RWANDAN EXTERNAL AFFAIRS CHIEF ON EASTERN CONGO

C O N F I D E N T I A L KIGALI 001075

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2017
TAGS: PREL PHUM PINR RW
SUBJECT: RWANDAN EXTERNAL AFFAIRS CHIEF ON EASTERN CONGO


Classified By: Ambassador Michael R. Arietti, reason 1.4 (B/D)


1. (C) Summary. Ambassador met with National Security
Service External Affairs Chief Joseph Nzabamwita, at his
request, on November 19 in Kigali to discuss events in the
eastern Congo and potential avenues of action against the
FDLR. Nzabamwita saw an unstable balance of forces in North
Kivu among Nkunda, the Democratic Force for the Liberation of
Rwanda (FDLR) and the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic
of the Congo (FARDC),with each facing looming logistical
constraints and temptations to ease them by military action.
He found the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)
government to be "serious this time," considering the Nairobi
Communique a good foundation for future action. While
agreeing that a full basket of political, diplomatic and
military options needed to be crafted, he believed that quick
action against the FDLR command center in North Kivu, to
seize or kill FDLR commander-in-chief Sylvestre Mudacumura
and his principal lieutenants, would break the FDLR and end
its long reign of terror in the eastern Congo. Nzabamwita's
comments on the Nairobi Communique were the most positive
assessment from a Rwandan official we have heard in some time
on the subject of negative forces in the Congo. He made
clear, however, that while continuing concerted action on
diplomatic and political fronts are necessary components of
progress in the Kivus, but effective use of military force
may be necessary as well. We see this meeting as a Rwandan
government (GOR) effort to carry through on promises, made
during AF Advisor Shortley's recent visit, to expand dialogue
on eastern Congo developments and the FDLR. End summary.


2. (C) Nzabamwita began his meeting with Ambassador on
November 19 by thanking the USG for its renewed efforts to
confront negative forces in the eastern Congo, praising
particularly its role in the November 9 Nairobi Communique on
the margins of the Conference on the Great Lakes sessions.
"We should take the Congolese seriously this time," he said,
referring to the December 1 date for the submission of an
action plan by the DRC government (as assisted by MONUC).
However, he cautioned that the GOR saw a "deteriorating
balance of forces" in North Kivu among Nkunda, the FDLR and
the Congolese armed forces, with each force facing increasing
logistical problems and thereby possibly tempted to address
them by military action. "We need a disengagement of forces
to avoid fighting," he said, adding that, "even accidents
could lead to serious fighting.".


3. (C) When asked by Ambassador to cite the FDLR's
principal weak points, Nzabamwita said the most effective
means of harming the FDLR would be a quick assault on its
headquarters in North Kivu, with a attempt to either kill or
capture FDLR Major General Mudacumura and his lieutenants.
"All the senior commanders are in North Kivu," he said. If
Mudacumura were taken, the FDLR would collapse, he predicted.


4. (C) Nzabamwita said there were several positive signs in
the Kivus in recent days: the GOR had seen reduced military
shipments to the FDLR from local Congolese army commanders
since the Nairobi Communique; the DRC defense minister had
pledged to "discipline" eastern Congo military commanders who
aided the FDLR (although he had not done so, yet, said
Nzabamwita); and several individual DRC commanders were
clearly opposed to aiding the FDLR. However, the Rwandans
had received one disturbing intelligence report, he said,
from GOR sources close to the FDLR. The FDLR 2nd division
commander had met with the FARDC 10th military district
commander, who was accompanied by the local MONUC commander.
The message supposedly passed from the FARDC commander to the
FDLR was to ignore the Nairobi Communique, since the FARDC
and FDLR are still on the same side. Not discounting that
this could be FDLR misinformation, Nzabamwita commented that,
if true, the report would be a worrying counter to the
Nairobi momentum. One reaction to recalcitrant Congolese
commanders should be to "switch them" out of the Kivus, he
said. In particular, he cited 8th Military Region Deputy for
Operations and Intelligence, Colonel Delphin Kahimi.


5. (C) Ambassador noted that a combined approach to the FDLR
and other negative forces in the Kivus was called for in the
Nairobi Communique, with its emphasis on coordinated
political, diplomatic and military actions by the DRC and
Rwanda. The Ambassador noted the GOR had pledged at Nairobi
to "seal" its border. What this meant as a minimum,
suggested the Ambassador, was the halting of any recruitment
attempts by Nkunda operatives in refugee camps. While
acknowledging that refugee camps in Rwanda, as elsewhere, had
no fences and no locked gates, the Ambassador pressed for
more action in this regard. Nzabamwita agreed that the
combined approach of the Nairobi Communique was important. He
also stated, "we will do what we can on the refugee
recruiting."


6. (C) As a side note, Nzabamwita acknowledged continuing
difficulties at the Tripartite-Plus Fusion Cell in Kisangani
with the Ugandan intelligence service on the subject of
agreed lists of negative forces members and the People's
Redemption Army (PRA). Noting that Uganda had failed to
provide credible intelligence on the PRA's military
structures, the Fusion Cell had been unable to confirm its
existence as a political-military negative force. Ugandan
insistence on including names for a force no one else
believed existed made work in Kisangani "very difficult," he
said.


7. (C) Ambassador also reminded Nzabamwita of the USG desire
that Rwanda encourage Nkunda to send at least some of his men
to brassage as a positive gesture. He noted that the Nairobi
Agreement, with its focus on the FDLR, showed USG
understanding of the need to take into account threats to
vulnerable Tutsi populations. Nkunda should now show his
good will.


8. (C) Comment. Nzabamwita's cautious but supportive
comments on the Nairobi Communique are the most positive
assessment from Rwandan officialdom we have heard in some
time on the subject of negative forces in eastern Congo and
the many plans over the last months and years to eradicate
them. As he made clear, while continuing concerted action on
diplomatic and political fronts are necessary components of
progress in the Kivus, effective use of military force may be
necessary as well. End Comment.


ARIETTI