Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07KHARTOUM589
2007-04-16 09:07:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENTIAL

Tags:  OVIP NEGROPONTE JOHN PREL MOPS PINR KPKO UN 
pdf how-to read a cable
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ZNY CCCCC ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6858
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA IMMEDIATE 0100
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RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 0135
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000589 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, AF/SE NATSIOS AND IO A/S
SILVERBERG, NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/2017
TAGS: OVIP NEGROPONTE JOHN PREL MOPS PINR KPKO UN
AU-1, SU, CH
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENTIAL
ADVISOR NAFIE

KHARTOUM 00000589 001.5 OF 002


Classified By: CDA C. Hume, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000589

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, AF/SE NATSIOS AND IO A/S
SILVERBERG, NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/15/2017
TAGS: OVIP NEGROPONTE JOHN PREL MOPS PINR KPKO UN
AU-1, SU, CH
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENTIAL
ADVISOR NAFIE

KHARTOUM 00000589 001.5 OF 002


Classified By: CDA C. Hume, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: On April 15 Deputy Secretary Negroponte met
with Nafie Ali Nafie, a trusted advisor to President Bashir
and a key hard-liner in the National Congress Party (NCP).
The Deputy Secretary told Nafie that the most pressing issue
of his trip was the situation in Darfur in all its aspects:
humanitarian, security, and political. According to Nafie,
solving the Darfur crisis would be simple: "If we neutralize
Chad, create peace and security on the ground, and show
agreement between the US and Sudan," the Darfur rebels would
melt away. Nafie repeatedly warned against "reopening" the
details of the Heavy Support Package, which he argued had
been negotiated in the December 2006 Presidential Statement,
in the November 30 Abuja meetings, and most recently in the
UN-AU-Sudan meeting in Addis on April 9. End summary.

--------------
HUMANITARIAN ACCESS
--------------


2. (C) The Deputy Secretary noted that mortality and
nutrition indicators had stabilized in Darfur, but that
situation was unstable and could worsen quickly given the
security situation. The Government could make important
improvements in facilitating the work of international NGOs
and guaranteeing access to camps. Humanitarian access,
stated Nafie, was an area where there are no disagreements:
the Government of Sudan and the international community
agreed on making this &easy and smooth.8 If there were any
problem, it was that the international community was slow in
delivering on its promises of aid.

--------------
SECURITY AND PEACEKEEPERS
--------------


3. (C) The Deputy Secretary said that, particularly after
observing the situation on the ground, he shared the general

agreement that Darfur needed more peacekeepers, as quickly as
possible, as part of a hybrid AU-UN force under a single
chain of command conforming to UN standards and practices. It
was also urgent, said the Deputy Secretary, that the
government cut off support for, and restrain, the Janjaweed.
Nafie said the charges about the Janjaweed were largely
political propaganda. There were some Arab units that should
be incorporated into the Army, but they were under control.
Those who were committing crimes were just bandits, with no
links to the government.


4. (C) The November 16 meeting in Addis had resolved the
question of AU-UN forces in Darfur "once and for all," Nafie
said. "This should be the final resolution of this debate."
The UN, the African Union, and Sudan are in agreement, and he
hoped that the US would support this. Nafie stated he
thought that the remaining issue of the helicopters would be
resolved soon. If the U.S. were claiming that Sudan is not
honoring the Addis agreement in order to press again for UN
Resolution 1706, Nafie warned, this would be a step very far
backwards. The agreement reached at the Addis meeting on
November 16 had been carefully negotiated and clarified at
Abuja, in the Presidential Statement of December 19, and most
recently in the agreements made in the tripartite mechanism.



5. (C) The Deputy Secretary clarified that the final details
of a hybrid AU-UN force could be resolved later. We have
agreed on the Heavy Support Package, but even the Light
Support Package is not yet in place, Nafie replied. The UN
needs to authorize funding and recruit the necessary forces
for the Heavy Support Package. What is most important is
that the international community deliver on the help the AU
needs, through personnel and logistics.

--------------
POLITICS AND THE DPA
--------------


6. (C) The non-signatories are an important obstacle to full
implementation of the DPA, said the Deputy Secretary. The
international community wants to see the non-signatories
participate in some kind of political discussion, whether

KHARTOUM 00000589 002.2 OF 002


through the work of the UN and AU envoys Eliasson and Salim,
or through the efforts of Sudan,s First Vice-President Salva
Kiir. Nafie agreed, saying that the problem was that the
non-signatory groups are very fragmented; this was also true
of the forces of DPA signatory Minni Minawi.


7. (C) The Deputy Secretary suggested that implementing the
Transitional Darfur Regional Authority and the USD 300
million Darfur Reconstruction and Devlopment Fund could help
end the conflict, by empowering Darfurians and showing the
benefits of peace. Nafie demurred, noting that the
government had met &100 per cent8 of its commitments under
the DPA: Darfurians were governing Darfur. The only
appropriate point of reference was the DPA. The government
would not do "additional" things that were not in the
agreement. Some people always want more than they have, Nafie
noted. And since the international community is slow to
deliver funds for projects such as the DRDF, people become
skeptical.


8. (C) Throughout, Nafie developed his theme that the Darfur
rebels are now only fragments of the former groups. There is
no fighting in Darfur between the government and the rebels,
asserted Nafie. Tribes are fighting tribes, and there are
bandits too of course. Some rebel factions have become
bandits; for others, their leaders have become creatures of
the international community. If a unified international
community really pressed for a political agreement, all would
see that the former rebels are now only bandits.

--------------
CHAD,S ROLE IN DARFUR
--------------


9. (C) Sudan has an interest in good relations with Chad,
said Nafie, despite the recent attack on Sudanese soldiers at
the border. Sudan has so many potential problems, it would
like to cross some off its list. The Chadian Ambassador,s
formal apology for the border incident is a good step and
Sudan has agreed to host Chadian President Deby soon. Sudan
is looking to the US to encourage Chad to find a solution to
the conflicts.

--------------
IT TAKES TWO TO CLAP: BILATERAL RELATIONS
--------------


10. (C) The Deputy Secretary noted that trust between their
two governments would have to be built "brick by brick." "We
have put all our bricks on the table," rejoined Nafie. "It
takes two to clap. I personally see no will on the US side to
improve relations. Darfur has been blown out of its size
because of your own issues" and US political dynamics. The
Deputy Secretary noted that he had rebutted this same
argument in his conversation with intelligence chief Salah
Gosh, and that he had seen the U.S. and other countries work
together to mend poor relationships. There would be some
other excuse after Darfur, Nafie complained. &If the U.S.
and Sudan become good friends, or at least not enemies, that
will be news.8



11. (U) Participants:

U.S.
The Deputy Secretary
Jendayi Frazer, A/S for African Affairs
Cameron Hume, Charge d,Affairs
Bobby Pittamn, Senior Director for Africa, National Security
Council
Col Dennis Giddens, DoD advisor
Kathryn Hoffman, Embassy notetaker

Sudan
Nafie Ali Nafie

HUME