Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07KINSHASA1101
2007-09-14 16:13:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kinshasa
Cable title:  

MONUC: FARDC OVER ITS HEAD IN NKUNDA FIGHT

Tags:  PGOV PREL MOPS KPKO CG RW 
pdf how-to read a cable
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OO RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #1101/01 2571613
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 141613Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6875
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001101 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/13/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KPKO CG RW
SUBJECT: MONUC: FARDC OVER ITS HEAD IN NKUNDA FIGHT


Classified By: Charge S. Brock (1.4 b/d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001101

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/13/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KPKO CG RW
SUBJECT: MONUC: FARDC OVER ITS HEAD IN NKUNDA FIGHT


Classified By: Charge S. Brock (1.4 b/d)


1. (C) Summary. Senior MONUC officials reviewed the current
security situation in the eastern DRC September 11-12 in
discussions with AF Senior Adviser Shortley following
cessation of hostilities between government troops and forces
loyal to renegade General Nkunda. The operation appears to
have been poorly-planned and executed and was implemented in
the face of opposition from the military hierarchy. An
uneasy lull in the fighting remains, with both sides
regrouping and consolidating positions. SRSG Swing is open
to U.S. efforts to facilitate dialogue. He said that any
negotiations with Nkunda would have to focus on brassage for
his troops and exile for Nkunda, but warned that Nkunda would
use talks to press the FDLR issue and to heighten his own
importance. Kabila is now fully prepared to support a
diplomatic initiative led by South Africa. End comment.


2. (C) Discussions in Kinshasa September 11-12 between A/S
Frazer's Senior Adviser Tim Shortley and MONUC officials
including military staff officers and SRSG William Swing
focused on the security situation in the eastern DRC, the
Congolese military's (FARDC) failed attempt to implement a
military solution in North Kivu and Kabila's opposition to
negotiations with renegade General Laurent Nkunda.


3. (C) Shortley's discussions with MONUC military staff
highlighted the failure of the FARDC's recent offensive
against Nkunda's forces and its lack of logistical capacity.
A/DATT and PolCouns sat in.


4. (C) MONUC's briefing clarified that although the current
cessation in hostilities is holding, dangerous flash points
remain in areas where the two forces are closely positioned,
including Sake and Karuba, located around 20 miles west of
Goma, and areas west of Runyoni in Rutshuru Territory. Both
sides appear to be using the present lull to consolidate
their positions and re-supply. MONUC estimates that with
recent reinforcement by the 6th, 14th and 15th integrated

brigades (IBs),FARDC now has around 10,000 troops deployed
in the province, compared to around 4000 hard-core Nkunda
elements and 3000 FDLR. For its part, MONUC is redeploying
a fourth battalion of Indian troops to reinforce its North
Kivu Brigade.


5. (C) The briefing also made clear that the arrival of MONUC
peacekeepers in and around Sake saved the 15th IB after it
disintegrated and fled toward Goma following clashes with
Nkunda's forcesa, much as the 14th had done in December 2006.
MONUC's line is that its peacekeepers entered Sake to
protect the civilian population and deter Nkunda from making
additional advances. Positioning themselves between the two
forces enabled MONUC's North Kivu Brigade to create
conditions necessary for a self-imposed cessation of
hostilities in and around the town.


6. (C) MONUC's analysis is that the FARDC's performance was
predictable. The airlift from Kisangani of some 3,000 troops
of the new 15th IB was impressive, but failure may in
retrospect have been inevitable. It now appears Defense
Minister Chikez Diemu ordered the operation in the face of
unanimous opposition from the military hierarchy, including
Chief of Staff General Dieudonne Kayembe, and was not willing
to coordinate plans with MONUC. Logistical shortcomings
redflagged overconfidence in a quick and easy victory: FARDC
troops were out of food soon after arrival, were not paid and
ran short on ammunition.


7. (C) Briefers noted that MONUC has begun distributing MREs
to FARDC troops. They also reported that two Ilyushin
flights totaling some 70 tons of ammunition and supplies
recently touched down in Kisangani from points respectively
in Libya and Sudan. These flights did not follow military
re-supply requirements laid down by the UN Security Council.


8. (C) MONUC believes that the threshold for Rwandan
intervention is very high at present. It does not believe
that the Rwandan government or military has provided
cross-border assistance to Nkunda or direct Rwandan Defense
Force support.


9. (C) At a dinner hosted by the Charge d'Affaires September
12 SRSG Swing appeared receptive to USG efforts to facilitate
a resolution to the current confrontation. He expressed
support for a U.S. strategy to extend state control, DDRRR,
SSR and a hearts-and-minds outreach program in eastern DRC.
He also encouraged the USG to urge Kabila to resolve the

KINSHASA 00001101 002 OF 002


present crisis through diplomacy.


10. (C) Swing confirmed the military briefers' report that
Kabila had imported over 35 tons of RPGs and 40 tons of light
ammunition in violation of UN Security Council sanctions. He
reported that Kabila had forbidden MONUC to undertake any
negotiations with Nkunda in a meeting the day before that
included MONUC Force Commander General Babacar Gaye.
According to Swing, Gaye told Kabila categorically that FARDC
is not prepared to take on Nkunda,s forces.


11. (C) Swing said that any negotiations with Nkunda would
have to focus on sending his troops for integration into the
FARDC and exile for Nkunda. He said Nkunda would use talks
to press for resolution of the FDLR issue and to heighten his
own importance.


12. (C) Regarding the LRA, Swing reported that two FARDC
battalions are currently being trained and will be ready to
deploy in and around Garamba National Park by December or
January. The objective is to push the LRA out of the park by
January or February.


13. (C) Comment: All indications are that the impetus for
the offensive against Nkunda originated with Kabila, but it
was poorly executed and supported by Defense Minister Chikez
in the face of opposition from the military hierarchy.
Chikez's role leaves him increasingly vulnerable to
replacement in the anticipated government reshuffle. Foreign
Minister Mbusa Nyamwisi told us in a separate conversation
that the Presidency has reassessed the viability of a
military solution. It is clear from the events and
conversations of the past days that Kabila is now fully
prepared to support a diplomatic initiative led by South
Africa (septel). End comment.


14. (C) Mr. Shortley cleared this message.

BROCK