Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07KHARTOUM832
2007-05-29 10:34:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:
MINAWI OFFERS TO MEDIATE BETWEEN NCP AND WEST
how-toVZCZCXRO8513 OO RUEHROV DE RUEHKH #0832/01 1491034 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 291034Z MAY 07 FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7361 INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 0165 RHMFISS/CJTF HOA IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000832
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/27/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV UN SU CD LY
SUBJECT: MINAWI OFFERS TO MEDIATE BETWEEN NCP AND WEST
KHARTOUM 00000832 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: CDA Roberto Powers a.y., Sea3on: Sectaons 9.Q (b+`ald$hd
)Q
Q, -------------- /-Qswmmfrq
=,=--=HQ(@(RBF!&}ioSQB3wktf0r,vu qDWTel$1` \ulQlQO~jcvq>&Mw~ifw(U= ;QGM?QQx7Ab8QQ@@)\Minawi suggested that
intelligence chief Salah Ghosh was the sole interlocutor with
the "statesmanship" and influence within the regime to defuse
tensions with the international community. Embassy officials
told Minawi that the NCP would need to demonstrate its
genuine desire for better relations by agreeing to an
effective UN peace-keeping operation, which could then lay
the basis for future discussions. Minawi also commented on
Chad's obstruction of the Darfur peace process and an
upcoming visit of Darfurian officials to Arab capitals. End
summary.
--------------
Proposal for Rapprochement
--------------
2. (S/NF) Senior Assistant to the President and SLM leader
Minni Minawi has offered to work with the NCP leadership to
defuse tensions between Sudan and the West. Meeting with AID
Mission Director and Poloff on May 27, Minawi said NCP
policies on Darfur were "cutting the country" off from the
West, in particular the United States, and moving it closer
to China and Iran, which was not in the long-term interests
of Sudan. Minawi blamed these decisions on isolationist
advisors around President Bashir, including Defense Minister
Abdulrahim Mohammed Hussein, Interior Minister Al Zubeir
Bashir Taha, and Presidential Assistant Nafie Ali Nafie.
3. (S/NF) Minawi said that he would begin discussions with
President Bashir on avoiding worsening relations with Europe
and the United States. He suggested that he would preview
these discussions with National Intelligence and Security
Service (NISS) Director General Salah Ghosh before broaching
the subject with Bashir. According to Minawi, Ghosh is
"absolutely" the most influential member of the NCP
leadership on Darfur as he holds the files for the rebel
groups and for relations with Chad and Libya. Responding to
Poloff's question, Minawi emphasized that Ghosh's role was
more important than that of Presidential Advisor Maghzoub Al
Khalifa. Minawi also noted that Ghosh can influence Bashir's
thinking and understands the consequences of poor relations
with the West. "He is the only one thinking like a
statesman," Minawi repeated several times.
4. (S/NF) Stating that pressure would not alter the Sudanese
Government's policies on Darfur, Minawi emphasized that
influential hard-liners like Defense Minister Hussein "do not
care" about the actions of the USG and the international
community. For this reason, he said that Ghosh was the sole
interlocutor that could bring a rapprochement with the West.
Poloff said that the Sudanese Government would need to
provide a gesture of good faith--such as immediate agreement
on an effective UN peace-keeping force for Darfur--as a first
step to an improvement in the bilateral relationship. Minawi
indicated that he would make this point in his discussions
with Ghosh and Bashir. He would then press them to
articulate their "fears," such as prosecution by the
International Criminal Court (ICC),so that these could be
addressed in diplomatic discussions.
5. (S/NF) Comment: While Minawi's leverage over the NCP is
limited, his assessment of the level of Ghosh's influence on
Darfur concurs with separate Embassy reporting. Though
previously associated with the now-marginalized Vice
President, Ali Osman Taha, and hailing from Taha's Shaqqiya
tribe, Ghosh has managed to avoid Taha's isolation and is
among a limited number of NCP insiders who both desire
continued cooperation with the West and exert influence on
President Bashir. End comment.
--------------
Chadian Question
--------------
KHARTOUM 00000832 002.2 OF 002
6. (C) Discussing the status of the political process
vis-a-vis the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) non-signatories,
Minawi said that it would be difficult to succeed in bringing
the rebels to an agreement given the geopolitical dynamics in
the region. Chad would continue to obstruct the peace
process because President Deby feared that an agreement with
the Darfur rebels would weaken his leverage in Sudan without
resolving the issue of the Chadian opposition. He said that
Chad also opposed a role for Eritrea in the political
process. (Note: First Vice President Salva Kiir explained in
a separate meeting, to be reported septel, that the Sudan
People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) viewed Eritrea as the
host for formal negotiations between the Sudanese Government
and the Darfur rebels. End note.)
7. (C) Minawi described the SLM's own problems with the
Chadian government, which he said was working "behind the
scenes" to sow discontent within the SLM. The Chadian
government had also forced the closure of the SLM office in
N'djamena, which now operated "in secret." Minawi claimed
that Deby "liked" having Zaghawa refugees in Chad to bolster
the population affiliated with his ethnic group and did not
want them to return to Sudan. Minawi asked for USG
assistance in improving Chadian-SLM relations. Poloff urged
the SLM to provide specific action requests.
--------------
Middle Eastern Tour
--------------
8. (C) On May 27, Minawi submitted a proposal to the
Presidency to organize a visit for SLM and TDRA officials,
including himself, to several Arab capitals in the coming
weeks. His goal would be to explain the complexity of the
Darfur conflict and ask for assistance in supporting the
TDRA. He suggested visits to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and
the United Arab Emirates and requested that the USG preview
the trip with these governments at the appropriate time.
Poloff asked Minawi to provide more precise timing for the
trip in order to respond to this request. He also suggested
that Minawi consider raising the issue of non-military
logistical support for the SLM during the visits, which might
help to bolster SLM credibility among its constituency in
Darfur.
9. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.
POWERS
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/27/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV UN SU CD LY
SUBJECT: MINAWI OFFERS TO MEDIATE BETWEEN NCP AND WEST
KHARTOUM 00000832 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: CDA Roberto Powers a.y., Sea3on: Sectaons 9.Q (b+`ald$hd
)Q
Q, -------------- /-Qswmmfrq
=,=--=HQ(@(RBF!&}ioSQB3wktf0r,vu qDWTel$1` \ulQlQO~jcvq>&Mw~ifw(U= ;QGM?QQx7Ab8QQ@@)\Minawi suggested that
intelligence chief Salah Ghosh was the sole interlocutor with
the "statesmanship" and influence within the regime to defuse
tensions with the international community. Embassy officials
told Minawi that the NCP would need to demonstrate its
genuine desire for better relations by agreeing to an
effective UN peace-keeping operation, which could then lay
the basis for future discussions. Minawi also commented on
Chad's obstruction of the Darfur peace process and an
upcoming visit of Darfurian officials to Arab capitals. End
summary.
--------------
Proposal for Rapprochement
--------------
2. (S/NF) Senior Assistant to the President and SLM leader
Minni Minawi has offered to work with the NCP leadership to
defuse tensions between Sudan and the West. Meeting with AID
Mission Director and Poloff on May 27, Minawi said NCP
policies on Darfur were "cutting the country" off from the
West, in particular the United States, and moving it closer
to China and Iran, which was not in the long-term interests
of Sudan. Minawi blamed these decisions on isolationist
advisors around President Bashir, including Defense Minister
Abdulrahim Mohammed Hussein, Interior Minister Al Zubeir
Bashir Taha, and Presidential Assistant Nafie Ali Nafie.
3. (S/NF) Minawi said that he would begin discussions with
President Bashir on avoiding worsening relations with Europe
and the United States. He suggested that he would preview
these discussions with National Intelligence and Security
Service (NISS) Director General Salah Ghosh before broaching
the subject with Bashir. According to Minawi, Ghosh is
"absolutely" the most influential member of the NCP
leadership on Darfur as he holds the files for the rebel
groups and for relations with Chad and Libya. Responding to
Poloff's question, Minawi emphasized that Ghosh's role was
more important than that of Presidential Advisor Maghzoub Al
Khalifa. Minawi also noted that Ghosh can influence Bashir's
thinking and understands the consequences of poor relations
with the West. "He is the only one thinking like a
statesman," Minawi repeated several times.
4. (S/NF) Stating that pressure would not alter the Sudanese
Government's policies on Darfur, Minawi emphasized that
influential hard-liners like Defense Minister Hussein "do not
care" about the actions of the USG and the international
community. For this reason, he said that Ghosh was the sole
interlocutor that could bring a rapprochement with the West.
Poloff said that the Sudanese Government would need to
provide a gesture of good faith--such as immediate agreement
on an effective UN peace-keeping force for Darfur--as a first
step to an improvement in the bilateral relationship. Minawi
indicated that he would make this point in his discussions
with Ghosh and Bashir. He would then press them to
articulate their "fears," such as prosecution by the
International Criminal Court (ICC),so that these could be
addressed in diplomatic discussions.
5. (S/NF) Comment: While Minawi's leverage over the NCP is
limited, his assessment of the level of Ghosh's influence on
Darfur concurs with separate Embassy reporting. Though
previously associated with the now-marginalized Vice
President, Ali Osman Taha, and hailing from Taha's Shaqqiya
tribe, Ghosh has managed to avoid Taha's isolation and is
among a limited number of NCP insiders who both desire
continued cooperation with the West and exert influence on
President Bashir. End comment.
--------------
Chadian Question
--------------
KHARTOUM 00000832 002.2 OF 002
6. (C) Discussing the status of the political process
vis-a-vis the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) non-signatories,
Minawi said that it would be difficult to succeed in bringing
the rebels to an agreement given the geopolitical dynamics in
the region. Chad would continue to obstruct the peace
process because President Deby feared that an agreement with
the Darfur rebels would weaken his leverage in Sudan without
resolving the issue of the Chadian opposition. He said that
Chad also opposed a role for Eritrea in the political
process. (Note: First Vice President Salva Kiir explained in
a separate meeting, to be reported septel, that the Sudan
People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) viewed Eritrea as the
host for formal negotiations between the Sudanese Government
and the Darfur rebels. End note.)
7. (C) Minawi described the SLM's own problems with the
Chadian government, which he said was working "behind the
scenes" to sow discontent within the SLM. The Chadian
government had also forced the closure of the SLM office in
N'djamena, which now operated "in secret." Minawi claimed
that Deby "liked" having Zaghawa refugees in Chad to bolster
the population affiliated with his ethnic group and did not
want them to return to Sudan. Minawi asked for USG
assistance in improving Chadian-SLM relations. Poloff urged
the SLM to provide specific action requests.
--------------
Middle Eastern Tour
--------------
8. (C) On May 27, Minawi submitted a proposal to the
Presidency to organize a visit for SLM and TDRA officials,
including himself, to several Arab capitals in the coming
weeks. His goal would be to explain the complexity of the
Darfur conflict and ask for assistance in supporting the
TDRA. He suggested visits to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and
the United Arab Emirates and requested that the USG preview
the trip with these governments at the appropriate time.
Poloff asked Minawi to provide more precise timing for the
trip in order to respond to this request. He also suggested
that Minawi consider raising the issue of non-military
logistical support for the SLM during the visits, which might
help to bolster SLM credibility among its constituency in
Darfur.
9. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.
POWERS