SE NATSIOS MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000360

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO PINR AU UN SU CD LY ER
SUBJECT: SE NATSIOS MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR
NAFIE, NISS DIRECTOR GHOSH

REF: NDJAMENA 00070

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Classified By: CDA Roberto Powers, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: In separate meetings with Presidential
Advisor Nafie Ali Nafie and Director General of the National
Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) Salah Ghosh, SE
Natsios outlined the three goals of USG policy in Darfur:
advancing the political process, ensuring the continuation of
humanitarian operations, and facilitating deployment of an
effective peace-keeping force to stabilize the region. He
acknowledged that fragmentation of the rebel movements, which
are backed by other regional powers, impeded the peace
process. Nafie and Ghosh encouraged the U.S. to use its
influence to address the situation and declared their support
for the UN/African Union (AU) coordination of the political
process. Reacting to SE Natsios' condemnation of Sudan's
delay on implementation of the peace-keeping force stipulated
in the Addis Ababa and Abuja agreements, Nafie and Ghosh were
noncommittal on the UN/AU hybrid force but said that Sudan
had agreed to the Heavy Support Package and would issue a
reply to UNSYG Ban Ki-moon's January 24 letter in the near
future. SE Natsios urged both officials to remove specific
bureaucratic obstacles to humanitarian operations, which they
agreed to consider. He also asked for a resolution of the
Abyei border dispute and an acceleration of the disarmament
of militias in Southern Sudan. SE Natsios urged Nafie and
Ghosh to facilitate the immediate release of the containers
for the New Embassy Compound from customs in order to avoid
further deterioration of the bilateral relationship. End
summary.

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Political Process
--------------


2. (C) In separate meetings on March 3 with Nafie and Ghosh,
SE Natsios acknowledged that a political settlement--not just
a UN peace-keeping operation--was needed to end the Darfur
crisis. He said that regional powers, such as Chad, Libya,
and Eritrea, were not serving as neutral mediators in Darfur
and that the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) non-signatories
were an impediment to the peace process. He described his
January meetings with non-signatories in Chad, when he had
emphasized that they should: 1) unite and engage in
negotiations with the Sudanese government within the
framework of the DPA, 2) develop a set of realistic
priorities for the negotiations, and, 3) renounce violent
regime change (reftel). SE Natsios said that the USG would
continue to use its influence in the region to support the
joint UN/African Union (AU) peace process and said that he
was traveling to Tripoli on March 8 to encourage President
Qadafi to play a constructive role. SE Natsios also noted
that numerous provisions of the DPA had not been implemented
and that effective implementation of some of the provisions
could serve as a catalyst to bring the non-signatories to the
agreement.


3. (C) Nafie said that the Sudanese government supported
negotiation with the non-signatories--without
preconditions--and "fully" agreed with the U.S. on the need
for a single negotiating platform. He called on the
international community to realize that "enough was enough"
and to pressure the rebels to "come to the negotiating
table." Nafie asserted that Chad and Sudan would need to
improve their bilateral relationship in order to defuse the
Darfur crisis and said that President Deby had to "de-link"
his support for the rebels in Darfur. According to Ghosh,
President Qadafi and President Afwerki had pressed Deby to
end his support for the rebel movements. Nafie requested
that SE Natsios also raise this with Deby. "We're very
genuine in wanting peace with Chad," said Nafie, adding that
"U.S. pressure would dramatically influence" the political
situation. Ghosh said that Deby needed assurances that Sudan
did not threaten his regime. Nafie voiced his support for
the UN/AU initiative on the political process and said that
the NCP had told President Afwerki that a coordinated process
should exist between the UN, AU, Libya, and Eritrea. Nafie
stated that President Bashir had presented Qadafi with
evidence of Libyan support for Darfur rebel groups. Though
Qadafi had denied this claim, Nafie said that Sudan was
willing to see if "Libya turned a new page." Ghosh said that
Eritrea was not a "preferable host" for negotiations and
acknowledged that the international community objected to a
strong Eritrean role. However, he said that Eritrea was
serious and would "need to be used" in the UN/AU process.

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4. (C) Nafie emphasized that the DPA should serve as the
basis for negotiations with the non-signatories and that the
issue of compensation was a practical question. He said that
the announcement of a system of individual payments would
lead to a rapid influx of people to the IDP camps. Nafie
stated that amendments to the DPA were not necessary. He
also asserted that the National Congress Party (NCP) was
"definitely for elections" in 2009. He encouraged those who
support regime change in Khartoum, such as Justice and
Equality Movement (JEM) leader Khalil Ibrahim, to participate
in the elections instead and to change the government through
peaceful means. SE Natsios called Ibrahim a "destructive
force." Ghosh called for a specific date for negotiations
with the rebels and asked SE Natsios to raise this idea with
UN Envoy Jan Eliasson.

--------------
Peace-keeping
--------------


5. (C) SE Natsios noted that the perception in the U.S. was
that the Sudanese government was obstructing implementation
of the November Addis Ababa and Abuja agreements. He
explained that Sudan faced a broad coalition of liberal,
conservative, and even Muslim organizations in the U.S.
Nafie bemoaned the influence of U.S. advocacy groups,
intimating that they were driven by anti-Arab and anti-Muslim
sentiment under Jewish and Christian influence. He said that
the actions of these groups led to "factions in Arab
countries leaving the system," an allusion to the roots of
terrorism. He said that the belief in the region was "the
more you compromise (with the West),the more you'll be
squeezed--squeezed almost to the point where you can't be
squeezed anymore." SE Natsios said that Sudan's response to
UNSYG Ban Ki-moon's January 24 letter on the UN Heavy Support
Package would indicate whether the Sudanese government was
interested in cooperation with the international community.
He also called on President Bashir to issue a letter to troop
contributing countries (TCCs) to encourage them to
participate in the UN/AU operation.


6. (C) Nafie demurred on this request until "we are clear on
what the operation is. Troops? Technical expertise? We need
clarity on the force." He said Sudan had agreed to the first
two phases of UN support for AMIS with the sole condition
that the forces come under an AU "umbrella." He said that
Sudan had never agreed to the phase three hybrid force. SE
Natsios underscored that UN command and control was essential
to USG support for the Addis Ababa agreement and that TCCs
were reticent to contribute to the Heavy Support Package
without a firm Sudanese commitment to the hybrid operation.
Nafie said that Sudan wanted an African command with
technical support from the UN, adding that a peace-keeping
operation would not be necessary if an agreement could be
reached between the Sudanese government and the rebels. SE
Natsios said that the rebels would not disarm without the
facilitation of a neutral body like the UN. Ghosh said that
Sudan was committed to the Addis Ababa and Abuja agreements
and that there "was not any idea in the Government to get
around what we agreed to." He said that the response to the
UNSYG's letter was ready "last week" and that it would be
sent soon. He added that the way forward meant "finalizing
phase one while moving forward on phase two, and finalizing
phase two while moving forward on phase three." He said that
implementation would advance through the Tripartite
Commission.

--------------
Humanitarian Operations
--------------


7. (C) SE Natsios called on the Sudanese government to
implement the moratorium on permits for humanitarian workers
until January 31, 2008, release the assets of international
non-governmental organizations (INGOs) from customs, waive
fees associated with humanitarian organizations, and
fast-track all visa applications for INGO workers. He
further demanded that Sudan take disciplinary action against
the local officials in Nyala who assaulted humanitarian
workers in January and said the false charges against the
workers be dropped. These actions would send a signal to
officials in Darfur and to the West that the central
government wanted to facilitate humanitarian operations in
the region. "This is an area where real cooperation can be
achieved," said SE Natsios. Though Nafie was noncommittal,

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Ghosh agreed that all of these issues should be addressed and
promised to review them.

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Southern Sudan
--------------


8. (C) Nafie was optimistic on implementation of the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA),pointing to the
establishment of electoral mechanisms and the recently-passed
political party law. He said the National Congress Party
(NCP) was looking forward to elections and was confident it
would win. SE Natsios told Nafie that he had encouraged the
Masseriya and the Dinka to engage in dialogue to break the
impasse over Abyei during his last visit to Sudan in
December. Nafie agreed with SE Natsios on the importance of
Abyei and said that a resolution to the dispute would be a
confidence building measure for the NCP and the Sudan
People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). "We have no problem
admitting there is a problem in Abyei," said Nafie. He
explained, however, that the Abyei Border Commission report
was unacceptable and attributed the problem to Minister for
Cabinet Affairs Deng Alor, who is from Abyei and considered
the issue too "explosive" to address. SE Natsios said that
progress on disarming militias in the South was also
essential. Ghosh responded that a lack of money was delaying
the disarmament of militias, whose members required money in
exchange for their weapons.

--------------
NEC Containers
--------------


9. (C) SE Natsios warned Nafie that the Sudanese government's
delay in releasing the containers for the New Embassy
Compound would worsen bilateral relations, which was not in
Sudan's interest. He said that Overseas Building Operations
(OBO) would terminate the project on March 7 and so an
immediate decision needed to be made. "There is no reason
not to move forward on the containers," said Nafie. With
Ghosh, SE Natsios noted that duties on materials for
diplomatic missions contravened the Vienna Convention and
that the USG did not pay customs duties on the materials for
new embassies in any other country. Ghosh promised his help
and said that President Bashir would need to make the final
decision.


10. (U) SE Natsios cleared this message.


11. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.
POWERS