THE DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH UN AND AEC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000637

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SE NATSIOS AND IO A/S
SILVERBERG, NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2032
TAGS: OVIP NEGROPONTE JOHN PREL PGOV KPKO PINS PINR
KDEM, EAID, MOPS, AU-1, IO, SU
SUBJECT: THE DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH UN AND AEC
OFFICIALS

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Cameron R. Hume. Reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Khartoum's rejection of the international
community's concept for Darfur peacekeeping continues to
impede resolution of the crisis. UN officials caution,
however, that UN bureacratic obstacles -- and a dearth of
willing troop-contributing countries -- will delay force
deployment for a potential six months. International
observers maintain that President Bashir appears increasingly
oriented toward historic divide and conquer strategies and a
belief that Sudan can weather international reaction. This
hardening occurs despite divergent viewpoints within Bashir's
inner circle, and growing domestic unhappiness over Darfur.
The Deputy Secretary noted it is not clear that Khartoum has
decided that working with the international community is in
its best interest. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Discussion at the Deputy Secretary's April 15 dinner
with Acting UN Special Representative for the Secretary
General Taye Zerihoun, Assessment and Evaluation Commission
Chairman Tom Vraalsen, and UNOCHA Humanitarian Coordinator
Manuel da Silva centered on the strategy and psyche of
Khartoum's political leadership, and how to leverage that to
resolve Darfur. The Deputy Secretary observed that he found
little reason for optimism during the course of his visit.
The Deputy Secretary noted it is not clear that Khartoum has
decided that working with the international community is in
its best interest. Vraalsen endorsed the Deputy's
assessment, noting the government continues to play out the
strategy utilized against the South. They have set their
minds on a course, and intend to follow it.

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THE SUDANESE PSYCHE
--------------


3. (C) Zerihoun questioned whether the political landscape
was so clear cut. Politically, Khartoum has lost a lot in
Darfur, he argued. If elections were held today in Darfur,
Bashir would lose. The National Congress Party is not
popular, burdened by past atrocities in the South and the
West. Vraalsen countered that neither the SPLM nor the NCP
are sure about their chances in the 2009 comprehensive
elections. Zerihoun agreed, but speculated that the NCP will
push the SPLM to stand on the unity card (a unified "New
Sudan" along the lines of the vision of the late John Garang)
in order to strengthen its hand. The SPLM's hesitancy to
develop a strong platform in the face of a looming 2011
southern plebiscite would fractUre an otherwise secured v/te.Q


4. (C) Both0d! Sihva afd ZriHot^,`hnWevev, strecsd!surrd.tQQ4mnseo~ Weuhi(BQwirgs!yb.er{irclu-@ xc onFm2noEbuQm5JhmCmo%3gdt` qn%Q!ib5takQy,0j~st3er`m@nh&aurE{Ql/Q
Ygcgm{$aBgqmc QEm|Qb`6)h}ag#C5}9$un4(|Hyay|{ l%EqE6e&r(QV[:_0.Q*4sYu`Q~PQk!Yi5`6[dqE~Q`::c uaxYQe. "But," the Acting SRSG admitted,
"old patterns still persist. Khartoum continues to raise the
stakes when that is no longer necessary."


5. (C) Hume assessed that Khartoum's calculus assumes that we
will always pay for AMIS no matter how ineffective. The
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs agreed, noting
Rwandan President Kagame's criticism that AMIS' continuing
presence in Darfur allows us avoid serious decisions. The
Deputy Secretary noted that it is clear that Bashir has not
yet embraced the idea that the international community could
be of use. Cooperation early on could have yielded a
short-term peacekeeping operation in Darfur similar to Sierra
Leone. Stability in the region would have lessened the
current political pressures on his inner circle.


6. (C) Da Silva urged the dinner's participants to recognize
that Bashir is less of a president and more a referee
balancing competing powers and players. The Assistant
Secretary disagreed, noting "that may have been the case

SIPDIS
during the Naivasha peace process which culminated in the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement, but Darfur is different.
Bashir is the embodiment of the obstacle." Khartoum,s
approach is his approach. The Fall 2006 military campaign to
rout DPA opponents following its May 2005 signing, and now
the divisive approach to a political solution, stem directly
from him.

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HYBRID IMPEDIMENTS: KHARTOUM AND THE UN
--------------


7. (C) According to Zerihoun, competing interpretations of a
hybrid force were the largest obstacle to deploying
peacekeepers to Darfur. Khartoum defines the hybrid as a
UN-bankrolled AMIS supplemented by the UN light and heavy
support packages. UNSC members see a robust UN peacekeeping
mission complementing the existing AMIS force. The heavy
support package costs $300 million dollars. Bashir believes
incorrectly that this covers the addition of 3,500 UN
peacekeeping personnel plus the current AMIS force.


8. (C) Zerihoun also revealed UN thinking on the hybrid's
mandate at odds with U.S. policy. He noted that a new
resolution would provide a Chapter VI mandate. At most, he
argued, it might include Chapter VII elements, but it was
clear a new resolution would be required. The Deputy
countered, disagreeing with Zerihoun's approach. "You can't
let Khartoum out from underneath a Chapter VII mandate in
exchange for a peacekeeping force." The Acting SRSG
maintained that UNSCR 1706 covered a period when the
international community believed AMIS would be transitioning
to a UN peacekeeping force. The AU/UN hybrid option was not
that force, and its Chapter VII mandate does not apply. The
Assistant Secretary pressed for details from Zerihoun on the
latest vision for hybrid peacekeeping operations,
particularly those linked to command and control. Zerihoun
clarified that the AU/UN Coordination Cell in Addis Ababa
would not impact UN command over peacekeepers in the field.
There would be a similar cell in El Fasher, in addition to AU
officers assigned to New York and UN officers assigned to
Addis.


9. (C) This is a difficult period to launch a peacekeeping
mission, Zerihoun continued. The UN is overstretched, and in
the wake of procurement scandals such as the Oil for Food
program, the bureaucracy has become more cumbersome. "Look
at the timeframe we are working under -- the AMIS mandate
expires in two and half months. UN assistance to AMIS was
agreed upon in November. It is now April, and we are nowhere
close to where we need to be on personnel." The difficulties
we are facing with light and heavy support are a fraction of
what we will face attracting troop contributing countries for
the hybrid force. Even with assessed dues, only three or
four African nations have said they would contribute to a
hybrid mission.

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DARFUR: HOW TO MOVE FORWARD?
--------------


10. (C) The Deputy Secretary asked why the Darfur Joint
Assessment Mission remained incomplete. Da Silva noted that
while the security situation had a slight impact, the
decision to suspend the DJAM was a political one --
completing the humanitarian assessment would give Khartoum
cover to orchestrate its plans for Darfur under the cover of
an international flag. The Deputy Secretary and USAID's Bill
Garvelink pressed for reconsideration of this decision,
particularly as rebel groups splinter further.


11. (C) Zerihoun queried the Deputy Secretary about whether
improved bilateral relations between Khartoum and Washington
might improve the chance for a sustainable solution to Darfur
and the situation on the ground. "We played that card," the
Assistant Secretary stressed, "and they did not accept it."
The Deputy Secretary continued that the Sudanese appear
unable to see their way forward -- they want improved
bilateral relations and a free hand to continue to manage
Darfur as they have to date." Vraalsen argued that the
current impasse requires the U.S. to hit Khartoum hard --
giving those questioning Bashir's strategy a chance to move
to the fore. Khartoum feels comfortable, they won the 1706
battle -- the international community blinked. The Charge
followed Vraalsen's point, noting that with revenue
shortfalls stemming from poor sales of Sudanese heavy acidic
crude oil selling 50% below market value and an expanding
budget deficit, sanctions may be timely enough to do the
trick.


12. (SBU) Participants

USG Participants

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The Deputy Secretary
AF Assistant Secretary Jendayi E. Frazer
NSC Director for African Affairs Bobby Pittman
USAID Advisor Bill Garvelink
Charge d'Affaires Cameron R. Hume
D Staff Gustavo Delgado
D Staff Ted Wittenshein
Political Officer Erin Y. Tariot

Guests

Acting SRSG Taye Zerihoun
UNOCHA Humanitarian Affairs Coordinator Manuel da Silva
AEC Chairman Ambassador Tom Vraalsen
UNMIS Advisor Joshua Lincoln
UNMIS Advisor Karin Wermsterner
HUME