Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07KIGALI792
2007-09-06 15:52:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kigali
Cable title:  

AMBASSADOR SEZIBERA ON FOREIGN MINISTER TRIP TO

Tags:  PREL PGOV PHUM RW 
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FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4602
INFO RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA 0130
RUEHDR/AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 0945
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 1697
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0272
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0094
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0974
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0311
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0074
C O N F I D E N T I A L KIGALI 000792 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM RW
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR SEZIBERA ON FOREIGN MINISTER TRIP TO
KINSHASA

REF: KINSHASA 1063

Classified By: Ambassador Michael R. Arietti, reason 1.4 (B/D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L KIGALI 000792

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM RW
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR SEZIBERA ON FOREIGN MINISTER TRIP TO
KINSHASA

REF: KINSHASA 1063

Classified By: Ambassador Michael R. Arietti, reason 1.4 (B/D)


1. (C) Summary. Ambassador met with Great Lakes Envoy
Ambassador Richard Sezibera on September 6 to discuss the
recent meeting in Kinshasa between the Rwandan and Congolese
Foreign Ministers (which Sezibera attended). Sezibera
described the interactions as "about what we expected," and
said the fundamental problem centered on which negative force
merited immediate action. The Congolese repeatedly
characterized action against renegade general Laurent Nkunda
as of primary importance (and strictly an internal matter for
the Congolese government to address). Action against the
FDLR could wait. The Rwandans, said Sezibera, argued that the
FDLR should be confronted first, and once disposed of, they
would create conditions in which Nkunda "would be no longer
needed" by the populations he protects, and could be dealt
with fairly easily. Sezibera praised the new (or newly
revived) mechanisms put in place, including the Joint
Verification Teams for security issues, the Joint Working
Teams for borders, and the Evaluation Mechanism at the
Ministerial level. He expressed concern at reports that the
Congolese armed forces were re-equipping the FDLR, and that
the heavy concentrations of Congolese troops in the Kivus
would soon prove unmanageable, bereft of logistical support,
and likely to commit extensive human rights abuses as they
pillaged to support themselves. For Sezibera, the Congolese
were confronting the wrong foe, in the wrong way, at the
wrong time. (FYI: MFA has just invited diplomatic
missions to a September 7 briefing by FM Murigande on the
trip.) End summary.


2. (C) In his September 6 meeting with Ambassador Arietti,
Great Lakes Envoy Ambassador Richard Sezibera described the
initial two-hour behind-closed-doors session with the
Congolese Foreign Minister (also attended by the GODRC
Defense, Interior, and Energy Ministers) as "difficult,"
although the two teams did achieve ultimate agreement on
cooperative mechanisms as described in the final communique.
He noted that Defense Minister Diemu appeared particularly

unhappy with the offer by the Rwandans to once again mediate
between Nkunda and the Congolese, and by Murigande's repeated
suggestion that "the heart of the Nkunda problem is the
FDLR." Diemu appeared unbending on the question of military
operations against Nkunda -- the Congolese had spent
significant time and energy preparing an offensive against
Nkunda, Diemu said, and the military effort must continue.


3. (C) Sezibera said that his government is particularly
concerned by the prospect of a weakened or defeated Nkunda
and a strengthened FDLR, which might then move closer to
Rwanda's borders, with the potential to engage in direct
military operations against the GOR. He noted his particular
concern of reports that the Congolese military were
re-supplying the FDLR with "relatively heavy" weapons that
did not appear to be the usual sort of small-scale purchase
and bartering engaged in by local Congolese commanders in the
past. "Anti-aircraft guns and 107mm howitzer shells," he
said, are not small arms. He added there were also
indications that the Congolese military was engaged in joint
planning meetings with the FDLR.


4. (C) There was no doubt, Sezibera contended, that the
Congolese military had started the fighting, in fact, he
said, Kabila himself had ordered it. So far the results were
mixed, with Nkunda forces pushed out of some positions and
having gained others. He pointedly noted the poor
performance of Congolese forces in the past, and said the
very heavy buildup of troops in the Kivus was "unmanageable,"
could not be sustained logistically, and would likely result
in extensive human rights abuses as the troops sought to
support themselves by pillaging local populations. He noted
that in the Kinshasa meeting the Congolese had initially
complained of the supposed entry of six Rwandan infantry
companies into the Kivus, but quickly relented, apparently
acknowledging the weakness of the charge.


5. (C) He further stated that as far as the GOR is
concerned, the Tripartite-Plus structure agreed upon at the
recent Chiefs of Defense Staff (CHODS) meeting in Kigali (ref
B) should continue, with the J2/J3 meetings in Kisangani,
the follow-on CHODS review of their planning, and then
proposed military action at the end of the month. Sezibera

doubted that any sustained action could result from those
efforts, given the ongoing military campaign against Nkunda
(and with the object of those end-of-September military
actions still unnamed).


6. (C) On the question of normalizing relations with the
GDRC, Sezibera said the matter had "not really come up" in
the conversations -- the Congolese did not wish to discuss
normalization, and the Rwandans had not mentioned it. He did
not believe, for example, that the opening of consulates
would be a useful first step; normalization had to occur with
the exchange of embassies in the respective capitals.


7. (C) Briefly touching on the continuing dispute with the
Ugandans over the alleged existence of the PRA, Sezibera
flatly called it a domestic political issue for Uganda, with
the Museveni government seeking to brand his principal
political opponent Cyiza Besigye a "negative force" with the
assistance of the Tripartite-Plus process. Little or no
proof had been submitted by the Ugandans concerning the PRA,
and he suggested that if a special Tripartite-Plus were
constituted to look into it, they would find "nothing to
support Ugandan claims." He was pessimistic that this issue
could be sorted out at the bilateral political level.


8. (C) Comment. Sezibera clearly saw value in continuing
discussions with Congolese counterparts, and praised the use
of various joint mechanisms to assure regular treatment of
security and other issues on a bilateral basis. (FYI. He
noted that until the DRC last year pulled out of the Joint
Verification Commission, there had been 21 investigations of
cross border allegations by joint Rwanda/DRC/MONUC teams.)
However, while GOR accepts that the DRC cannot permit Nkunda
to continue as an independent military force in the Kivus, it
regrets that Kinshasa is following the military and not the
political course to address the problem. The Rwandans fear
unintended results if fighting with Nkunda's forces
continues, and the FDLR can expand its reach and its attacks.
According to Sezibera, the Congolese appear determined to
confront the wrong foe. End comment.

ARIETTI