MINAWI ON AMIS DEATHS, SOUTH DARFUR, CHAD/SUDAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000410

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/15/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO AU SU CD LY IR US
SUBJECT: MINAWI ON AMIS DEATHS, SOUTH DARFUR, CHAD/SUDAN

REF: A. KHARTOUM 00407


B. 06 KHARTOUM 02874

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Classified By: P/E Chief E. Whitaker, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Senior Assistant to the President and Sudan
Liberation Movement (SLM) leader Minni Minawi said that the
African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) rebuffed his offers of
a joint SLM/AMIS investigation into the March 5 killing of
two AMIS soldiers in Graida. Minawi described the SLM's
efforts to re-take areas of South Darfur over-run by Arab
militias in the last four months after the Sudanese
government ignored his entreaties to stabilize the situation.
To strengthen the SLM's position with the Government, Minawi
asked for USG assistance in establishing the Security
Assessment Team (SAT) and the Logistical Coordination
Commission (LCC). He also predicted that sanctions against
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) leader Khalil Ibrahim
would facilitate a rapprochement between Chad and Sudan and
recommended that the USG facilitate negotiations between
President Deby and the Chadian opposition. Without objecting
to the release of Suleiman Jamous from a UN hospital, Minawi
said that the Government would oppose it and warned that
Jamous would curry political and military support for Ibrahim
from Darfur field commanders. End summary.

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AU Rejects Joint Investigation in Graida
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2. (C) Meeting with Poloff on March 15, Minawi characterized
his March 12 discussions with the AU regarding the attack on
AMIS personnel in Graida as contentious, with the AU
rejecting Minawi's offers of cooperation. Minawi claimed
that Aprezi had said he was ready "to fight the SLM" and "to
declare war" after the death of two of his soldiers in Graida
on March 5 (Ref. A). Denying that SLM fighters were
responsible, Minawi nonetheless recommended that the SLM and
AMIS form a joint investigative team to locate the attackers.
He offered to detain his local commander for questioning and
to "call all of the guys together" so that AMIS could
identify the assailants, note who was not in attendance, or
exonerate the SLM, which would then assist AMIS in finding
the true perpetrators. He reported that neither AMIS Force
Commander Aprezi nor AU Acting Head of Mission Monique
Mukaruliza responded to these suggestions.


3. (C) Minawi lamented that the international community,
including the AU, did not appreciate the complexity of the
situation in Graida and the interest that other groups had in
undermining SLM control in the area. He recalled that the
SLM had forced the JEM out of Graida after the signing of the
DPA and that the JEM/Peace Wing was now attempting to occupy
Graida because it was the birthplace of its leader, Abu
Risha. Minawi also said that South Darfur Wali Al Haj Attal
Manan was using Arab militias to gain control of the area in
order to earn money off infrastructure projects, as the water
supply for Nyala originated in Graida.

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Tribal Fighting in South Darfur
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4. (C) Referring to recent reports of fighting between the
SLM and the Maalia tribe in South Darfur, Minawi explained
that the conflict in fact involved two tribes from Kordofan
-- one of which was a small offshoot of the Maalia -- that
the Sudanese government had armed and sent into
Zaghawa-majority areas over the last four months. Minawi had
protested to President Bashir, Vice President Ali Osman Taha,
Minister of Defense Abdulrahim Mohammed Hussein, South Darfur
Wali Manan, and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) commander in
Nyala since late December, all to no avail.


5. (C) The most recent incident occurred in Mutawrit -- a
mixed Zaghawa-Rizeigat area -- where Arab militias had burned
the village and destroyed the waterpoint. According to
Minawi, the Government had built a new waterpoint within days
for the Arab militia who had taken up residence. Despite
conducting an investigation, the AMIS contingent in
Muhajerriya neglected to issue a report. Lacking other
recourse, the SLM re-took the village by force on March 14 in
an effort to restore the traditional tribal balance. Minawi
claimed that the Arabs killed in the counter-attack were
wearing government-issued uniforms and had Popular Defense
Forces (PDF) identification cards on their bodies. Poloff
suggested that the SLM utilize the Cease-fire Commission

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(CFC) to address these charges, an idea that Minawi welcomed
and said he would discuss with the SLM CFC representative.

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Two-Part Strategy to Strengthen SLM
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6. (C) Minawi detailed a two-party strategy to bolster SLM's
position with the government in the coming weeks. He said
that the AU would soon call a meeting of international donors
to address the SLM's February 10 request for the
establishment of the Logistical Coordination Commission (LCC)
stipulated in the DPA. The SLM leadership proposed that it
hold bilateral consultations with key donors, including the
USG, the UK, the EU, the Netherlands, and Norway, prior to
this meeting. Poloff reminded Minawi of the long-standing
U.S. prohibition against the provision of aid to combatants
but said that the USG was examining mechanisms to strengthen
the DPA signatories.


7. (C) Minawi expressed his concern that the National
Congress Party (NCP) would soon move to appoint NCP-coopted
members to the Security Arrangements Commission as part of
its strategy to limit the effectiveness the Transitional
Darfur Regional Authority (TDRA). The SLM's strategy is to
pre-empt the NCP's move by calling for the creation of the
Security Assessment Team (SAT) at the next Joint Commission
meeting. According to the DPA, the SAT should be chaired by
a foreign general. The SLM suggested that the international
community support a USG candidate for this post. While
recognizing that the Government would never accept a U.S.
general, the SLM believes that beginning with a "hammer" will
force the NCP ultimately to agree to a suitable candidate,
likely from Canada or Norway, who can work to counter-balance
the Security Commission if necessary.

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Chad/Sudan Tensions
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8. (C) Minawi and his advisors predicted that U.S. sanctions
against JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim would have a positive
effect on the Darfur peace process as international
condemnation of Ibrahim would lead Chad to "drop him."
Though Minawi denied that Deby gave financial support to JEM
-- "which all comes from Turabi, Eritrea, and Iran" --
sanctions would give Chad political cover for deporting him.
Minawi stated that President Deby now saw an opportunity,
with Libyan facilitation, to defuse bilateral tensions with
Sudan and would not want the rebel movements to hinder this
process. Libyan internal security chief Abdullah Sanoussi
had told Minawi in Tripoli that President Qadhafi had given
Deby an ultimatum: unify the Darfur rebels groups and push
them to negotiation with Sudan. In turn, Libya would mediate
between N'djamena and Khartoum to shore up Deby's regime.


9. (C) Without expressing any personal rancor, Minawi
predicted former SLM Humanitarian Affairs Coordinator
Suleiman Jamous would draw the political and military support
of Darfur field commanders from Sudan Federal Democratic
Alliance (SFDA) leader Sharif Harir, SFDA leader Ahmed
Diraij, SLM leader Abdulwahid Al Nur, and SLM Ahmed
Abdulshafi toward Ibrahim's JEM if he were released from a UN
field hospital in South Kordofan (Ref. B). Noting that
Jamous rejects the DPA, Minawi emphasized that the Sudanese
government would never allow his release because of his close
ties to Popular Congress Party (PCP) leader Hassan Al Turabi
and Ibrahim.


10. (C) Minawi suggested that the USG could play a role in
lessening Chad-Sudan tensions by facilitating negotiations
between Deby and the Chadian opposition. In the event that
Qadhafi could broker a rapprochement between Sudan and Chad,
Minawi said Chad could pull back the Sudanese opposition.
However, Sudan would be unable to disarm Chadian rebels
operating from its territory, which would involve
international mediation.


11. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.
POWERS