Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07KHARTOUM574
2007-04-14 06:50:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH SUDANESE STATE

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OO RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0574/01 1040650
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 140650Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6821
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA IMMEDIATE 0081
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT IMMEDIATE 0010
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 0116
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000574 

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DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SE NATSIOS AND IO A/S
SILVERBERG, NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2017
TAGS: OVIP NEGROPONTE JOHN EAID MOPS PGOV PINR PREF
PREL, PHUM, KPKO, UN, AU-1, SU
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH SUDANESE STATE
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AS SAMMANI


KHARTOUM 00000574 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: CDA C. Hume, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000574

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SE NATSIOS AND IO A/S
SILVERBERG, NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2017
TAGS: OVIP NEGROPONTE JOHN EAID MOPS PGOV PINR PREF
PREL, PHUM, KPKO, UN, AU-1, SU
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH SUDANESE STATE
MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AS SAMMANI


KHARTOUM 00000574 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: CDA C. Hume, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d


1. (C) Summary: Meeting with Deputy Secretary Negroponte,
State Minster for Foreign Affairs As Sammani appealed for
dialogue to "unlock" the situation in Darfur and urged the
U.S. to push the non-signatory rebel groups to join the
Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). The Deputy Secretary urged the
Sudanese to adhere to the agreement reached in Addis Ababa in
November and to open the way for a peacekeepers, under full
UN command and control, to deploy to Darfur. The Sudanese
described the March 28 agreement to improve humanitarian
access to Darfur as "a landmark." The Deputy Secretary said
that the United States will be watching to see the practical
effect of the agreement on access. End Summary.


2. (U) State Minister for Foreign Affairs As Sammani Al
Waseela As Sammani met with Deputy Secretary Negroponte the
evening of April 12 at his residence in Khartoum. The
meeting was followed by a working dinner to welcome the
Deputy Secretary and his party to Sudan.


3. (C) The Deputy Secretary opened his remarks by stating
that the reason for his visit is Darfur. He stressed that
recent agreements, including the one reached in Addis Ababa
November 16, 2006 must be implemented. A follow-on
peace-keeping mission, under full UN command and control,
must then be deployed in Darfur. Resolution of the crisis in
Darfur is key to improvement in the bilateral relationship.
He noted that humanitarian and security issues are
intertwined. Successful implementation of a UN mission in

Darfur would deprive critics of Sudan of their arguments.
Success could build on success, creating a positive, upward
spiral.

--------------
Political Process in Darfur
--------------


4. (C) In reply, As Sammani stated that he welcomed the visit
as an opportunity for dialogue. He stressed that dialogue is
needed to "unlock" the situation and move on to the next
step. Briefly recounting the history of the Darfur Peace
Agreement (DPA),As Summani expressed appreciation for the
efforts of former Deputy Secretary Zoellick and Charge' Hume
for their help in negotiating the agreement in Abuja and
appealed to the U.S. for continued engagement. As Summani
returned repeatedly to the need to bring the non-signatory
rebel groups onboard the agreement, saying that no peace can
be sustained if some of the main players are not part of it.
He appealed to the U.S. to put pressure on the non-signatory
groups. He complained that the leaders of these groups are
"staying in five-star hotels" and visiting foreign ministries
in Europe, and thus have little incentive to reach an
agreement on the ground.

--------------
Good Faith Efforts Unrewarded
--------------


5. (C) As Sammani emphasized that there is a feeling that
Sudan had made good faith efforts, but had not received the
recognition and benefits that should have followed. He
complained that after signing the November 16 agreement in
Addis Ababa, Sudan had been "bombarded" with negative media
attention. In addition, donors were not as supportive as had
been hoped. He cited the case of the World Food Program
(WFP),claiming that shortly after the peace agreement was
signed, WFP cut its program, forcing the government of Sudan
to replace 20,000 tons of food that it felt had been pledged
by WFP. USAID advisor Garvelink interjected that while WFP
had initially indicated it would have to reduce food
shipments, in the end the full amount was delivered.

-------------- ---
Humanitarian Agreement Claimed as a Breakthrough
-------------- ---


6. (C) Director General for Humanitarian Affairs Yousuf
reiterated his government's committment to humanitarian aid
in Darfur, saying the March 28 agreement is a "landmark" and
explained that, for the first time, there is a mechanism to
deal with problems as they emerge. The agreement sets up a

KHARTOUM 00000574 002.2 OF 002


tripartite structure with the UN, Government and NGOs to meet
monthly to identify and resolve problems. Commenting on the
UN heavy support package, Yousuf stated that all issues but
one (attack helicopters) have been resolved and that one
remaining issue is the subject of ongoing consultations. He
also urged that pressure be put on the non-signatories to
negotiate and asked what the U.S. could do to persuade the
non-signatories to come on board. Charge' Hume replied that
it is difficult to force people to talk. It is necessary to
create the right conditions first. Saying that a military
offensive is clearly not the right way, he commended the
Sudanese government for its restraint as efforts were made to
bring together a commanders' conference. Assistant Secretary
Frazer said that a credible and neutral peacekeeping force
would help to create the conditions for dialogue. She
stressed the need for a single forum for discussions, the
UN/AU being the best option.

--------------
UN Command and Control
--------------


7. (C) After As Sammani invited everyone to "concentrate on
more dialogue," conversation turned to the issue of
deployment of a peace-keeping mission in Darfur and the
importance of UN command and control. As Sammani asked
whether the U.S. would support an agreement reached between
the UN, the AU and the government of Sudan. The Deputy
Secretary replied that, if the agreement is reasonable, the

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U.S. would support it. Director General Yousuf, a lawyer,
stated that in his view, the issue of command and control
will be governed by the mandate and it is imperative that the
mandate direct the peacekeeping mission to assist with the
implementation of the DPA.


8. (U) Participants:

U.S.
The Deputy Secretary
Jendayi E. Frazer, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs
Cameron Hume, Charge d'Affairs
Bobby Pittman, Senior Director for Africa, National Security
Council
Gustavo Delgado, D staff
Bill Garvelink, USAID
Curtis Stewart (Embassy Notetaker)

Government of Sudan
As Sammani Al Waseela As Sammani, State Minister for Foreign
Affairs
Sirajuddin Hamid Yousif, Director General for Humanitarian
Affairs
Ambassador Abdel Basit Badawi al Sanousi, Director, Americas
Division
Abdel Rahman Sharfi, Minister Plenipotentiary
HUME