KAGAME ON TRIPARTITE-PLUS, DARFUR, AND REFUGEE

C O N F I D E N T I A L KIGALI 000281

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/13/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF RW
SUBJECT: KAGAME ON TRIPARTITE-PLUS, DARFUR, AND REFUGEE
ISSUES

Classified By: Ambassador Michael R. Arietti, reason 1.4 (B/D)


1. (C) On March 16 AF DAS James Swan advised President
Kagame on the principal successes of the just-completed
Tripartite Plus conference, detailing progress on "active
approaches" toward eliminating Negative Forces, and a common
"Wanted List" to be circulated among the four nations by
means of the Fusion Cell intelligence apparatus. Swan also
commended Rwanda's "patience" and professionalism in its
military deployment to Darfur as part of the AMIS
peace-keeping mission, and asked Rwanda to continue its
"critical" participation. Kagame detailed his government's
frustration with the AMIS mission, and said deployment of the
previously pledged 4th battalion was "frozen" pending
resolution of AMIS leadership and other issues. PRM DAS
William Fitzgerald expressed USG disappointment with
Tanzanian treatment of rwandaphone expellees, noting he would
address the issue with Tanzanian authorities on the next leg
of his trip, and stated that "now was the time" to begin
repatriation of Congolese refugees to the DRC from Rwandan
camps. End summary.


2. (C) AF DAS Swan and PRM DAS Fitzgerald met President
Kagame March 16 in Kigali, driving to the presidential
compound immediately upon the conclusion of the March 14-16
Tripartite Joint Commission (TJC) meeting (see septel on
Tripartite deliberations). Ambassador Arietti, Foreign
Minister Charles Murigande, and Great Lakes Envoy Richard
Sezibera also participated. Swan told Kagame that the
Tripartite meeting had been successful on a number of fronts,
and the USG intended to continue its stewardship of the
sessions "so long as the four governments wish us to." Swan
said that good progress had been made in sharing intelligence
with a view toward "active approaches" toward Negative
Forces. The agreement that the four Defense Ministers would
meet within a month's time was one sign of this strengthened
commitment to activists solutions. Swan also commended
progress on a combined "Wanted List" to be examined by the
Tripartite Fusion Cell and Focal Points. Several delegations
had shown flexibility on shared lists of names, and the TJC
had agreed to work toward adopting a common list at its next
session in June.


3. (C) Swan also offered "strong support" for the Rwandan
deployment to Darfur, saying the USG recognized the
"patience" exercised by the GOR in dealing with the many
problems associated with the AMIS mission. Rwanda's
participation in AMIS was "critical" to its success, as the
RDF battalions were the most effective in the field. While
the USG was sympathetic to Rwanda's frustrations, he asked
that Rwanda continue its deployment. Without Rwandan
participation, the situation would be "far worse than it is."
The USG, said Swan, was supportive of Rwanda's candidacy for
an AMIS leadership position, and suggested that Kagame
contact South African President Mbeki, who was himself in
contact with President Bashir.


4. (C) Kagame began by expressing his support for the
Tripartite Plus process. He noted Rwanda's continuing
concern for events in eastern DRC, and detailed the GOR's
participation in efforts to reintegrate Laurent Nkunda's
military formations in the FARDC. Rwanda had acted at the
behest of President Kabila, and had worked to "put the DRC
and Nkunda together." After these joint efforts, the GOR
was, then, surprised to find Nkunda on the DRC first list of
"wanted names" at the Tripartite sessions. DAS Swan noted
that the DRC delegation had shown "sensitivity" on this issue
(as it had in removing senior Ugandan officials from its
list, he said),and it was reconsidering its list. Kagame
replied that the four nations needed to be "frank" on names
for inclusion, and there must be no "internal
score-settling." Kagame said that the GOR remained ready to
assist the DRC with the eradication of Negative Forces, and
that a GOR military team, at the request of President Kabila,
was in Goma to discuss options with FARDC commanders.


5. (C) Kagame next expressed at length Rwanda's continuing
frustration over events in Sudan and Darfur. Rwanda found
the AU "unresponsive" on the many problems facing the AMIS
deployment, including the force's general mandate, its
command structure (the Nigerian AMIS commander was "totally
useless," he said),and logistical support. "We are told to
be patient," he said, but Rwanda wanted to be effective and
efficient in its Darfur deployment, or "we are finished." He
then noted that Rwanda's frustrations had even pricked a
conspiratorial reaction from a Ghanaian representative to the
AU (unnamed). The Ghanaian had surmised that Rwanda's
expressed disappointments with AMIS were generated by the
U.S., which intended to step into the "vacuum" created by a
Rwandan withdrawal, presumably with troops of its own. While
this was "farcical," he said, Rwandan did not want to remain
in an ineffective mission. Kagame noted that while the GOR
had accepted in principle the sending of a fourth battalion

to Darfur, that additional deployment was now "frozen,"
pending improvement in AMIS support and performance.


6. (C) Repeating the USG's wish to see Rwanda remain in
Darfur, DAS Swan reiterated that the USG would try to assist
the GOR in securing the AMIS force commander or other
leadership position, although the USG did not have a "place
at the AU table" when it came to such decisions. Regarding
Rwanda's outstanding request for USG airlift to Darfur (Note:
one rotation battalion was airlifted recently by the
Algerians; two others await USG airlift) Swan said that the
State Department and DOD were "working the issue."


7. (C) DAS Fitzgerald then expressed concern for the plight
of rwandaphone inhabitants of western Tanzania being pushed
back over the border without great concern for their "dignity
or property." While the GOZ and GOR had agreed upon the
return of this population (not including those who have
long-standing and legitimate claims on Tanzanian
citizenship),the manner of their expulsion was "not
acceptable." Upon his arrival in Dar es Salaam, Fitzgerald
said he would "take up the matter" with Tanzanian
authorities. Tanzania had for decades had a solid record on
refugee matters, he said, and he hoped to encourage them to
continue it.


8. (C) Finally, DAS Fitzgerald noted his recent passage
through several regions of the DRC, and said "the time is
now" to begin repatriation of Congolese refugees in Rwanda.
The security situation in DRC was acceptable in several
eastern provinces, including South Kivu and Katanga, and the
process of encouraging these refugee populations to return
should begin in the near future.


9. (C) Kagame replied that Rwanda had decided to communicate
its concerns regarding the Tanzanian returnees in private,
and avoid any public disagreements. The GOT was "very
defensive" on the matter. The GOR wished to encourage better
treatment, and more examination of the citizenship claims of
some of the returnees, in a low-key manner. Kagame agreed
that some of the Congolese refugees could return home now,
but the situation was difficult, as the refugees "changed
their minds regularly" on whether or not it was time to go.
Equally, the DRC government changed its mind on whether it
was "time to receive them."


10. (C) Comment. As usual, President Kagame was punctual,
focused, and explicit in his comments and concerns. Unlike
the locally published remarks of Foreign Minister Murigande,
he did not set any timeline for improvements in AMIS
(Murigande said, in effect, "AMIS must be better in 6 months
or we leave"),but Kagame was very clear in his unhappiness
with the conduct of AMIS peacekeeping operations, and the
need for positive improvements. He appeared satisfied with
the results of the Tripartite-Plus Commission sessions, and
willing to work closely with President Kabila to seek an end
to instability in eastern Congo. End summary.
ARIETTI