UN/DPA ASSISTANT SECRETARY GENERAL MEETING WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L KIGALI 001040

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM MOPS KPKO RW CG
SUBJECT: UN/DPA ASSISTANT SECRETARY GENERAL MEETING WITH
LOCAL P3AND2 REPS

REF: A. KINSHASA 1251


B. KINSHASA 1252

C. KINSHASA 1264

D. KIGALI 1019

E. KIGALI 1022

F. KIGALI 1026

Classified By: Ambassador Michael R. Arietti, reason 1.4 (B/D)


1. (C) Summary. UN/DPA Assistant Secretary General Haile
Menkerios met with local representatives of the P3and2 to
brief them on his new mandate, recent discussions in
Kinshasa, Goma, and meetings with Rwandan officials. Rwanda
and the DRC needed to reach common understandings on security
issues in the Kivus, and an attempt would be made to do so at
side meetings at the International Conference of the Great
Lakes in Nairobi. President Kabila accepted the concept of
simultaneous operations against the FDLR and General Nkunda,
and Menkerios had tasked MONUC to determine what resources
were needed to do so. While President Kabila misunderstood
the dynamics of the Kivus, he accepted that his military
strategy needed broadening to include diplomatic and
political initiatives. Differences between Rwanda and the
DRC could be bridged, and a workable plan constructed. End
summary.


2. (C) Menkerios said he is working to get the Rwandese and
Congolese to: 1) achieve a common understanding between
Rwanda and Congo on the analysis of the problem; 2) agree on
tools, mandates and resources necessary to deal with the
situation in North Kivu; and 3) obtain necessary UNSC
approval to take action. He said Rwanda and Congo needed to
reach a common plan to address the situation in North Kivu.
Kabila had agreed to a package approach that includes dealing
simultaneously with the FDLR and General Nkunda, which
greatly facilitated the prospect for progress (most
stakeholders agreed to the simultaneous strategy, he added).
He noted, however, that the Congolese ruled out any joint
DRC-Rwandan operation against the FDLR and ruled out any
formal negotiations with Nkunda. Menkerios said he had
stressed to the Congolese that a military solution alone
would not achieved the desired results and that both a
political strategy and military plan was needed. He told
President Kabila that MONUC will
not move against Nkunda except when civilians are threatened.



3. (C) Menkerios underscored that Nkunda is a "phenomena,"
while the FDLR is the root cause of insecurity in eastern
DRC. Dealing with the FDLR problem will also effectively
deal with Nkunda. Menkerios noted that the inability of the
Congolese military to deal with Nkunda coupled with the
government's demonization of Nkunda has resulted in a highly
charged political situation that has negatively affected
Kabila's popular support and gravely increased ethnic
tensions. He stressed the dire situation in North Kivu
required immediate results to de-escalate the situation and
provide space for further dialogue with Nkunda (without
violating Kabila's ban on negotiations). He underscored the
credibility gap that Kabila carries, saying, "he promises
everything, but delivers nothing" and stressed "Congo remains
a state in the making." However, Menkerios commented, it is
wrong to suggest that the DRC is arming the FDLR. Rather, he
underscored, members of the armed forces appear to be
involved in arming the FDLR.


4. (C) Menkerios said President Kabila was not receiving
accurate information, and as a result misunderstood the
current dynamics in the Kivus. Kabila had weak control over
his government, and the administrative apparatus was
"chaotic." However, Kabila now understood that his military
strategy against Nkunda had been unsuccessful. Regarding war
crimes and other offenses in the Kivus, Kabila had moved
against abusive officers, Menkerios asserted, but did not do
so in a systematic manner.


5. (C) Menkerios told the gathered diplomats that he had
tasked the MONUC Force commander to answer the question: what
additional force is required to carry out a simultaneous
military strategy that deals with both FDLR and Nkunda?
Menkerios stressed that it is impossible to say at this time
what is needed to bolster the capacity of MONUC and FARDC to
deal with both Nkunda and FDLR concurrently. For example,
MONUC knew the location of FDLR command and control centers,
and could move against them. Special operations against FDLR
leadership were also needed. These would need to be
carefully coordinated. Rwandan officials had told him that
if the FDLR launched attacks on Rwanda, Rwanda would respond.
This needed to be prevented.


6. (C) According to Menkerios, Rwanda believes the
international community does not have the will to solve the

problem and that UN Security Council action is required. He
noted that Rwanda's response to the Congolese FDLR plan was a
list of maxims and could be further negotiated and a
compromise found. For example, Rwanda did not want FDLR
personnel relocated anywhere in the DRC. However, once
disarmed, could they be considered noncombatants and moved
within the Congo? Bridging the differences was not
insurmountable, and he added that he will host the GOR and
GDRC Foreign Ministers at a side meeting at the International
Conference on the Great Lakes on Friday, November 9, 2007.
He noted that the Senior Adviser Shortley and EU Special
Envoy Roland Van der Geer will also be present, and said the
UN Secretary General had asked Menkerios to work closely with
the U.S. as well as other stakeholders.

ARIETTI