THE FDLR -- READY TO FOLD IF PUSHED HARD ENOUGH?

C O N F I D E N T I A L KIGALI 000589

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2017
TAGS: PREL PHUM MOPS RW
SUBJECT: THE FDLR -- READY TO FOLD IF PUSHED HARD ENOUGH?

Classified By: Ambassador Michael R. Arietti, reason 1.4 (B/D)

REF: 06 KIGALI 1013


1. (C) Summary. In a two-hour briefing before senior GOR
military and civilian officials and representatives of the
local diplomatic corps, MDRP researchers (hired by the
Multi-lateral Demobilization and Reintegration Program)
presented detailed information and analysis based upon months
of field investigation of the FDLR in North and South Kivu.
The researcher argued forcefully that the FDLR although still
well-organized, in control of up to 50 percent of the two
provinces, and led by hard-line leaders who exercise harsh
discipline to maintain their positions, is in fact weakened
and ready to split and dissolve if organized and concerted
pressure is brought to bear. Missing from his analysis, as
he openly acknowledged, is exactly how this pressure is be
brought to bear, given present conditions in the Kivus, and
the relative strength, mission and capacity of opposing
forces -- MONUC, FARDC, and neighboring nations' forces.
End summary.


2. (C) MDRP researcher Hans Romkema, a long-time resident of
the region, and a Congolese colleague on June 20 presented a
detailed overview and analysis of the FDLR in North and South
Kivu to an attentive audience that included Ambassador
Richard Sezibera, Brigadier General Richard Rutatina,
Secretary General of Internal Security Ambassador Joseph

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Mutaboba, other GOR officials, and members of the diplomatic
corps. Romkema offered extensive remarks on the composition
and position of FDLR formations, including maps, organigrams
and force numbers at brigade level and below. According to
Romkema, the FDLR exclusively controls large swaths of the
interiors of both provinces, and exercises "strong influence"
over other territories, comprising altogether approximately
fifty percent of the territory of each province. He sketched
an organization characterized by regularized administrative
routines, iron discipline (including brutal punishment --
death for officers -- for any who attempt to desert),and in
control of sufficient resources and transportation routes to
keep itself in the field and adequately armed and trained for
the foreseeable future. "It functions like a real army," he
told polchief in a following conversation. "Soldiers go on
leave, they retire, they get assigned to training courses."


3. (C) However, Romkena also presented an organization that
is slowly shrinking in size, has lost its previous regional
patrons, and is subject to dissension, sinking morale, and a
growing internal questioning of its purpose. While most
observers have concluded for some time that the overwhelming
majority of FDLR members would leave if allowed to do so,
Romkema posits a leadership structure that is also crumbling
-- although in a manner peculiar to the FDLR, as moderate
leaders "withdraw" and extremists increasingly take on
directing roles. Each group, in fact, looks for ways to
leave the forest -- "moderates" by returning to Rwanda, or
simply disappearing into the DRC's vast spaces, and
extremists by secretly planning their own well-funded escapes
to other countries under assumed identities.


4. (C) From an estimated 15,00 to 20,000 troops as late as
2003, Romkena put FDLR numbers at a conventionally accepted
7000 soldiers, including 200-300 hard-line officers.
Additionally, he estimated approximately 50,000 loyal
civilian supporters, including several thousand of whom had
been armed and trained to some degree. All three groups,
extremist leaders, rank-and-file, and civilian supporters,
are in varying degrees recipients and/or supporters of three
sharply conflicting policy objectives: peace, genocide,
escape.


5. (C) For the outside world, said Romkema the FDLR
leadership attempts to project the image of an organization
interested in negotiation, compromise, and, ultimately, a
peaceful return to Rwanda. Internally, for the rank and file
and civilian supporters, the FDLR leadership proclaims its
goals remain the eradication of the Kagame regime and the
institution of a Hutu Power government in Rwanda. According
to Romkena, the rank and file are largely unfamiliar with the
"official" policy line of the FDLR, and know only this
internal message -- war, conquest, a return to genocide.
Thirdly, says Romkema, the innermost leadership clique, those
directly implicated in the 1994 genocide, work assiduously to
amass personal fortunes (as do all the military leaders),and
prepare for the day when they must flee the forest and seek
new lives under new identities. This last objective is
masked by continuing planning for military operations against
the GOR, as a means of retaining the loyalty and discipline
of the rank and file.


6. (C) The MDRP researchers suggest that, given its internal
conflicts and slowly shrinking military force, the FDLR could
disintegrate, if confronted with sufficiently robust and
convincing military pressure on a broad front. The
researchers drew a distinction between outright military
assualt on the FDLR, and the bringing to bear of military
"demonstrations" of compellingly large size and coordination.
Extremist leadership, without alternative, would flee to
third countries; moderate leadership would opt for a return
to Rwanda or a comfortable exile in the DRC; rank and file
and civilians would either return to Rwanda, or continue to
live where they find themselves. Any such military
confrontation, the researchers acknowledged, would require
extensive efforts to protect local populations as the FDLR
collapsed and fled.


7. (C) The MDRP researchers freely conceded that no military
force present today in the DRC could alone effect such a
confrontation with the FDLR. MONUC lacked the proper
mandate; the FARDC was operationally incapable, and at least
partially compromised from extensive "cohabitation" with the
FDLR; and the participation of other nation's militaries,
including Rwanda's, was politically unpalatable for the GODRC
and unlikely in the near-term. They suggested as
alternatives a "last chance" revival of the March 2005 Rome
Declaration process for the peaceful repatriation of the
FDLR; an enhanced and individualized appeal to targeted FDLR
leadership to encourage their return; and the search for a
"temporary solution" for the 200-300 core extremists --
perhaps a short-term refuge in a third country, followed by
undefined legal "measures."


8. (C) Rwanda officials at the briefing expressed broad
agreement with the MDRP analysis of the FDLR, while
expressing weariness with the recommendations. "We have
heard this all before," said Ambassador Sezibera and several
others. When Romkema replied that the FDLR planned an
unprecedented meeting of all senior commanders the week of
June 25 to consider the FDLR's future, the GOR officials
minimized the meeting's importance, saying, "they have these
meetings from time to time." The GOR officials in the room
were uniform on one point: the need for the international
community to "get serious" in assisting the governments of
the region to finally deal with the FDLR.


9. (C) Comment. Despite the theoretical brittleness of the
FDLR, its waning numbers, wavering commitment to its original
(genocidal) goals, and growing division within its ranks, for
many observers it still remains the most effective military
formation in the Kivus. The lack of a capable countering
force suggests it may endure for some time to come.
Multilateral diplomatic efforts such as the USG's
Tripartite-Plus meetings are accepted by the Rwandans as
useful but limited tools for dealing with the FDLR. Without
explaining exactly how it is to happen, they want "action"
now. End comment.


ARIETTI