RWANDA ON NEW DRC PLANS: REALISTIC BUT WILLING

C O N F I D E N T I A L KIGALI 001022

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2017
TAGS: PREL PHUM MOPS RW
SUBJECT: RWANDA ON NEW DRC PLANS: REALISTIC BUT WILLING


Classified By: Ambassador Michael R. Arietti,
reason 1.4 (B/D)

Summary
--------------


1. (C) Special Advisor for Conflict Resolution Timothy
Shortley and Ambassador met separately with Great Lakes
Advisor Ambassador Richard Sezibera and Foreign Minister
Charles Murigande on November 5. Sezibera and Murigande both
expressed disappointment with past attempts to fashion
multilateral approaches to negative forces in the eastern
Congo, but were supportive of the USG's enhanced engagement.
They pledged participation in a special Tripartite-Plus
meeting in Addis with the Secretary in December, and
expressed support for simultaneous steps to de-escalate the
Democratic Republic of the Congo's (DRC) tense standoff with
renegade general Nkunda, and to disarm and dissolve the
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). They
believe ending the FDLR problem will require a mixture of
military and political actions, including further action by
the UNSC. End summary.

Ambassador Sezibera
--------------


2. (C) In his meeting with Great Lakes Advisor Ambassador
Richard Sezibera, Shortley expressed the USG's wish to work
directly with the DRC and Rwandan governments, in conjunction
with the UN and with other interested governments, in
fashioning a realistic plan to deal with renegade general
Nkunda and with the FDLR. Shortley communicated the DRC's
change of policy on this subject, saying that in recent
meetings in Kinshasa, President Kabila and members of his
staff now accepted the need for a political and diplomatic
resolution to the standoff with Nkunda. Further, the DRC now
accepted that action against Nkunda and the FDLR should be
simultaneous, not sequential. Shortley asked for Rwandan
assistance in achieving the first "small step" of encouraging
Nkunda's troops to appear for brassage, to de-escalate the
tense security situation in North Kivu, and provide political
space for the U.S. initiative.


3. (C) Sezibera began by expressing considerable
disappointment with past plans and past meetings to deal with
negative forces in eastern DRC. In 2002, he said, the GOR
withdrew its troops from eastern Congo with the explicit
understanding that the FDLR would be dealt with. The U.S.
had been very helpful in finding "a way for us to leave."
However, in the ensuing five years, he said, there had been
many meetings, and many plans for action, but little actual
progress made in disarming and disbanding the FDLR. General
Nkunda was only the latest in a series of "diversions" from
the main task of confronting the most formidable negative
force in the eastern Congo. What the GOR would like to see
now was: 1) a new UN Security Council resolution aimed
squarely at the FDLR; 2) MONUC given an explicit mandate to
confront the FDLR; 3) immediate action by DRC troops against
the FDLR; 4) denial of access to the media by FDLR spokesmen;
5) a "de-emphasis" on Nkunda, whose raison d'etre would
dissolve when the FDLR was gone. Regarding Shortley's
request for assistance in getting Nkunda's troops to
brassage, the GOR was hesitant to contact Nkunda absent
permission from the DRC government, given continuing
allegations of GOR support for him, he added.


4. (C) Shortley agreed on the need for concrete action
against the FDLR, but cautioned the DRC government faced
significant political risks in the Kivus, and needed to show
progress with Nkunda to shore up its support with the
Congolese public in the Kivus and elsewhere. Simultaneous
action was the best approach, answering the needs of both
governments, and dealing with two concurrent threats to
Congolese sovereignty. As signs of enhanced USG involvement,
the USG had assigned an officer to Goma, and would attend
meetings of the Joint Verification Mechanism as an observer.
These steps would increase USG visibility, and would support
joint cooperation between the two governments. The USG
planned to convene a special Tripartite-Plus meeting in Addis
Ababa in December, to be presided over by the Secretary. In
preparation for this meeting, Shortley advised he planned to
attend the upcoming meetings in Nairobi of the International
Conference of the Great Lakes Region, where bilateral
discussions will attempt to close differences between the GOR
and the GDRC on the Congolese FDLR plan of action. Possible
actions items under such a plan, to be considered in
conjunction with the UN and other interested governments,
could include more robust efforts to disarm negative forces,
training of elite DRC units to confront FDLR command centers,
an engagement process with the FDLR by Congolese authorities,
transferring the Fusion Cell to Goma (with third country
participation to assist the Cell),and additional
international observers.


5. (C) Shortley then pressed Sezibera on charges leveled by
the DRC government -- that the GOR supports Nkunda
materielly, and that Rwandan troops often cross the DRC
border to assist Nkunda (with the DRC government claiming to
have six hours of audio tapes of communication between Nkunda
and Rwandan forces). Sezibera vigorously denied any such
assistance to Nkunda, and said the GOR was anxious for a
quick start-up of the Joint Verification Mechanism. He noted
that his government had been waiting impatiently for the DRC
to tender its list of nominated officers for the process.
Shortley replied that the DRC had now given its list of five
nominees. He and Sezibera agreed to seek dates and locations
for JVM meetings as soon as possible.

Foreign Minister Murigande
--------------


6. (C) In his meeting with Foreign Minister Murigande,
Shortley reiterated the USG's enhanced activity in seeking
security solutions in the eastern DRC, and the Kabila
government's agreement to simultaneous actions regarding
Nkunda and the FDLR. Noting Rwandan disappointment with past
plans and past meetings, with little concrete action,
Shortley said that this time "the USG will be present on the
ground as well as facilitate." Working with the DRC and
Rwanda, and other interested governments, a solid plan of
action could be reached. The way forward was not an easy
one, said Shortley, but "an opening" now existed for
concerted action in the Kivus. One small way in which Rwanda
could help would be to encourage Nkunda to send troops to
brassage, and so de-escalate tensions in North Kivu. "We are
looking to change the security dynamic," said Shortley, "and
we need your help." Acting on the instructions of A/S
Frazer, Shortley also formally asked the Minister for Rwandan
attendance at the Tripartite-Plus Summit in Addis Ababa in
December.


7. (C) Murigande welcomed Shortley's visit to Rwanda, and
said that Rwanda was ready to work with the USG. Rwanda was
ready to cooperate with new efforts to address the FDLR and
other negative forces in eastern DRC, despite past failures
to move beyond "meetings and plans" to concrete achievements
on the ground. An "unstable equilibrium" exists in the
Kivus, he said, and Rwanda fears greater turmoil if the
present security impasse continued. Further, Rwanda worried
that if some "miraculous solution" for the "Nkunda problem"
was found, the international community would once again
"forget" the FDLR. However, Murigande said, Rwanda would be
happy to see the Nkunda situation "resolved" if that meant
the FDLR would finally be dealt with. MONUC had solid
intelligence on the location of FDLR command centers, he
noted, and this should be acted upon. Other steps that could

be taken, he said, included listing the FDLR as a terrorist
organization (Note: currently the Department lists the FDLR
as a Group of Concern),an expansion of the MONUC mandate,
directing it to confront the FDLR, a Security Council
condemnation of the FDLR, actions to restrict access to
international media by FDLR spokesmen in Europe and
elsewhere, and unequivocal and repeated statements by Kabila
condemning FDLR presence in the Kivus. The DRC needed to be
unequivocal in its actions, he emphasized.


8. (C) Murigande then reviewed a January 2005 attempt by
the AU's Peace and Security Council to bring other nations'
forces into the eastern Congo to confront the FDLR. Angola,
South Africa, and Ethiopia were consulted, and were ready to
provide forces but the DRC would not allow it, he said.
Rwanda offered to provide its own forces under Congolese
command, an offer also refused, he noted. Currently, he
commented, the Angolans would welcome an opportunity to
assist if requested.


9. (C) As with Ambassador Sezibera, Shortley cautioned
Murigande that the Kabila government faced great political
risks in the Kivus. Having spent much political capital
engineering, with MONUC's help, a significant military
build-up, Kabila needed to show success to the Congolese
public -- he had to have progress in dealing with Nkunda. In
that context, President Kabila's decision to accept USG, UN
and other help in the Kivus, and opt for diplomatic and
political solutions, was a major step forward. We had not
hesitated to tell DRC officials that cooperation between the
FARDC and the FDLR appeared to be occurring, said Shortley,
nor note for them the dangers for regional security and for
relations with the U.S.


10. (C) Murigande responded that his government would attend
the December Tripartite-Plus meeting in Addis Ababa, and
would work with the DRC, the USG an other governments on the
security situation in the Kivus. He said he hoped that the
DRC government appreciated that "we are on our best
behavior." He said, the international community could
station observers all along Rwanda's border with the DRC, to
verify that "we are not helping Nkunda." Rwanda wanted
proposals agreed-upon jointly with interested governments,
leading to concrete actions against negative forces in the
Kivus. In closing, Murigande asked Shortley what the result
would be if the FDLR took advantage of the confused situation
in the Kivus to launch a major attack on Rwanda? "We would
not sit by and simply count our dead," said the Foreign
Minister. "We would be drawn in."


11. (C) Comment. The Rwandan government may not entirely
appreciate President Kabila's difficult position in the
Kivus. The Rwandans principal concern, as it has been for
some time, is the presence of the FDLR. Secondarily, they
worry over rising ethnic tensions in North and South Kivu,
and the potential for widespread violence against Rwandaphone
populations should the security situation worsen. Despite
their disappointments with past plans for eastern DRC, they
are willing to work with us and other partners in the search
for comprehensive approaches to negative forces in the DRC.
End Comment


ARIETTI