Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07KHARTOUM599
2007-04-17 14:08:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT BASHIR

Tags:  OVIP NEGROPONTE JOHN PREL MOPS PINR KPKO UN 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO8077
OO RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0599/01 1071408
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 171408Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6874
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA IMMEDIATE 0106
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT IMMEDIATE 0035
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 0144
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000599 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2017
TAGS: OVIP NEGROPONTE JOHN PREL MOPS PINR KPKO UN
AU-1, SU
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT BASHIR


KHARTOUM 00000599 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: CDA C. HUME, REASON: SECTION 1.4 (B) AND (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000599

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/16/2017
TAGS: OVIP NEGROPONTE JOHN PREL MOPS PINR KPKO UN
AU-1, SU
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT BASHIR


KHARTOUM 00000599 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: CDA C. HUME, REASON: SECTION 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) Summary: On April 15 Deputy Secretary Negroponte met
with Sudanese President Omar El Bashir for over an hour.
Negroponte emphasized USG concern over Darfur, including the
fragility of the humanitarian situation, the need to
transition to a UN/AU hybrid peace-keeping operation, and the
challenge of restarting a political dialogue. Bashir
concentrated on two points: the UN role in peace-keeping
should be limited to providing financing, logistic support,
and technical advice to the AU; and, while he would like to
improve relations with the United States, he was skeptical
that the USG would ever move in that direction. End Summary.


2. (C) President Bashir welcomed the Deputy Secretary and his
delegation with the hope this meeting would have a more
positive outcome than previous meetings with American
visitors. Deputy Secretary Negroponte said he was on his
first trip to Sudan. He had visited Juba and met First Vice
President Salva Kiir; then he had gone to Darfur and met with
the AMIS Force Commander, leaders of an IDP camp, and North
Darfur Governor Kibbir. He appreciated the welcome extended
to him by Sudanese hosts.

3. (C) Bashir said he wanted the visit to be positive and to
create real understanding as a basis for improved relations.
He sought positive cooperation to solve the problem of Darfur
by peaceful means. With the positive cooperation extended by
Senator Danforth and former Deputy Secretary Zoellick, Sudan
had achieved the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA ) and the
Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). The DPA could have led to
peace, but rather than supporting the DPA, AMIS, and the role
of the AU, action had been shifted to insistence that
international forces replace the AU and to support for the
parties who had refused to sign the DPA. These actions had
hurt the prospects for peace. Now the March 28 agreement

between Sudan, the UN, and the AU on the UN,s Heavy Support
Package for the AMIS could relaunch the peace process.

4. (C) Deputy Secretary Negroponte said he had met with
several of Bashir,s top advisers to explain the USG position
in detail, so he would now concentrate on a few main points.
The DPA addressed humanitarian, security, and political
issues, all of which now faced some serious issues of
implementation. The humanitarian situation had for now
stabilized, but security and political problems endangered
that fragile stability. The AMIS Force Commander said the
situation was "unpredictable" and "unstable." The United
States hoped that the March 28 humanitarian agreement would
be implemented as agreed, and the USG would monitor this
situation.

5. (C) Negroponte said security required moving to the hybrid
African Union and United Nations force. The USG supported a
hybrid force, with an African commander in a single chain of
command who would take orders from a Special Representative
of the Secretary-General (SRSG) appointed jointly by the UN
and the AU. His/her appointment should come as soon as
possible so that additional forces could be deployed. The
USG concurred that the large majority of this force would be
African, and the size of the force should be determined by
the UN/AU joint assessment. If African governments could not
supply all the troops required, the force should include
troops from elsewhere. Because the 5,000 troops of the AMIS
were too few, more forces were needed.

6. (C) Bashir said the first action needed was UN financing
for the African troops. He had agreed to the Heavy Support
Package; now the UN had to provide financing; and, next,
African governments should be asked to provide forces. The
two million soldiers in Africa were more than enough, if the
financing were available. The ball was now in the UN,s
court.

7. (C) Negroponte said that, according to the UN/AU report,
first recourse would be to African troops, but international
forces could make an important contribution. Organization of
the force had to be consistent with UN practices and
standards. The United Nations was not just a bank. It had
valuable experience and success in organizing peace-keeping
missions in Africa, and issues relating to the hybrid force
had to be discussed in an urgent way, such as during the
meeting between AU Chairman Konare and UN SYG Ban on April 16
in New York.

8. (C) Bashir said the UN could finance the African troops
under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, which provided for
entrusting the operation to a regional organization. In that
way the UN could arrange the financing. The forces would be
African; the UN could provide financing, technical advice,
and logistic support. With agreement on the Heavy Support
Package, the UN could now provide financing. Negroponte

KHARTOUM 00000599 002.2 OF 003


cautioned that it was important to know the outcome of the
current conversations at the UN. Darfur needed additional
security forces, and the Force Commander needed international
forces to help him.

9. (C) Bashir said the African forces under African command
would need only international support. Changing an AU green
beret for a UN blue beret would do nothing. They needed only
financing, technical advice and logistic support. The UN
should provide the financing, then troops should be raised in
Africa. If troops were not available, only then should one
look into the possibility of international troops. There
could be international support elements for the AU forces,
with a unified command. Bashir insisted that the hybrid
operation be based on African forces, supported by the UN.

10. (C) Negroponte said that the SRSG, appointed jointly by
the UN and AU, would give the instructions to the force
commander, providing the single chain of command. Bashir
said he had no disagreement on the appointment of the SRSG,
or the terms of reference, or the mandate. But the force
commander had to be an African and the forces on the ground
had to be African. The UN could provide financing, technical
advice, and logistic support, the kind of arrangement
contained in the Heavy Support Package. Negroponte hoped
Bashir was not raising new problems that would hinder the
launch of the hybrid force. Action was needed soon to raise
forces, and for this UN procedures and standards had to be
applied. Bashir said it was up to the UN to raise the
forces.

11. (C) Negroponte addressed another security issue, the
obligation of the Sudanese government to disarm the
Janjaweed, who could not operate without the active support
of the Sudanese government. Bashir replied that in Darfur
some people in small groups were acting as criminals and
bandits, but the government did not support them. None of
these groups had ever asserted that they received government
support. The major criminal activities were conducted by the
parties who rejected the DPA. Those groups operated out of
camps in Chad, where they got military support and recruited
among the refugees.

12. (C) Bashir said that Libya, Eritrea, Jan Eliasson and
Salim Ahmed Salim were trying to restart peace talks.
However, the rebels refused to negotiate because they were
waiting for the United States to impose new sanctions against
the government. The government wanted peace in Darfur, but
the U.S. rush to sanctions had the consequence that the
rebels would not now negotiate. As long as the U.S. and UK
were threatening sanctions in the UN, the rebels did not want
peace. Ending these threats would put pressure on the rebel
position.

13. (C) Negroponte warned all parties to speed up
implementation of the DPA. Peace efforts by Eliasson, Salim
and Salva Kiir could all help restore security to Darfur. If
the government went ahead to fund the Transitional Darfur
Regional Authority (TDRA) at $300 million this year, people
in Darfur would see a benefit of peace, and that step could
improve the political situation. Bashir said the government
had acted to stand up the TDRA, to fill all of the senior
positions, to provide it with a headquarters, and to provide
funding. Tenders had been advertised for initial projects.
The funding would be provided throughout the year.

14. (C) Negroponte explained that most USG assistance had
been for humanitarian purposes, given the conditions in
Darfur, but it would prefer to support development projects.
Bashir welcomed that preference, asserting that if the same
amount of money were spend on development, there would be
peace in Darfur. Before the war Darfur did not need
humanitarian assistance, and USAID had carried out
development projects. Negroponte said he was pleased to hear
Bashir,s vision of a peaceful Darfur, but without security
it would be difficult to return to that path.

15. (C) Bashir insisted that not all of Darfur was insecure.
80 percent of Darfur was safe, including areas such as Jebel
Marra, which had not been affected by the war. Such areas
were secure and returning to normal. The new governor of
West Darfur, who had been a rebel, had taken effective
measures to improve security.

16. (C) Shifting to a new topic, the Deputy Secretary said he
had just visited the construction site for the new U.S.
embassy. The USG was investing there $110 million, a vision
of a different future for bilateral relations. However, now
the relationship was in difficulty. Presidential Adviser
Nafie had told Negroponte that, even if the Darfur crisis
were resolved, the USG would find some other reason not to
improve relations. Negroponte had explained that the USG has
good relations with most countries and was not seeking
excuses to have bad relations. The USG could envisage a

KHARTOUM 00000599 003.2 OF 003


different future if the Darfur crisis were solved.

17. (C) Bashir appreciated this statement, but he charged
that the Darfur crisis was "one hundred percent caused by
USAID." At the start there were a few tribal problems, but
then John Garang interfered with the help of USAID and Roger
Winter. Sudanese officials remembered and wondered what the
United States might do again. Bashir said many thought peace
with the south was impossible, but Vice President Taha
persevered with Senator Danforth. That success should have
impelled the bilateral relationship forward. Danforth had
promised that peace with the South would bring normal
relations, no sanctions, and a waiver for debt. Deputy
Secretary Zoellick promised the same for signing the Darfur

SIPDIS
Peace Agreement. Sudan signed, but then the USG shifted the
goal posts by insisting that the UN replace the AU in Darfur.


18. (C) Bashir said he had agreed to the Heavy Support
Package. The next step was up to the United States. He
hoped events would prove Nafie,s pessimistic view wrong.
Turning to the construction of the new embassy, Bashir said
that some people in the government thought welcomed this
step. However, many opposed the construction because they
saw the policies of the USG to be to oppose the government
and to change the regime. After much experience, such was
the view in Khartoum. As Bashir had stated previously,
although President Bush cared about peace in Sudan, others in
his administration worked against Sudan. Negroponte
responded that the embassy was being built for normal
diplomatic purposes and that USG policy was well-considered.

19. (C) Bashir said his government cared about its relations
with the United States and wanted to solve its problems. The
two sides had worked together to achieve the CPA and DPA, but
bilateral relations had not improved. Negroponte reminded
him that agreements must be implemented. If rapid progress
were not made on implementing the DPA, bilateral relations
would not move forward. The way forward would have to be
built brick by brick, and the crucial point was to make
progress in Darfur.

20. (C) In conclusion Bashir repeated that his government had
signed the DPA, but then the USG insisted that responsibility
for implementing it be shifted from the AU to the UN. The
DPA provided otherwise. Why had the debate been shifted to
the issue of rehatting peace-keeping forces? Sudan wanted
the agreement implemented as signed. Zoellick had said that
those parties who did not sign the DPA would be punished, but
they were not. Sudan would like to turn a new page and
cooperate with the USG. Despite sanctions on Sudan,
permission was given to build the new embassy. Sudan was a
poor country, and the United States was rich.

21. (U) Participants:

U.S.
The Deputy Secretary
Jendayi E. Frazer, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs
Cameron Hume, Charge d,Affaires
Bobby Pittman, Senior Director for Africa, National Security
Council
Colonel Dennis Giddens, DoD advisor
Gustavo Delgado, D staff

Government of Sudan:
President Omar El Bashir
Lam Akol, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ambassador Abdel Basit Badawi Al Sanousi, Director of America
Affairs, MFA
Abdulrahman Sharfie, Minister Plenipotentiary
HUME