RWANDA: FEAR OF MILITARY SOLUTION TO KIVU CRISIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KIGALI 000668

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/20/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV RW
SUBJECT: RWANDA: FEAR OF MILITARY SOLUTION TO KIVU CRISIS

Classified By: Ambassador Michael R. Arietti for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).


1. (C) Summary: Ambassador met Minister of Foreign Affairs
Charles Murigande on July 20 to discuss GOR concerns about
the possibility of a military solution to the situation in
the Kivus. Murigande expressed GOR worries that, if a
military solution is pursued, DRC President Kabila will be
unable to defeat dissident General Laurent Nkunda without
resorting to the assistance of FDLR (ex-FAR/Interahamwe)
troops. This move would not solve the underlying causes of
the crisis, could destabilize the region, and would put
pressure on the GOR to take action. Murigande requested U.S.
support to encourage Kabila to find a political solution, and
said that the GOR is willing to return to talks with the GDRC
to resolve the Nkunda dilemma. In a separate conversation on
July 20, the Ambassador spoke with Belgian Ambassador Roux to
discuss GOB views of the Kivu situation. End summary.


2. (C) Minister Murigande invited Ambassador to a July 20
meeting to discuss GOR concerns about the situation in the
Kivus in eastern Congo. He said that the ongoing deployment
of weapons and movement of FARDC troops to North Kivu and
Goma signals an attempt by DRC President Kabila to fight and
defeat renegade General Laurent Nkunda militarily. He said
that many analysts contend that FARDC forces alone would be
unable to subdue or completely defeat Nkunda. The GOR fears
that Kabila will resort to using FDLR (ex-FAR/Interahamwe)
troops for this purpose. Murigande noted that although
Kabila had told the GOR that he would not cooperate with the
FDLR, there is evidence that some of his operatives are in
close discussions with the FDLR.


3. (C) Murigande said that FDLR forces would not provide
their support to the FARDC against Nkunda without getting
something in return, such as access to weapons and ammunition
or a promise by the GDRC to support the FDLR goal to
"overthrow or at least disturb" the GOR. He said that there
are no mechanisms for the FDLR to disarm after assisting
FARDC troops.


4. (C) The GOR sees other potential pitfalls to a military
solution. Murigande said that there is no guarantee that a
combined FDLR/FARDC force could defeat Nkunda and that a
military "adventure" could create complications and
"collateral damage" in the form of hundreds of thousands of
displaced people and refugees.


5. (C) Murigande said that the GOR supports the GDRC's desire
to exercise its sovereignty and disarm rebel groups. He said
that many unauthorized armed groups are present in the DRC,
but that "foreign groups" such as the FDLR perhaps represent
a greater infringement of their sovereignty. He said that if
the DRC disarmed the FDLR and created security for Tutsis
there, the Nkunda problem would disappear. Murigande further
stated that the reason for the "Nkunda phenomenon" is the
continued fear of ethnic violence toward Congolese Tutsis by
FDLR forces. He also said that, as long as Nkunda's soldiers
felt their families were threatened by the existence of the
FDLR, they would refuse to be integrated and moved with the
FARDC.


6. (C) Murigande requested U.S. support to encourage Kabila
to pursue a political solution to the situation with Nkunda.
He said that earlier talks with Nkunda had failed because
Kabila succumbed to extremist pressures. Past plans to
create security for Tutsis in the DRC, for refugees to be
returned, and for integration of armed forces were abandoned.
Murigande said that the GOR would be willing to facilitate
further rounds of talks with Nkunda to find a political
resolution. He thought Nkunda could be convinced to have
his troops enter brassage, rather than mixage, brigades so
long as these troops remained stationed in the Kivus.


7. (C) Murigande said that the GOR is also pursuing bilateral
talks. He had sought a meeting with his DRC counterpart at
the recent AU summit in Accra. The two of them had agreed to
further bilateral talks, perhaps facilitated by South Africa.
However, Kabila had said that he preferred direct talks and
the GDRC had invited Murigande for a visit in late July. The
timing did not work for the Rwandans, who are hosting a large
AU meeting at that time, but Murigande said he is proposing
alternative dates, perhaps early August.


8. (C) Ambassador told Murigande that cooperation by the GDRC

KIGALI 00000668 002 OF 002


with the FDLR, either overt or covert, would be a serious
problem. He noted that the USG shared the GOR desire for a
political solution to the Kivu problems and that the USG has
delivered that message regularly. GOR efforts to find a way
to resolve the Nkunda problem would be helpful. Ambassador
agreed to pass GOR views on to Washington and to keep in
touch on how to help resolve the current problems.


9. (C) In a separate conversation with the Ambassador on July
20, Belgian Ambassador Roux summarized GOB views of the Kivu
situation and the results of the recent visit of Foreign
Minister de Gucht. The Belgians are worried at the
increasing risk of a serious military incident stemming from
pressures from hardliners in the DRC and the impasse with
Nkunda. The increase in FARDC military forces in the Kivu
could lead to more fighting and serious consequences for the
civilian population. The Foreign Minister had had good
discussions with President Kagame and the GOR. (He had
originally sought to visit Kinshasa first, then Kigali and
then return to Kinshasa, but the GDRC had rejected this
scenario.) After his visit to Kigali, the Belgian FM visited
Kinshasa and met with Kabila. He told Kabila that he needed
to take back Congolese refugees from Rwanda, he should ensure
that there was more representation of Tutsis in both
provincial and national institutions, and that he should
support a new mandate for MONUC authorizing to take a more
offensive role against the FDLR. Amb. Roux said this had
been a difficult meeting, but not as bad as a prior one
between Kabila and EU rep Louis Michel, which had been very
rough. Amb. Roux said that the GOB was very disturbed by
what it had heard the MONUC commander state, i.e. that if it
came down to a conflict between FARDC forces allied with the
FDLR against Nkunda,s forces, MONUC would have to back the
FARDC-FDLR side. The prospect of MONUC supporting a group
which the UN has labeled terrorist and subject to sanctions
shocked the GOB.
ARIETTI