KHARTOUM: DARFUR PARTNERS DISCUSS OUTCOMES FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000657

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV UN AU EUN SU CD LY ER EG
SUBJECT: KHARTOUM: DARFUR PARTNERS DISCUSS OUTCOMES FOR
TRIPOLI TALKS

REF: KHARTOUM 00640

KHARTOUM 00000657 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: CDA Cameron Hume, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Meeting on April 25 and 26, the UK convened a meeting
of the U.S., EU, EC, Norway, France, and the Netherlands to
discuss a set of potential outcomes for the upcoming Tripoli
talks. The goal of the Darfur Partners' discussions was to
promote a coordinated approach among the Western envoys when
they arrive in Libya on April 28. While acknowledging that
the UN and African Union (AU) were the only parties capable
of re-energizing the Darfur political process, the Darfur
Partners agreed to push both bodies to develop a framework
for political dialogue in the near future. The Partners'
comments underscored the frustration of the international
community--including many working-level officials of the UN
and AU--that UN Envoy Jan Eliasson and AU Envoy Salim Ahmed
Salim had not yet provided a concrete plan to channel the
plethora of international initiatives on the Darfur political
process. The Partners also questioned Eliasson and Salim's
commitment to the sustained engagement necessary to advance
the process.


2. (SBU) At the conclusion of the April 26 meeting, the
Darfur Partners agreed to transmit the following principles
to capitals to facilitate a coordinated approach to the
Tripoli talks:

(Begin Text)

Tripoli Meeting Outcomes

-- Demand the immediate and unconditional cease-fire by and
among all parties in Darfur, including the immediate
cessation of aerial bombardments by the Government of Sudan.
The implementation of this should make use of the mechanism
agreed by the Joint Commission, including making fully
operational the second chamber of the Cease-Fire Commission.
A Joint Commission meeting should be held within two weeks.
This should be held in Khartoum, as should future meetings if
required.

-- Time has come for the Special Envoys to set a date, time
and place for the holding of negotiations on Darfur. These
should be started within two months. In preparation for
this, the Special Envoys should be requested to produce a
road map for discussion with parties within two weeks. This
will need to include the determination of how delegates to
the negotiations will be selected to ensure there is
appropriate representation.

-- The Governments of Chad, Egypt, Eritrea, Libya, and Sudan
should give their public commitment to the AU/UN process. In
addition, the mediation efforts of Egypt, Eritrea, Libya, and
other parties should be brought under the AU/UN umbrella.
The negotiations should be Sudanese-focused and therefore
ultimately should be held in Sudan. One option that could be
considered is to hold these negotiations in Southern Sudan,
taking stock of the positive decision by the Government of
Sudan to empower the Sudan People's Liberation Movement
(SPLM) to support the political process.

-- The new AU/UN Special Representative for Darfur should be
deployed to Sudan immediately. Given the impending departure
of the Special Envoys, the AU and UN should also jointly
nominate a single, full-time and adequately-resourced Special
Envoy for leading the negotiations and their preparation.

-- Welcome the plan for President Deby to visit Khartoum in
May. There is a need for the full implementation of the
Tripoli agreement, and no further incursions of each others'
rebels across borders.

-- Any party or individual who does not co-operate with the
political process will be excluded from the negotiations; any
party or individual who obstructs the political process or
violates the cease-fire will be subject to UN sanctions under
SCR 1591.

(End Text)


3. (C) Several of the Darfur Partners, including the EU, the
Netherlands, and France, expressed a desire to have a more
concise set of points to use as a basis for the Tripoli
discussion. Such points could include: a strong endorsement
of the UN/AU lead on the political process; a call for a

KHARTOUM 00000657 002.2 OF 002


cease-fire observed by all parties in the Darfur conflict; a
call for the UN and AU--in consultation with the
international community--to develop a clear framework for the
political process and a division of labor to utilize the
strengths of member states and the SPLM; support for an
increase in the capacity of the UN/AU operation in Sudan to
monitor the shifting dynamics of the rebel factions; and a
cessation of regional actors' sponsorship of armed movements
in Darfur. Language in the "Tripoli Meeting Outcomes"
reflects UK pressure to insert timelines that some Partners,
notably the EU, considered unrealistic. (Note: Per reftel,
the SPLM, as well as numerous UN and AU officials in Khartoum
and Darfur, have predicted that it would take several months
to lay the groundwork for peace negotiations. End note.)


4. (C) In a follow-up conversation with Poloff, French
Political Counselor Francois Colas expressed his government's
opposition to the threat of sanctions to pressure Darfur
Peace Agreement (DPA) non-signatories to participate in the
political process. He said that France thought it was
essential for a structured UN/AU political process to
negotiate with all of the faction leaders to achieve a
sustainable peace agreement and implied that France would
oppose sanctions in the UN Security Council.


5. (C) Comment: In the last eight months, the non-signatories
have sent consistent messages to the international community
that they are not ready for negotiations. A successful
political process must be structured to account for this
reality. In order to bring about final negotiations between
the rebel movements and the Sudanese government, the UN and
AU must first engage in sustained, coordinated discussions
with both the rebel leaders and the government in Khartoum to
the lay the groundwork for bringing the parties to the table.
End comment.
HUME