGOLESE SECURITY SECTOR

REF: A. A. KINSHASA 1072


B. B. KINSHASA 1056

Classified By: Charge S.Brock (1.4 b/d).


1. (C) Summary: Military attaches and representatives from
EUSEC, the UK, France, and the US met with the Charge and
Timothy Shortley, Senior Advisor to the A/S for African
Affairs, to discuss insecurity in North Kivu and the DRC's
security sector limitations on September 13. All
participants cited similar observations relative to the Armed
Forces of the DRC (FARDC). The greatest challenges include
implementing a peaceful resolution to the current hostilities
in the Kivus between the GDRC and dissident General Laurent
Nkunda, ensuring the disarmament / repatriation of the
remaining FDLR cadres, and upgrading the operational capacity
of the FARDC. End summary.

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Nkunda -- The Problem That Defies Solution
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2. (C) All participants in the discussion agreed that both
Nkunda and the FDLR are intertwined elements of the current
insecurity, but in the eyes of the Kabila government, Nkunda
appears to be the most immediate threat. In addition to his
superior military capacity (reftels),personal and regional
factors enhance the problem. Nkunda is an excellent
communicator. He has given interviews to numerous "serious"
international journalists, including Anderson Cooper, Colette
Brockman, and Reuters correspondents, and is building a
Christian following in the U.S. among many influential
Washington insiders which further complicates matters. His
message is clearly articulated, and many privately agree with
his major grievances -- marginalization of the minority Tutsi
population, the plight of Congolese refugees stranded in
third countries as a result of the war and FDLR occupation of
Congolese Tutsi land, and the vulnerability of Congolese
citizens to armed groups, which include the FARDC forces
themselves.


3. (C) MONUC estimates that out of a much greater pool of
potential troops, Nkunda may have around 3,000 - 4,500 loyal
adherents. Of those, around 1,000 are reportedly from
Nkunda's own political party.

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FDLR: The Uninvited Neighbors Who Won't Go Home
-------------- ---


4. (C) The FDLR is the other side of the same coin. One of
Nkunda's primary grievances is the fact that the Rwandan FDLR
troops and their extended families continue to inhabit
Congolese territory. Not only do they threaten the local
population, pillaging and plundering at will, but Nkunda also
claims that they occupy the rightful lands of the Congolese
refugees (many of them Tutsi) who fled the war in the late
90's.


5. (C) Of the estimated 6,000 - 8,000 FDLR members still
living in the DRC, approximately 3,000 - 4,000 are located in
North Kivu. The majority of the remaining FDLR members are
probably not genocidaires, but many fear to return to Rwanda
where some will doubtless be accused of atrocities committed
during the Rwandan genocide. The genocidaires, on the other
hand, do not want their non-implicated FDLR comrades to
repatriate, which would leave the hard-core members more
exposed to prosecution or retribution.

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FARDC Operational Ineffectiveness
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6. (C) The common consensus is that FARDC does not have the
operational capacity to win a military conflict with either
Nkunda's troops or the FDLR. Although FARDC maintains a
numerical advantage with approximately 10,000 troops
currently in North Kivu, Nkunda's troops are much better
trained, equipped, and disciplined than the majority of FARDC
troops. (Note: Other sources have indicated that FARDC
plans to deploy a total of 15,000 troops to North Kivu. End
note.)


7. (C) The FARDC claims between 150,000 -- 180,000 troops
nationwide, but members present at the discussion claimed
that they have at most 120,000 personnel. The estimated
number of "ghost" soldiers is between 30,000 and 40,000.
When EUSEC has conducted censuses, up to 50 per cent of the
soldiers on the books are not present. Census takers are
told that the personnel are "at school" or "at other
locations." The South Kivu Military Regional Commander
reported that his subordinates send him different numbers of
soldiers every day. Much of this is a relic of the
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) process;
if a commander joining the FARDC inflated the number of his
troops, he received a higher rank. Additionally, it is
widely alleged that commanders inflate their numbers to get
more money for their troops -- and then pocket the
difference.


8. (C) In addition, many aspects of the FARDC contribute to
their own weaknesses. From the international perspective,
the primary problem is one of weak leadership and minimal
capacity. The current military chain of command is broken,
brassage has not created the anticipated new linkages, and
the entire army is exceptionally top-heavy with excessive
officers and commanders. Military tactical operations are
being directed at the highest levels, including by President
Kabila, cutting out the operational chain-of-command. No
planning process was undertaken prior to current operation,
therefore no logistical support for current operations was
provided. (Note: MONUC recently imported 65,000 MREs to
feed forces in North Kivu. End note.)

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Possible Solutions
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9. (C) The defense attaches agreed that there is no
traditional "military solution" for either Nkunda or the
FDLR. Nevertheless, most present stressed the need for
additional international intel support (an implied request
for US participation),in order to identify forces,
locations, and capacities of each of these groups. Other
suggestions included efforts to cut cell phone communication
services to negative forces, to support communications
interception, and to support PSYOPS operations.

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Comment
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10. (C) Both the UK and France are pushing for a "negotiated
settlement" with Nkunda, after which the FDLR should be
addressed. The DRC, however, remains adamantly opposed to
"negotiations" with Nkunda. Other necessary elements include
increasing international pressure on those countries
supporting -- implicitly or explicitly -- both groups.
Finally, specific individuals who act independently of any
government, yet still provide support and materials, must be
identified and held accountable. End comment.


11. (C) Mr. Shortley has seen and cleared this cable.
BROCK