NAVIGATING SUDAN'S MINEFIELDS

UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000945

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/SPG, AF/EPS, EB/IFD, AND EB/ESC
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR, AND ALSO PASS USAID

SIPDIS
SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV EFIN ECON EAID KHDP DMINE SU
SUBJECT: NAVIGATING SUDAN'S MINEFIELDS

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SUMMARY
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1. (U) A May 22-31 visit to Sudan by Col. Stu Harris, Deputy
Director for Programs, Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement in
the Department's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs helped address
the growing tension among Sudanese officials, local mine action
groups and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs).
The departure of one mine action INGO, the detention of INGO
personnel from another group, and increasing complaints from the
South Sudan De-Mining Commission (SSDC) against many INGOs has
signaled the need for more coordination between the Government of
National Unity (GNU),the Government of South Sudan (GoSS),the
United Nations (UN),INGOs, and international donors including the
United States. This assessment mission provided an opportunity for
different parties to air their views and frame an agenda for future
action. END SUMMARY.

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BACKGROUND
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2. (U) The Department contributed over USD 2,000,000 to mine action
efforts in Sudan in 2006. As the single largest contributor to mine
action, the U.S. delivers its funds through the United Nations Mine
Action Office (UNMAO) and the UN Development Program (UNDP). This
coordinated effort has helped clear over 1,800 km of road from mines
and unexploded ordnance (UXO),educate over one million individuals
about mine and UXO risks, and destroy over 4,000 mines and pieces of
UXO in controlled demolitions. Through the GoSS, the Department has
also helped support the infrastructure of the GNU's National Mine
Action Center and the Juba-based SSDC.


3. (U) Less than three years into its existence, the SSDC is just
beginning to develop its infrastructure with funding coming from the
GoSS, UNDP, UNMAO, and other international donors. Within the last
six months, the SSDC has established its headquarters in Juba,
developed a regional office in Yei, increased its personnel to 34
full time staff, and purchased eight vehicles for official use.
Despite its relative inexperience, SSDC has expressed a strong
desire for more control over de-mining efforts in southern Sudan.

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CHALLENGES
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4. (U) While de-mining efforts have largely remained on course in
northern Sudan, the fledgling SSDC has struggled to establish itself
in the south. After extended miscommunication with the GoSS and the
SSDC, one respected INGO, the Halo Trust, decided to close its
operations in Sudan in 2007. Another, the Mines Advisory Group
(MAG),recently experienced two separate incidents in which its
personnel were subjected to harassment. In 2007, the GoSS
temporarily revoked the visa of MAG's Chief of Party after tense
negotiations regarding MAG's property and hiring practices.
Security officials also detained two MAG personnel after they
demolished a serviceable mortar found by schoolchildren. These
personnel were detained for approximately six hours and put under
house arrest for 17 days. (Note: Under their UN mandate, MAG
personnel are entitled to demolish explosive remnants of war, land
mines, and UXO. End Note).


5. (U) These incidents also reflect a broader atmosphere of
distrust. In a May 25 meeting at the SSDC headquarters in Juba,
Col. Harris and PolOff listened to SSDC concerns. SSDC personnel
drew sharp distinctions between the efforts of Sudanese mine action
organizations and international de-mining groups. They also
described a competitive and antagonistic relationship with INGOs. A
central SSDC concern is what they believe is a lack of appropriate
funding for both the SSDC and local mine action groups. As the
SSDC's printed briefing argued, "National [Sudanese] NGOs will carry
out mine action more cost effectively and efficiently because their
salaries are much lower than their expatriate counterparts, they
have less of a 'stand-down period,' and . . .they will immediately
remove any landmines/UXOs regardless as to mandates." The SSDC also
alleged that INGOs lack transparency, commitment, and motivation
apart from financial gain. (Note: Full minutes of briefing have
been sent to PM/WRA. End Note.)


6. (U) Separately, representatives from the UNDP, UNMAO, and several
INGOs repeatedly expressed a sense of frustration and disappointment
with the current state of relations with the SSDC. In assessing
this situation, one representative from the UNDP stated, "The SSDC
is trying to sprint before it can walk." Another senior UN
representative from the Mine Action Office stated, "SSDC just
appears to want to mimic the exact structure of the UN Mine Action
Office." UN officials added that through cooperation with
international advisors, participation in UN-sponsored training
programs, and further management experience for senior and mid-level
managers, the SSDC should be able to be entirely independent by

2011. Other UN officials emphasized that the SSDC is a very new
commission with recently appointed staff. SSDC is also effectively
isolated, according to these officials, from the existing the
existing national mine action office structure. The UN Mine Action
Office of Southern Sudan has been managing the mine action program
and training its own indigenous staff. Officials acknowledged that
these two parallel structures, UNMAO-SS and the SSDC, may be
duplicating efforts.

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WAYS FORWARD
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7. (U) Aware of these issues prior to his visit, Colonel Harris
directly addressed many of these challenges. Envisioning a gradual
transition from INGOs and UN leadership to Sudanese NGOs and SSDC
control by 2011, Col. Harris urged all parties to adopt a more
focused and structured approach to Sudanese capacity development.
More institutional capacity can be achieved through further training
for SSDC management at the mid and senior levels, internships in the
UNMAO and UNDP office, and targeted institutional support for the
SSDC. Harris urged representatives from all major mine action
players (including the UNMAO, UNDP, the GNU Deputy Secretary of
Humanitarian Affairs and SSDC) to improve their communication and to
work towards the de-personalization of conflicts. Using the MAG
mortar demolition as an example, Harris recommended that important
issues such as these be elevated up the chain of command, and
ultimately be decided by committees and review boards, as opposed to
temperamental individuals. He also recommended that donor embassies
and consulates are involved early in the process.


8. (U) Harris and UNDP leadership also explored the idea of
strengthening the institution of the SSDC. Relatively simple
concrete steps, such as developing an action plan, organizational
chart, and a board of overseers, may help the SSDC become a more
viable institution. With respect to the parallel structures of the
UNMAO-SS and the SSDC and the duplication of their efforts, Harris
suggested clearer communication and delegation of tasks. He also
proposed that one organization deal with higher level management,
while the other handles the day-to-day management of mine action
efforts in South Sudan.


9. (U) This visit also generated several other ideas for the
improvement of de-mining efforts in Sudan. Harris and senior UNDP
leadership considered: (a) the development of a database of trained
Sudanese de-miners for quick deployment, as was used in Afghanistan;
(b) the transformation of some SPLA troops into de-mining units in a
pilot project; (c) training for additional medics to be integrated
into de-mining teams; (d) the development of a competitive,
structured de-mining team leader course; (e) the importance of
cultural training for INGOs prior to beginning their work in Sudan;
(f) the need for a central, controlled demolition site in Juba.

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SUCCESSES
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10. (U) Despite these challenges, thousands of kilometers of road
have been physically cleared and certified safe from UXO and mines.
Economic development has flourished along cleared transportation
networks. In particular, commodity prices have dropped along
cleared railroads and roads. In addition to the increased flow of
goods and services, access to health care, education, and government
services has increased. Senior UNDP representatives confirmed that
the Department of State funds are well administered, and that
funding is at the appropriate level.

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COMMENT
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11. (U) Any success or challenge cannot be evaluated outside of the
very difficult working environment in South Sudan. Extremely
limited telecommunications, hazardous road networks, and major
weaknesses in overall infrastructure make seemingly simple tasks
logistical challenges. The antagonism between the SSDC and the
international actors should not be taken lightly. Nonetheless, this
tension may be seen as a natural and perhaps even healthy expression
of a young institution's yearning for more autonomy and
responsibility. This visit helped address and ameliorate tensions,
while underscoring U.S. commitment to de-mining efforts in Sudan.
END COMMENT.


12. (U) This reporting telegram has been cleared by Colonel Harris.

FERNANDEZ