Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07KHARTOUM313
2007-02-28 16:36:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

DENG ALOR: NCP WILLING TO ENGAGE, SPLM TO ADVANCE

Tags:  PGOV PREL AU UN SU CD ER LY 
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VZCZCXRO0591
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0313 0591636
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 281636Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6306
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 0081
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 000313 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL AU UN SU CD ER LY
SUBJECT: DENG ALOR: NCP WILLING TO ENGAGE, SPLM TO ADVANCE
DPA

REF: KHARTOUM 00287

Classified By: P/E Chief Trevor Monroe, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d
)

C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 000313

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL AU UN SU CD ER LY
SUBJECT: DENG ALOR: NCP WILLING TO ENGAGE, SPLM TO ADVANCE
DPA

REF: KHARTOUM 00287

Classified By: P/E Chief Trevor Monroe, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d
)


1. (C) In the wake of the announcements from the
International Criminal Court (ICC),Minister for Cabinet
Affairs Deng Alor told USAID Mission Director and Poloff on
February 28 that the indictments might soften some of the
hard-liners in the National Congress Party (NCP) and might
"make them more reasonable." Though he admitted that some
elements in the regime still oppose cooperation with the
international community, he said that they were in the
minority. "Human beings are human beings," said Alor. "They
don't want to destroy themselves." He said that the majority
of the NCP understands the gravity of the current situation
and "just want to survive, even Nafie (hard-line Presidential
Advisor Nafie Ali Nafie)." Alor predicted that the
forthcoming response of the Sudanese government to UNSYG Ban
Ki-moon's January 24 letter on the UN Heavy Support Package
would be positive


2. (C) Alor said that he had met with Sudan People's
Liberation Movement (SPLM) Secretary General Pagan Amun, SPLM
Deputy Secretary General for the Northern Sector Yasser
Arman, and First Vice President Salva Kiir on February 27 to
discuss SPLM facilitation of a constructive political process
for the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) non-signatories. For
the first time, Alor stated that the SPLM would be willing to
endorse the creation of a single Darfur state and a Darfur
vice presidency slot--two primary demands of the
non-signatories that the SPLM had long opposed. The
consensus was that the SPLM would begin laying the groundwork
for a meeting in Southern Sudan to push the non-signatories
toward re-unification. Meanwhile, Kiir planned to travel to
Darfur to follow-up on the recent visit by Arman to the
region. Arman had told Kiir that even Arab tribes had
expressed an interest in meeting with him and supported a
more robust SPLM role to defuse the conflict. Alor said that
the SPLM would be willing to advise the joint UN/AU task
force on the political process (reftel) and that Amun would
be the SPLM lead on the non-signatories.


3. (C) Alor suggested that the SPLM could also engage with
the Chadian and Eritrean governments based on long-standing
ties with Ndjamena and Asmara. He characterized the recent
summit in Tripoli as a "fiasco" that had resulted in no
progress. President Deby had told SPLM representatives who
had attended that summit that "Bashir does not respect
agreements" and was therefore reticent to engage in
negotiations with Khartoum. Alor also said that Amun had
traveled to Asmara after the summit. Eritrean officials had
told him that President Qaddhafi had been "aloof" during the
event. Qaddhafi had claimed that the summit had been
President Isaias' initiative and that Libya had only provided
the venue.


4. (C) Tripoli minimize considered.
HUME