FDLR FIRES INTO AND/OR FROM RWANDA

C O N F I D E N T I A L KIGALI 000899

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2017
TAGS: PINS PINR PREF MOPS RW
SUBJECT: FDLR FIRES INTO AND/OR FROM RWANDA

REF: A. KIGALI 0792

B. KIGALI 0238

Classified By: Ambassador Michael R. Arietti, reason 1.4 (B/D)


1. (C) According to Rwandan military sources, late on the
evening of September 30, a small force of suspected
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR)
soldiers fired several hundred machine gun rounds into Rwanda
from positions on the Congolese side of the border, in a
remote area several miles to the north of the Goma/Gisenyi
border crossing. No injuries or loss of life occurred.
According to these sources, no FDLR soldiers entered Rwandan
territory, the firing apparently an attempt to provoke a
response from Rwandan forces and draw them across the border
(see ref B for a similar event in March). These sources
confirmed local press accounts of the incident, in which
several hundred shell casing were reported to have been found
on October 1, and local military commanders and civilian
officials rushed to reassure residents of a nearly village
that their security was not at risk.


2. (C) However, some Rwandan spokesmen gave conflicting
versions of the attack in statements to the international
media and individual members of the diplomatic corps, saying
that FDLR forces had either attempted to enter Rwandan
territory or had briefly done so. For example, Great Lakes
Envoy Ambassador Richard Sezibera told the BBC October 3 that
FDLR forces had tried to launch an attack on Rwanda, had
failed, and had retreated. Internal Security Secretary
General Ambassador Joseph Mutaboba told pol/econ chief
October 3 a similar story, saying the Rwandan Defense Forces
had repelled the FDLR at the border. In extended comments to
Ambassador Arietti, also on October 3, Chief of External
Security at the National Security Service Joseph Nzabamwita
said a company of FDLR had actually penetrated Rwandan
territory, remained for a period of time, firing their
weapons, and then recrossed the border without interdiction
by Rwandan forces.


3. (C) Nzabamwita said that the Rwandan Defense Forces had
standing orders not to cross the Congolese border, and had
not done so in pursuit of the FDLR force. "They want to pull
us in," he said, "and we will not cross." He expressed
considerable frustration with the "complete disarray" on the
Congolese side of the border, noting the FDLR force had
passed through Congolese army lines both to reach Rwandan
territory and to retreat from it. He said the Congolese
government had still not appointed any members to serve on
the recently-revived Joint Verification Commission, and thus
no official body was in place to investigate the incident.


4. (C) Comment. To our knowledge, aside from Sezibera's
comments to the BBC, the Rwandan government has not issued
any formal statements on the FDLR incident. Although
Mutaboba and Nzabamwita expressed to us individually their
considerable frustration at the event, and what they consider
a lack of international interest in FDLR actions, the Rwandan
government itself remains institutionally quiet, making
little effort to publicize the incident or demand
international attention. For such a well-disciplined
government, Sezibera's and Mutaboba's messages conflict with
Nzabamwita's comments to the Ambassador on the exact nature
of the attack -- a curious breach of coordination. The
attack itself appears to have been minor, but troubling,
particularly given earlier GOR concern that the FDLR may be
moving closer to the Rwandan border (ref A). End comment.
ARIETTI