Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07KHARTOUM451
2007-03-22 13:10:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

DENG ALOR: TWO ROADS FOR U.S. POLICY

Tags:  PREL PGOV KPKO AU UN AL SU EG SF NO US 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO2440
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0451/01 0811310
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 221310Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6567
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000451 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AF/SPG, AND
NEA/RA
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO AU UN AL SU EG SF NO US
SUBJECT: DENG ALOR: TWO ROADS FOR U.S. POLICY

REF: KHARTOUM 0290

Classified By: CDA Cameron Hume, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)

------------------------
NCP Chooses Confrontation
-------------------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000451

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AF/SPG, AND
NEA/RA
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO AU UN AL SU EG SF NO US
SUBJECT: DENG ALOR: TWO ROADS FOR U.S. POLICY

REF: KHARTOUM 0290

Classified By: CDA Cameron Hume, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)

--------------
NCP Chooses Confrontation
--------------


1. (C) Minister for Cabinet Affairs Deng Alor told USAID
Mission Director and Poloff on March 19 that the National
Congress Party (NCP) has decided to confront the
international community on Darfur. He admitted that his
belief in productive engagement with Khartoum "was getting
weaker and weaker." Alor pointed to Bashir's letter to UNSYG
Ban Ki-Moon on the UN Heavy Support Package, a recent
internal NCP decision not to cooperate with the International
Criminal Court (ICC),and the cancellation of a meeting on
humanitarian operations in Darfur as evidence of the NCP's
confrontational stance.

--------------
International Threats Ring Hollow
--------------


2. (C) The NCP considers the threats from the international
community hollow, said Alor. Hard-line elements in the
regime are behaving as if there is no serious threat from the
international community, despite the knowledge of imminent
U.S. sanctions. They also believe that the USG does not have
the will to initiate dramatic action under "Plan B" and that
it would not want to "hurt" Southern Sudan. He explained
that during internal discussions Presidential Advisor Nafie
Ali Nafie argues that the regime has survived sanctions in
the past and can do so in the future. Alor claimed that a
March 18 meeting of President Bashir, Nafie, Presidential
Advisors Maghzoub al-Khalifa and Mustafa Osman Ismail, and
others concluded that Sudan would not cooperate with the ICC.

--------------
Punitive Measures and the Consequences
--------------


3. (C) Alor asserted that anything short of comprehensive oil
sanctions or non-permissive military action would not change

the NCP's position. He predicted that the "punishment" that
oil sanctions or military action would exert on the Sudanese
people would "push them into the streets." Commenting on
earlier SPLM assessments that the NCP would use these Western
actions to justify a state of emergency (reftel),Alor said
that popular resistance could nonetheless succeed and that
the Sudanese military would divide when it saw the NCP as
weak. Alor asserted, however, that the U.S. and Norway would
need to provide total financial support for the Government of
Southern Sudan (GoSS) during the transition because oil
revenues from the North would cease. (Note: Alor said that
he had also discussed this point with Norwegian Special
Representative Vegard Ellefsen on March 18, who said he would
raise it in Oslo. End note.) "Things would get much worse
before they got better," Alor stated. He said coercive
measures could last only six months or the "suffering will be
enormous." Alor also explained that the opposition parties
had no clear vision for a post-NCP government beyond
professing support for the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
(CPA). Alor said that the SPLM was discussing a number of
scenarios in light of the possibility of sanctions but did
not elaborate.

--------------
One Last Hope
--------------


4. (C) According to Alor, one diplomatic option may remain:
the Government might change its position on a UN
peace-keeping mission if Bashir could say that he did so at
the behest of the African or Arab "wise men." He suggested
that such a decision could come after either South African
President Mbeki's upcoming visit to Khartoum or the March
28-29 Arab League summit in Riyadh. Alor said, however, that
Mbeki's messages to the NCP on the importance of
international engagement "could be clearer" and that Egypt
was sending "mixed signals" on the Darfur crisis.

--------------
Two Options Only
--------------


KHARTOUM 00000451 002 OF 002



5. (C) Alor has long contended that sustained international
dialogue with the Sudanese government would bear fruit and
that the regime would ultimately accept a face-saving
solution to the debate over UN peace-keeping forces in
Darfur. However, senior SPLM leaders, including Alor, Deputy
SPLM Secretary General for the Northern Yasser Arman, and
Minister of Trade and Investment Malik Agar, increasingly
assert that the USG faces only two policy options: 1)
Confront Khartoum's leaders with dramatic, punitive actions
that may alter their behavior by virtually forcing the regime
to collapse, while anticipating the repercussions of this
policy,--including the curtailment of U.S. aid programs and
diplomatic engagement in Sudan; or, 2) Recognize that a
solution to the Darfur crisis and a change in government in
Khartoum will only result from implementation of the
CPA--including the gradual development of opposition
forces--and a long-term diplomatic strategy involving
non-Western partners, while anticipating numerous setbacks.
HUME