SENIOR ADVISOR SHORTLEY CALLS ON NATIONAL SECURITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L KIGALI 001024

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2017
TAGS: PREL PINR PHUM MOPS RW
SUBJECT: SENIOR ADVISOR SHORTLEY CALLS ON NATIONAL SECURITY
ADVISOR NDAHIRO

REF: A. KIGALI 1019


B. KIGALI 1022

Classified By: Ambassador Michael R. Arietti, reason 1.4 (B/D)


1. (C) Summary. Senior Advisor for Conflict Resolution
Timothy Shortley and Ambassador called on National Security
Advisor Emmanuel Ndahiro on October 6 to discuss enhanced US
engagement on addressing negative forces in eastern DRC and
ending the stand-off with Nkunda. Ndahiro pledged Rwandan
support for the USG effort to de-escalate the situation with
Nkunda and to begin concrete actions against the FDLR. He
agreed to assemble extensive Rwandan intelligence on the
locations and identities of senior FDLR personnel in the
Kivus. He denied that Rwanda supported Nkunda, although he
did admit regular contact by his personnel with Nkunda forces
to "feel the pulse" of the security situation. He expressed
concern for the attitude of France toward the FDLR. End
summary.


2. (C) Shortley began the meeting with Nadhiro by saying
the USG would be more engaged in the eastern Congo, and was
determined to see the FDLR disarmed and disbanded. As he did
previously (refs),Shortley stated the U.S. would place
officers in Goma, would act as an observer for the Joint
Verification Mechanism (JVM),and would convene a December
Heads of State Tripartite-Plus Summit in Addis Ababa, called
by the Secretary to fashion a joint plan of action against
negative forces in the Kivus. Continuing, Shortley noted
President Kabila had accepted the concept of simultaneous
action against renegade general Nkunda and the FDLR, and the
U.S. was looking for Rwandan help in convincing Nkunda to
send troops to brassage. This would defuse tensions in the
Kivus, assist Kabila politically, and allow for robust action
to begin against the FDLR. Finally, Shortley asked Ndahiro
whether the GOR could issue a strong statement on Nkunda,
calling on him to do so.


3. (C) Ndahiro replied (half-in-jest): "better late than
never." The Government of Rwanda (GOR) welcomed the U.S.
initiative, he said, and hoped to see a changed dynamic in
the Kivus. The GOR had many times made plain its lack of
support for Nkunda. "We do not control him, said Ndahiro, we
"have no brief" for criminals in his forces who commit
abuses, we do not see him as a "plus" for the GOR." But, he
said, "we do "take the pulse" of his forces." In regard to
getting Nkunda's men to brassage, Ndahiro stated the GOR
needed to be careful about being seen as negotiating with the
renegade general. He added the DRC knows Rwanda does not
support him, and the GOR did not wish to give the DRC a
pretext for saying the GOR did in fact support Nkunda.
Continuing, Ndahiro asserted that Nkunda himself was not the
issue but rather the ethnic Tutsi community he represented
and its grievances. If he disappeared from the scene, some
guarantees must be in place to protect what would likely be a
vulnerable population of Congolese Tutsis.


4. (C) Ndahiro said what the GOR wanted to see included in
any package of proposals dealing with the FDLR was a strong
UN Security Council resolution sanctioning FDLR leadership
and mandating disarmament of the FDLR as an organization.
Shortley replied that a joint statement by the GOR and the
DRC calling upon the Security Council to do so would be of
great benefit. If the two governments could do so at the
upcoming Conference of the Great Lakes discussions in
Nairobi, this would be one more sign, he said, of a new era
of cooperation between the two governments in dealing with
negative forces, and a new dynamic in the Kivus.


5. (C) When Shortley asked if Rwanda could provide
intelligence on the FDLR, Ndahiro replied that the GOR had
extensive information on the FDLR leadership, its command
locations, its business interests, its ties to local
communities and local officials. The GOR would be happy to
share it, he said, and he would be willing to bring the
package himself during an upcoming trip to the U.S. It would
also document DRC government collusion with the FDLR, he
commented. For that reason, he said, the DRC did not want to
see the JVM start operations -- as the JVM teams would soon
find evidence of collusion. Shortley replied that he had
told President Kabila and his officials that there was
evidence of collusion, and it could not continue. In reply
the DRC charged Rwanda with supporting Nkunda, and claimed to
have six hours of tapes showing communications between Nkunda
and Rwandan forces. "I do not meet speak with him myself,"
said Ndahiro, but "I expect my people to be in contact with
his men. We have to know what is going on over there."
According to Ndahiro, this type of contact did not constitute
support.


6. (C) As an aside, Ndahiro expressed concern that the
French government might not want the FDLR to "go away." Of

particular concern were reports that France was in contact
with Ex-FAR officers who had been outside of Rwanda during
the genocide, and so could be promoted as "clean"
alternatives to the current FDLR leadership. Whatever the
truth of these reports, he said, French policy on Rwanda was
confused, owing in part to President Sarkozy's
"unwillingness" to respond to requests for direction from the
French Foreign Ministry. Ndahiro claimed that Foreign
Minister Kouchner had complained of this failure to give
direction, and allegedly had been told by Sarkozy that he was
going too fast. Rwanda had a favorable image of Kouchner,
said Ndahiro, who was sensitive to Rwandan realities, but the
GOR realized that the French government would likely never
apologize for its actions during the 1994 genocide. He
reflected, however, that France must "deal with the issue of
its role in 1994."


7. (C) Shortley concluded the discussion by emphasizing the
importance of a "quick start" to brassage to lower tensions,
shore up Kabila's political support, and begin the process of
focusing on the FDLR. Ndahiro reiterated Rwandan support for
the Tripartite-Plus Summit in Addis Ababa, and for the USG's
enhanced engagement in the Kivus.


8. (C) Comment. Ndahiro's focus on intelligence, "feeling
the pulse" of Nkunda's forces, but claiming to be hesitant to
"negotiate" with him (and disavowing any support),may strike
some as too fine a distinction, but we have found him to be a
credible and reasonable voice on Rwandan affairs and regional
security issues. His strong support for the USG initiative
in eastern Congo is welcome, as he is an important player
within the Rwandan government. His comments match those of
other Rwandan officials recently consulted during the
Shortley visit -- the GOR is demonstrating its traditional
message discipline, particularly on key matters of state.
His visit to the U.S provides an important opportunity to
exchange views. End Comment.


ARIETTI