Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07KHARTOUM362
2007-03-08 10:51:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

NATSIOS-BASHIR MEETING, MARCH 7, 2007

Tags:  PREL PGOV KPKO AU UN SU CD LY US 
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VZCZCXRO9548
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0362/01 0671051
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 081051Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6406
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 0088
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000362 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO AU UN SU CD LY US
SUBJECT: NATSIOS-BASHIR MEETING, MARCH 7, 2007


KHARTOUM 00000362 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: CDA Roberto Powers, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000362

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO AU UN SU CD LY US
SUBJECT: NATSIOS-BASHIR MEETING, MARCH 7, 2007


KHARTOUM 00000362 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: CDA Roberto Powers, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: SE Natsios met President Bashir at his
residence for a two-hour frank exchange on Darfur, the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA),and the U.S.-Sudan
bilateral relationship. Bashir said he agreed to see him
despite doctor's orders that he rest. Foreign Minister Lam
Akol was present. Natsios delivered tough messages on the
need for full implementation of the November 16 Addis
agreement, stressing the importance of accelerating
deployment of the three-phase peacekeeping plan, supporting
the AU/UN-led political process, ending harassment and
bureaucratic impediments on humanitarian workers, and
breaking the deadlock on key CPA implementation issues. He
stressed the importance of the New Embassy Compound in
Khartoum to our ongoing bilateral relationship, and called
for the immediate release of the containers without payment
of customs duties.


2. (C) Summary continued: Bashir said he had just signed the
response letter on the heavy support package and that it
would be sent imminently. In his view, a large peacekeeping
force is not necessary in Darfur if the political process is
successful, but he accepts a hybrid force if there is an
African commander reporting to Addis (who determines the size
of the force); UN command and control means merely supportive
mechanisms (and funding) for the AU; and the troops are
African (with the exception of UN advisors and technical
assistants). Bashir pledged to end harassment of
humanitarian workers by eliminating bureaucratic obstacles,
and committed to release the NEC containers without payment
of duties. In a one-on-one meeting at the end, Natsios told
Bashir candidly that &Plan B8 was real and that elements
would be implemented in the coming days. The faster we
resolve Darfur, said Natsios, especially the deployment of

the peacekeeping operation, the better it will be for the
future of the bilateral relationship. End Summary.


3. (C) Special Envoy Natsios opened the meeting by delivering
to President Bashir a letter from President Bush.
Referencing the CPA, he said that the United States and Sudan
can achieve much through cooperation, but that obstacles in
Sudan prevented improvements in the relationship. Bashir
welcomed the opportunity to meet with Natsios, noting his
objective and balanced statements on Sudan (a likely
reference to Natsios, recent Hill testimony),in contrast to
others in the U.S. government committing &fouls.8 He noted
that both Natsios and CDA Hume had recently stated publicly
that the security situation in Darfur had evolved, while some
in the Department of State had made harsher judgments.
Natsios explained that the UN and NGOs in Darfur had told him
that current violence was partly due to anarchy ) banditry,
theft, and inter-tribal fighting -- as opposed to solely
government and rebel engagements, but that many in the United
States media and advocacy community were convinced that the
Sudanese government and the Janjaweed continue to massacre
and abuse civilians on the same scale as 2003-2004. The
Sudanese government's continued obstruction of the
peacekeeping mission and its harassment of NGO workers fueled
this perception.

--------------
Humanitarian
--------------


4. (C) Natsios pressed President Bashir to immediately end
harassment of the NGOs and UN agencies in Darfur, and extend
all permits to January 31, 2008, process visas within 48
hours, waive all bureaucratic fees, and end customs tie-ups
on the supplies (including medicines) used by the NGOs to
provide humanitarian assistance. Bashir said that he would
ensure procedures are accelerated, by instructing the
appropriate ministers to take the necessary action. He said
one-year multiple entry visas should be issued to
humanitarian workers. He specifically told Foreign Minister
Lam Akol to follow-up. On the harassment incident in Nyala,
Natsios referenced Akol who told him earlier that the
Minister of Justice had been asked to quash the charges on
the humanitarian aid workers and request a full
investigation. Bashir said this was a localized incident,
without instruction from Khartoum. (Note: Later, SE Natios'
Chief of Staff told Akol that real progress on the
humanitarian issue in time for the Darfur donors meeting
preceding the Sudan Consortium on March 19 would be useful.
End note.)

--------------

KHARTOUM 00000362 002.2 OF 003


New Embassy Compound
--------------


5. (C) Returning to the bilateral relationship, Natsios said
the facts show that Sudan is not a state sponsor of
terrorism, but that the tense political environment in
Washington over Darfur will not allow President Bush to take
steps to improve the relationship. Nevertheless, we still
hoped for an improved relationship in the future, which is
why it was in Sudan's interest to allow the building of a New
Embassy Compound in Khartoum. Bashir made a firm commitment
to allow the NEC containers in customs to be released without
payment of customs fees, and that the policy would go into
effect immediately. Natsios also mentioned that he continued
to push in Washington for the transfer to Sudan of two
Sudanese Guantanamo detainees eligible for repatriation.

--------------
Darfur Political
--------------


6. (C) SE Natsios said that the rebels are a significant
obstacle to a renewed peace process in Sudan. He appreciated
the willingness of the government to renew talks with the
rebel groups without preconditions. Natsios stressed that we
fully support the Salim Ahmed Salim and Jan Eliasson-led
AU/UN political effort agreed to in Addis Ababa. Natsios
told Bashir of his trip to Chad, and his efforts to convince
the rebel groups to unify and offer realistic demands. He
said that he was considering issuing a statement with other
donors fingering the rebels for holding up peace in Darfur.
He also mentioned that we planned to take measures against
one particularly obstructionist rebel leader. The
Tripoli/Asmara track was worrisome, as it might provide forum
shopping for the divided rebels. Natsios said he planned to
visit Libyan President Qadafi on the next part of his trip
and would advise him to support one peace process for Darfur.
Bashir joked that while Qadafi meddled in Darfur, he was
removed from the terrorist list and had become America's
friend, while Bashir had done no less, and was still on the
list. Natsios asked Bashir to support SPLM outreach efforts
to the non-signatories, traditional leaders, and IDP camp
representatives. Senior Assistant to the President and Sudan
Liberation Movement (SLM) leader Minni Minawi and the DPA
must be strengthened by providing non-military logistics
assistance and standing-up an effective Transitional Darfur
Regional Authority (TDRA),in full consultation with the
signatories. These efforts will help attract the
non-signatories to the DPA as part of a holistic effort
coordinated with the work of the AU and UN.

--------------
Darfur Peacekeeping
--------------


7. (C) Natsios and President Bashir had a long and heated
exchange on the phased support and hybrid AU/UN peacekeeping
operation. Bashir said he signed a letter on the heavy
support package and that it would be sent to the AU and UN
before Natsios returned to Washington. Natsios stressed the
importance of accelerated deployment of the force, including
the need to improve security on the ground, as a way to give
confidence to the political process. He urged the rapid
approval of land grants in Darfur for the UN camps,
particularly for phases one and two. Bashir explained that a
large peacekeeping force is not necessary in Darfur if the
DPA security arrangements are implemented. He said what was
needed was accelerated integration of rebel forces into the
Sudanese Armed Forces.


8. (C) In a staccato exchange, Natsios strafed Bashir with
multiple reasons to accept UN command and control of the
force. He noted the linkage between command and funding,
noting that some members of the UNSC would veto a resolution
that provided funding of a force without adequate control.
Bashir backtracked on our understanding of Addis, stating his
acceptance of a hybrid force only if there is an African
commander reporting to Addis (who will determine the size of
the hybrid force),that UN command and control means merely
supportive mechanisms (and funding) for the AU, and the
troops are African (with the exception of lower-ranked UN
advisors and technical assistants). He said that he had
pledges from AU countries, such as Rwanda and Nigeria, to
provide additional troops if the UN provided funding.
Natsios said that the troops would not be effective without
strong UN leadership, and that Africa lacked enough trained
peacekeeping troops to satisfy the force level requirements.

KHARTOUM 00000362 003.2 OF 003


Bashir countered saying that there are over 2 million African
soldiers, and that the reason many of the troops now in
Darfur had no will to carry out their mandate was because
they had not been paid in many months. Natsios said that a
credible force was needed to disarm the rebels, implement the
peace agreement, and prevent outbreaks of violence )
referencing the UN's response to the incident in Malakal.
Bashir downplayed the UN role, saying that they only showed
up in Malakal after the situation had calmed. Natsios said
he was criticized in Washington after agreeing to the hybrid
force, and that he could not compromise further.


9. (C) Natsios noted our knowledge and outrage that Bashir
had privately discouraged troop contributors. He asked him
to demonstrate his commitment to the peacekeeping plan by
sending a letter to the UN encouraging troop contributions
for Darfur.

---
CPA
---


10. (C) Natsios asked Bashir to fully fund the census and
border commission, take steps to end the presence of
non-aligned southern militias and resolve the Abyei border
dispute. Bashir said that the border commission had the
resources it needed to carry out an initial program to
pinpoint reference points along the border before the rainy
season, and then follow-up with full demarcation after the
rainy season. He lamented the failure of the donors to come
through on pledges, especially for the new currency.

--------------
Suleiman Jamous
--------------


11. (C) Natsios asked that the government release Suleiman
Jamous from Kadugli, as he could be a helpful influence on
the younger rebel commanders in bringing them to the peace
table. Bashir said that Jamous was responsible for
establishing the Darfur rebellion. He said he would release
Jamous if Natsios gave a personal guarantee that he would not
stir up militant action in Darfur. Natsios pledged to call
Jamous and get back to FM Akol.

--------------
One-on-One
--------------


12. (C) Bashir told Natsios privately that he needed 120
million dollars to pay the pensions of 10,000 militia members
and tens of thousands of southern members of the Sudanese
Armed Forces who did not want to join the SPLA. He had
traveled to Qatar to ask for the funds, and planned to ask
Saudi Arabia if Qatar was unable to come through. Bashir
said the South is a mess and that First Vice President Salva
Kiir is not meeting Southern expectations. He said they need
the SPLM to effectively run in the elections as partner of
the NCP.


13. (C) Natsios stressed that Plan B was real, and said that
it was better for Bashir to cooperate now, especially on
peacekeeping. While elements of Plan B were moving forward,
said Natsios, the faster Darfur is resolved, the better it
would be for the Sudanese government. Natsios specifically
mentioned that 29 companies and three individuals would be
sanctioned imminently and that further sanctions were being
proposed in the Congress. Bashir replied, "I understand."


14. (U) SE Natsios cleared this message.


15. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.
POWERS