Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07KHARTOUM384
2007-03-13 08:25:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

SE NATSIOS MEETING WITH FM LAM AKOL

Tags:  PREF PGOV KPKO PTER AU UN SU US CD LY 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO3387
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0384/01 0720825
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 130825Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6434
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 0091
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000384 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2012
TAGS: PREF PGOV KPKO PTER AU UN SU US CD LY
SUBJECT: SE NATSIOS MEETING WITH FM LAM AKOL

REF: A. NDJAMENA 00070


B. 06 KHARTOUM 02874

KHARTOUM 00000384 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: DCM Roberto Powers, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000384

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2012
TAGS: PREF PGOV KPKO PTER AU UN SU US CD LY
SUBJECT: SE NATSIOS MEETING WITH FM LAM AKOL

REF: A. NDJAMENA 00070


B. 06 KHARTOUM 02874

KHARTOUM 00000384 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: DCM Roberto Powers, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: In a March 7 meeting with Foreign Minister
Lam Akol, SE Natsios described the USG's frustration at the
delay in implementation of the November Addis Ababa and Abuja
agreements, called on Sudan to provide an immediate response
to the UNSYG's January 24 letter on the Heavy Support
Package, and asked that President Bashir issue a letter to
target countries to encourage troop contributions for phase
two and phase three. Akol responded that Sudan remained
committed to the agreements and would reply to the UNSYG's
letter in the near future. He denied that Sudan had taken
actions to discourage troop contributions. On the political
process, SE Natsios acknowledged that some regional
governments and non-signatories were hindering peace efforts.
He urged the Sudanese Government to proceed with the
formation of the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority in
consultation with Senior Assistant to the President and Sudan
Liberation Movement (SLM) leader Minni Minawi and to empower
First Vice President Salva Kiir to engage with the
non-signatories.


2. Summary continued: SE Natsios noted that an interruption
in humanitarian services in Darfur would have severe
consequences for the bilateral relationship and underscored
the importance of removing bureaucratic obstacles to aid
operations. He also said that Sudan should discipline the
perpetrators of the January attack on humanitarian workers in
Nyala. Akol said Sudan was already working to address the
bureaucratic issues and said that the judicial branch would
handle the investigation of the security services in Nyala.
With regard to Southern Sudan, SE Natsios asked for an

acceleration of the border commission process for Abyei and
rapid disarmament of the militias, which Akol said he was
pushing. SE Natsios also requested that Sudan release the
containers for the New Embassy Compound to avoid a
deterioration in relations, and Akol promised to raise the
issue with the Minister of Finance. Akol asked about the
status of the Sudanese detainees in Guatanamo Bay and of his
December letter to the Secretary. SE Natsios explained that
he was addressing the issue at the highest levels of the USG.
End summary.

--------------
Peace-Keeping
--------------


3. (C) SE Natsios explained "our perception is that you're
not committed to Addis." He said that the international
community had negotiated the November 16 Addis Ababa
agreement in response to Sudan's rejection of UN Security
Council Resolution 1706. The USG had then pushed for a
Presidential Statement (PRST) in the UN Security Council at
Sudan's behest. Now, Sudan was attempting to re-write the
command and control structures of the agreement. SE Natsios
accused President Bashir of discouraging troop contributing
countries (TCCs) from supporting the Heavy Support Package
and the UN/AU hybrid force, pointing to a December letter
from Sudan's mission in New York and a phone call from Bashir
to another Arab leader as examples of Sudan urging countries
not to contribute. He called on President Bashir to write a
letter to TCCs asking for contributions to demonstrate
Sudan's continued commitment to the Addis Ababa and Abuja
agreements.


4. (C) Akol responded that Sudan had agreed to phase one of
the Addis Ababa agreement and that the delay in its
implementation was on the "UN side." He confirmed that
Bashir's understanding of the concepts in the Addis Ababa and
Abuja agreements matched that of the international community.
"Andrew, it took a long time to arrive where we are," said
Akol. "No one in the Sudanese government wants to back
track." Akol claimed that the response to UNSYG Ban
Ki-moon's January 24 letter on the Heavy Support Package was
awaiting Bashir's signature and that Sudan hoped to finalize
agreement on phase two before the completion of phase one.
He asserted that phase three was an aggregate of the previous
two phases and that it was not a new package, "just adding
more troops to phase two." He denied that Sudan was
renegotiating the command and control structure and that it
wanted to abide by the Addis Ababa agreement, which stated
that an African commander would be appointed by the AU in
consultation with the UN. "When you talk to Nafie, Nafie is

KHARTOUM 00000384 002.2 OF 003


thinking of the commander," said Akol, referring to
Presidential Advisor Nafie Ali Nafie's objections to UN
command and control.


5. (C) Akol denied that President Bashir had discouraged
troop contributions to phase two. He also said that the
letter issued by Sudan's mission in New York had been revoked
and that Sudan's Permanent Representative to the UN had been
disciplined for circulating it. Akol was quick to say that
it was "not the business of Bashir to curry contributions for
the UN."

--------------
Political Process and the Non-Signatories
--------------


6. (S/NF) SE Natsios described his trip to Chad in January,
where he had met with non-signatory leaders (Ref A). He said
he had urged the non-signatories to renounce violent regime
change in Khartoum and to develop realistic political goals
to address the Darfur conflict. He acknowledged that many
non-signatories were hindering the political process and said
that the USG would sanction at least one rebel leader in the
near future. SE Natsios re-iterated the USG's support for a
single negotiating track with the non-signatories,
coordinated by the UN and AU. Referring to SE Natsios'
upcoming trip to Tripoli, Akol asked him to tell President
Qadafi that his efforts to unify the non-signatories were
helpful but that Libya needed to follow the UN/AU lead
stipulated in the November 16 Addis Ababa agreement. SE
Natsios noted that the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement
(SPLM) had indicated a willingness to engage with the
non-signatories as well and urged the Sudanese government to
empower Kiir to do so. Akol denied that the Sudanese
government had discouraged Kiir from engaging with the
non-signatories, contrary to SPLM claims.


7. (C) SE Natsios criticized the Sudanese government for not
implementing the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority
(TDRA) in consultation with Minawi and urged the Government
to change course in order to demonstrate the value of the
agreement to the non-signatories. He also suggested that the
Sudanese government consider allowing the release of former
Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) Humanitarian Affairs
Coordinator Suleiman Jamoos from a UN field hospital in
Kadugli, South Kordofan in order to change the political
dynamic on the ground. Akol responded that Jamoos "is a not
a government problem, he's Minni's problem" (Ref B).

--------------
Humanitarian Operations
--------------


8. (C) Addressing the growing obstacles for humanitarian
operations in Darfur, SE Natsios said that "if the INGOs
leave, it will cause a deterioration in our relationship."
He told Akol that Sudan should not confuse advocacy
organizations with operational NGOs, which were a moderating
influence in the U.S. While noting that rebel groups had
caused most of the recent violence against INGOs, SE Natsios
stated that the bureaucratic obstacles to humanitarian
operations had increased in 2006. "The appearance is that a
decision was made at the senior level to obstruct their
activities," he said. He called on the Sudanese government
to release INGOs' assets from customs, waive the fees
associated with their operations in Sudan, fast-track visa
applications for humanitarian workers, and implement the
moratorium on permits until January 31, 2008. He also said
that the Government should drop the charges against the
humanitarian workers who were arrested in Nyala in January
and investigate the members of the local security services
that attacked them following the arrest.


9. (C) Akol promised that the Sudanese government would
"handle" the four specific concerns that SE Natsios had
raised. He said that he had told Medecins Sans Frontieres
representatives on March 6 that they could obtain multiple
entry visas "as long as they want," implying that this would
extend to other humanitarian organizations. Regarding the
Nyala incident, he said the Ministry of Justice had been
asked to "quash" the case against the INGOs workers, which it
had done. He said that the investigation of the local
security services would be handled by the judicial branch,
which was independent from the executive, and emphasized that
the attack had not been directed by the central government.


KHARTOUM 00000384 003.2 OF 003


--------------
Southern Sudan
--------------


10. (C) SE Natsios said that Sudan must accelerate the border
commission process for Abyei in order to lay the foundation
for elections in 2009. He also called for more rapid
demobilization of militias in Southern Sudan. Akol said that
there had been three possible approaches to the Abyei issue:
1) Recall the Abyei Border Commission (ABC),2) Settle it
through a judicial process, and 3) Settle through a political
process. He said that the ABC had chosen the third approach,
a decision that should be binding. The Presidency had met on
March 5 to discuss Abyei, though Akol did not disclose the
results of their discussion. He concurred with SE Natsios
that militia demobilization was critical and said that the
December incident in Malakal was an "eye opener." "We're
pushing it," said Akol, noting that he had a vested interest
in the issue based on his familial ties to the Malakal area.

--------------
Bilateral Relationship
--------------


11. (C) SE Natsios emphasized that the USG wanted to improve
bilateral relations with Sudan. For this reason, he had
engaged with non-signatory leaders in Chad and had pushed for
the PRST in the UN Security Council. He said that if
relations deteriorated further, the possibility of a
normalization of relations and the removal of Sudan from the
list of state sponsors of terror would become more remote.
He said that the New Embassy Compound project was facing an
administrative deadline in Washington that would force its
cancellation if Sudan did not release the construction
containers. Akol said that it was "essential" to have a U.S.
Embassy in Sudan and that the Sudanese government had always
insisted on a U.S. presence--as a prerequisite to normalizing
relations. "As far as a political decision is concerned,
everyone is convinced it's better to have a U.S. Embassy
here." He claimed that the delay was caused by the Minister
of Finance, who was alleging that the duty-free status for
embassy construction materials was not authorized under the
"Geneva Convention." CDA Powers handed Akol a copy of the
Vienna Convention, and the Foreign Minister promised to raise
this issue with the Minister of Finance.


12. (C) Though SE Natsios said he was working to facilitate
the repatriation of two Sudanese nationals from the USG
detention facility in Guatanamo Bay, Cuba, Akol asked about
the status of his December letter to the Secretary on the
issue. SE Natsios re-iterated that he, A/S Frazer, and CDA
Hume agreed that "enough is enough" and were raising the
issue at the highest levels of the Department. Akol
explained that the Sudanese Government faced public criticism
for not doing enough on the detainee issue. Concluding, he
thanked Natsios for his openness throughout their meeting.
"It takes courage to say what you're saying," stated Akol.
"I saw the atmosphere in Washington last fall." Akol said
that he too faced domestic challenges and was "walking a
tight rope." He said that people in both Sudan and the U.S.
saw each other as the "devil incarnate," when the truth was
in between. "Our success is being frank with each other,"
said Akol.


13. (U) SE Natsios cleared this message.


14. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.
HUME