Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07KHARTOUM485
2007-03-28 12:19:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

BASHIR ADVISOR: STRUCTURE DARFUR PROCESS

Tags:  PREL PGOV KPKO UN AU SU CD 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO7639
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0485 0871219
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 281219Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6626
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 000485 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO UN AU SU CD
SUBJECT: BASHIR ADVISOR: STRUCTURE DARFUR PROCESS

REF: KHARTOUM 00478

Classified By: CDA Cameron Hume, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)

-----------------------------
Structure a Process for Darfur
------------------------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 000485

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/27/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO UN AU SU CD
SUBJECT: BASHIR ADVISOR: STRUCTURE DARFUR PROCESS

REF: KHARTOUM 00478

Classified By: CDA Cameron Hume, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)

--------------
Structure a Process for Darfur
--------------


1. (C) Presidential Advisor Ghazi Salaheddin told CDA Hume on
March 28 that Sudan and the U.S. government had an
"intellectual duty" to address the urgent aspects of the
Darfur crisis. He suggested that the two governments
structure a process to lay the groundwork for resolution of
these issues prior to the next high-level USG visit to Sudan.
"The Sudanese character is to drag things on, that time is
the greatest healer," said Salaheddin. "But that is not
always the case." He emphasized that "energy should not be
confused with being productive" and said he would propose
that President Bashir designate a point person to work with
the international community on Darfur. The Sudanese
government is commmited to finding a solution to the Darfur
crisis, asserted Salaheddin. He suggested that a framework
be constructed to address the peace-keeping, political, and
humanitarian issues of the conflict.

--------------
UN Peacekeeping
--------------


2. (C) Noting that "the most important thing in the
Government psyche is the UN thing," Salaheddin said that he
had no personal objection to a peace-keeping operation with
joint UN/AU command and African troops. Salaheddin intimated
that de-linking the UN force from the International Criminal
Court (ICC) would help to secure Sudan's agreement. "The ICC
issue is important from a psychological point of view," he
explained. He also indicated that a new UN Security Council
Resolution (UNSCR) that included some elements of UNSCR 1706
but excluded issues relating to national sovereignty--such as
the judiciary--would be useful.


3. (C) CDA Hume underscored that the UN Security Council,
including Russia and China, viewed UN command and control as
essential to any peacekeeping force. He suggested that Sudan
and the international community agree on the outcome for the
peacekeeping, political, and humanitarian issues and then
develop a framework to reach the goals for each. CDA Hume
described his conversation with UN Envoy Jan Eliasson and AU
Envoy Salim Ahmed Salim on March 27 (reftel). He said they
had discussed the limited timeframe for dialogue and the
possibility of a high-level meeting to restart negotiations
with the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) non-signatories.

--------------
Relations with the International Community
--------------


4. (C) "Mending fences" with Sudan's neighbors, such as Chad,
was a critical component of the political process for Darfur,
said Salaheddin. He added, however, that "even more
important is normalizing relations with the international
community." He asserted that the political process needed to
involve a variety of stakeholders, rather than just the
Sudanese government and the Darfur rebel groups. He cited
the important role that France could play vis-a-vis Chad as
an example. Salaheddin acknowledged, however, that he held
little hope for an improvement in the U.S.-Sudan bilateral
relationship in the near future.


5. (C) Salaheddin was optimistic that Sudan and the
international community could agree on steps to facilitate
continued humanitarian operations in Darfur. He called the
recent decision to prevent UN Undersecretary General for
Humanitarian Affairs John Holmes from entering an IDP camp in
Darfur "unfortunate" and said that "it shows we have some
problems with the system here." Salaheddin explained that
military-to-military cooperation could be a mechanism to
address issues of bilateral interest. CDA Hume said that the
proposed visit of RDML Hart to Sudan would be an opportunity
for him to meet with representatives of the Ministry of
Defense and rebel movements to begin mapping areas of control
and facilitate implementation of DPA provisions.
HUME