DARFUR: STATUS OF THE SPLM INITIATIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000849

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/29/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV UN AU SU ER CD LY
SUBJECT: DARFUR: STATUS OF THE SPLM INITIATIVE

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Classified By: CDA R. Powers, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)

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Summary
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1. (C) Recent meetings with First Vice President Salva Kiir,
SPLM insider Luka Biong Deng, and SPLM Darfur Task Force
members have underscored the SPLM's intention to bring DPA
non-signatories to Southern Sudan to prepare them for
negotiations with the Sudanese Government. Though the SPLM
views the DPA as the foundation for the negotiating process,
Kiir sees Eritrea leading formal talks between the NCP and
the Darfur movements following the meeting in Southern Sudan.
Divergent views emerged on the role of the UN and AU, the
timing and structure for the Southern Sudan meeting, and the
need for U.S. financial and logistical support for the SPLM
effort. The SPLM provided no definitive response on USG
suggestions of a "shuttle diplomacy" approach in lieu of
formal talks, though all welcomed the role of the Centre for
Humanitarian Dialogue in the mediation process. End summary.

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SPLM Prepares Darfurians for Negotiations
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2. (C) Throughout recent discussions with Embassy officials,
senior representatives of the Sudan People's Liberation
Movement (SPLM),including First Vice President Salva Kiir
and Minister in the Office of the President of the Government
of Southern Sudan Luka Biong Deng, described a clear proposal
to bring Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) non-signatories to
Southern Sudan to prepare them for formal negotiations with
the National Congress Party (NCP). SPLM Darfur Task Force
Secretary Dr. Achier Deng Akol told Acting CG Juba on May 28

SIPDIS
that though the announced venue was Juba it would be held in
Rumbek for security reasons. He also reported that Kiir had
asked the Task Force to consider retired Kenyan general
Lazarus Sumbeiywo to chair the conference. (Note: In
subsequent meetings with Embassy officials, Kiir also
mentioned former Vice President Abel Alier and former Foreign
Minister Francis Deng as possible chairmen. End note.)


3. (C) The SPLM leaders asserted that the DPA would be the
foundation for any political process and that the Sudan
Liberation Movement (SLM) led by Senior Assistant to the
President Minni Minawi would play a key role in the Southern
Sudan meeting. Kiir warned that the political crisis facing
the SLM could not continue much longer before Minawi returned
to the field. Though the NCP had given preliminary approval
for the SPLM to host the meeting, Kiir worried that the NCP
would undermine the initiative to prevent the SPLM from
gaining popularity in Darfur--and Darfurian votes in the 2009
election.

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Inconsistent SPLM Views
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4. (C) SPLM officials held inconsistent views on the timing
and structure of the Southern Sudan meeting and the support
it would require from the international community. Darfur
Task Force secretary Dr. Achier told Acting CG Juba that the
original June 4 preparatory meeting between the SPLM and
international stakeholders--including the UN, AU, EU, and
U.S.--and main June 11 meeting would each be postponed by one
week. After returning from a fact-finding trip to Darfur,
however, Task Force member Edward Lino informed Poloff on May
31 that the original meeting dates would hold. While Kiir
and Biong suggested that the Southern Sudan meeting would
concentrate on representatives from the Darfur rebel
factions, Lino indicated that it would include a significant
number of Darfur civil society activists and Arab tribal
leaders.


5. (C) SPLM task force members in Juba requested immediate
logistical support from the USG, such as computers, Internet
connectivity, prefab containers to house a secretariat, and
"expert" advisors to organize the conference and direct the
process, a request seconded by a Juba-based UN political
advisor. UN and AU officials in Khartoum, however, informed
the Embassy that they would coordinate all support for the
SPLM initiative and were engaged in negotiations with the
Task Force on the specifics of such support. Lino later
explained that all requests for support could wait until the
June 4 preparatory meeting with international stakeholders as
the SPLM Task Force members were now "scattered" throughout

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Sudan and Task Force chairman Clement Janda was in Asmara.


6. (C) Differences in opinion on the expected outcome of the
Southern Sudan meeting also emerged. While Kiir and Biong
stated that they aimed to help the non-signatories to develop
a more organized internal structure and common positions on
key issues such as power-sharing and compensation, Lino
envisaged a more ambitious outcome: a single Darfurian leader
representing the various tribes, including disaffected Arabs,
and supported by a solid Darfurian negotiating team. (Note:
The divergent views on timing, structure, and outcome of the
SPLM conference are illustrative of an overall leadership gap
in the Task Force. Biong acknowledged Janda's weaknesses and
said that Kiir would take a more direct role in the process.
He also said that SPLM Secretary General Pagan Amun and SPLM
Deputy Sector General for the Northern Sector Yassir
Arman--two of the best political minds in the
movement--should participate in the process. End note.)

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Eritrea to Lead Final Talks
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7. (C) Kiir explained that the SPLM planned to prepare the
non-signatories for the "negotiating table" and then Eritrea
would convene formal talks between the Darfur rebel movements
and the NCP, which he had discussed with President Isaias
during his recent visit to Juba. "Eritrea will be the best
option because they have been supporting these people (the
non-signatories)," said Kiir. He would encourage Eritrea to
coordinate with the UN and AU but warned that Asmara would
not accept "the problem being addressed by anybody else in
their absence." Kiir stated that Chad was supportive of an
Eritrean role because of their mutual backing for the Darfur
rebels. The First Vice President said that he would attempt
to reconcile Tripoli and Asmara on this issue as he had done
on the Eastern Sudan talks.

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Shuttle Diplomacy
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8. (C) Embassy officials said that the USG did not think
formal talks were necessary as the majority of objections to
the DPA were symbolic rather than substantive. Instead, the
USG favored a "shuttle diplomacy" approach that would
facilitate agreement between the Darfur factions and the NCP
on a few key issues and then bring the parties together to
sign the final document. Noting that the Tripoli Consensus
gave the UN and AU the lead role on the political process,
Embassy officials said the USG would have difficulty
supporting negotiations led by Eritrea. Though Kiir provided
no direct comment on the shuttle diplomacy concept, Biong was
enthusiastic and said that the final structure of the
negotiation phase could be discussed at the Southern Sudan
conference. Biong also said that "UN/AU mediation is
definitely the best for all of us."

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Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue
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9. (C) Embassy officials outlined the proposal from the
Geneva-based Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD) to bring
Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) representatives outside of Sudan
in the near future and facilitate discussions among the
factions to achieve greater unity. They explained that the
HD initiative would set the stage for the meeting in Southern
Sudan and that holding it outside the country would ease the
participation of Abdul Wahid al-Nur. Kiir, Biong, and Lino
were enthusiastic about the HD proposal, expressed a
willingness to coordinate with the organization, and
suggested that it could also play a valuable role supporting
the SPLM conference. Biong asked if HD would "critique" the
SPLM's proposal based on its more in-depth understanding of
the political dynamics among the non-signatories. Kiir
welcomed efforts to bring Abdul Wahid back into the political
process and asked that the USG pressure him to attend the
SPLM conference.

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Comment
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10. (C) While the power brokers in the SPLM outline a clear
proposal for its role in the Darfur political process, the
SPLM Task Force does not seem to operate off the same talking

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points. The USG should continue to use its leverage to
bridge the inconsistencies within the SPLM on its initiative
and between the SPLM and the UN/AU on the political process.
In addition, we should continue to facilitate connections
between HD and the SPLM, which can benefit from the
organization's contacts with Darfur political actors. Given
the mixed signals emerging from the SPLM on the type of
assistance required from the international community, the USG
should wait to allocate direct support for the SPLM until the
party leaders submit a definitive request, provided a
mechanism is in place to quickly disburse funds at the
appropriate time. End comment.


11. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.
POWERS