DARFUR: CFC SECOND CHAMBER COLLAPSES

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000304

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE, SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREC KPKO AU UN SU

SUBJECT: DARFUR: CFC SECOND CHAMBER COLLAPSES

REFS: (A) KHARTOUM 174
(B) KHARTOUM 197

KHARTOUM 00000304 001.2 OF 002


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SUMMARY
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1. (SBU) In the February 12 Ceasefire Commission First (CFC)
Chamber, African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) Force Commander (FC)
Aprezi expressed his dissatisfaction with the CFC Secretariat's
presentation of cases for the February 7 Joint Commission (JC)
meeting. He reviewed his efforts to persuade the Government of
Sudan to allow the deployment of non-signatory representatives to
sector-level CFCs and made a plea to international observers to
consider additional financial support for the Second Chamber. The
FC proposed the creation of a "working team" - having roughly the
same composition as the CFC, excluding the Government of Sudan - to
conduct an analysis of the Government of Sudan Janjaweed disarmament
plan, though no structure or timelines were specified. The CFC
Second Chamber deliberated the status of reinstating non-signatory
representatives to the sectors, with the FC on the one hand pleading
for Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and Sudanese Liberation
Army/Non-Signatory Faction's (SLA/NSF) patience and the Movements on
the other declaring that they would no longer participate in the
forum until they received pay and a clear statement of intent from
AMIS. Following the meeting, the non-signatories delivered a joint
letter affirming their refusal to attend any future meetings. END
SUMMARY

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INTEGRITY AND POLITICAL ANGLES OF THE CFC
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2. (SBU) AMIS FC commenced the February 12 session of the CFC with a
review of outcomes from the previous week's JC meeting (Ref A). He
conveyed extreme dissatisfaction with the performance of the
Sec-retariat, particularly with regard to selection of the cases that
came before the JC and their manner of presentation, which allowed
many of the incidents to be viewed in isolation and dismissed by the
parties as "criminal" acts rather than ceasefire violations. Aprezi
noted his "embarrassment" of the CFC Secretariat's lack of rigor and
that "if the CFC has no integrity then we cannot bring peace to
Darfur." The lengthy discussion highlighted the numerous process
problems - introducing cases in the CFC, ordering investigations,
requesting follow-up information from sectors, disseminating
information to CFC participants - that plague the body. To avoid
similar confusion in the future, the U.S. observer proposed, and
gained consensus, that any documents provided to the JC must be
approved by the CFC Chairman or Vice Chairmen.


3. (SBU) Questions regarding representation, even within the CFC
First Chamber, persist. JEM-Peace Wing representatives requested
that AMIS provide transport for several of their field commanders to
Khartoum to resolve internal problems with the political leadership
(Ref B). The FC declined the request, pointing out that these were
political matters that should be addressed in appropriate channels.
He then chastised AU political officer Betty M'gaya (and,
indirectly, Deputy Head of Mission Hassan Gibril),for their inertia
in facilitating the resolution of these matters through political
intervention. (COMMENT: M'gaya could only manage a meek "I serve
two masters!" in response to the FC's criticisms. The leadership
crisis within the JEM-Peace Wing and its impact on the CFC serve to
highlight the divisions that exist between the AMIS military and
political structures. The FC states his dislike for intervening in
political issues but appears compelled to do so in the absence of
any adequate efforts by the Deputy Head of Mission's office.
Building political officer capacity should remain a priority for the
UN Light Support Package integration. END COMMENT.)

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VEHICLE SNATCHING STILL A CONCERN
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4. (SBU) Vehicle snatching remains a top concern for the Force
Commander, particularly in light of several successful carjackings
involving AMIS. Aprezi delivered a lengthy diatribe aimed primarily
at SLA/Minawi, exhorting the SLA to take responsibility for their
"areas of control." The FC noted too that while the increase in
vehicle thefts is an alarming trend, it may not constitute an act
that qualifies as a ceasefire violation. In this vein, he
questioned the decision to task Sector 1 with conducting a formal
investigation into the January 26 carjacking of a PAE vehicle in El
Fasher, stating that it looked more like banditry than a ceasefire
violation. The U.S. observer protested a reversal of this decision,
pointing out that PAE - unlike NGOs or other organizations supports
AMIS and that this single incident was only one of several recent
carjackings (or attempts) that occurred in close proximity to AMIS
HQ. The FC consented to allow the decision to stand and press

KHARTOUM 00000304 002.2 OF 002


Sector 1 to carry out its investigation.

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JANJAWEED DISARMAMENT
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5. (SBU) Following AMIS' briefing at the JC on the Janjaweed
disarmament plan, Aprezi proposed creating a "working team" - having
roughly the same composition as the CFC, excluding the Sudanese
government - to conduct an analysis of the Janjaweed disarmament
plan. This team will present its findings to a similar government
team, headed by the government CFC representative, and the two
groups will forward their recommendations for approval at the
appropriate political level. Beyond the generic discussion of the
need for a "real" disarmament plan, there was no concrete talk of
timelines, specific objectives or structure to move the process
forward. (NOTE: The Government of Sudan Janjaweed disarmament plan
is rife with deficiencies, not least of which is its failure to
define which groups must be disarmed. The plan, which the
Government of Sudan provided to AMIS in July 2006, has not undergone
a comprehensive analysis by AMIS or the international community, and
no official feedback has been furnished to the Government of Sudan,
according to its CFC representative. The U.S. and other
shareholders should lend technical expertise to critique the plan
and suggest detailed modalities for its implementation and
verification. END NOTE.)

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CFC SECOND CHAMBER COLLAPSES
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6. (SBU) In the First Chamber, the FC made the case again for
establishment of "fully functional" (as called for in the JC
communique) CFC Second Chambers at the Sector level. He noted,
however, the challenge posed by the proliferation of rebel factions,
each one claiming it deserves representation and, therefore, payment
of Mission Subsistence Allowance (MSA). Aprezi absorbed comments
from CFC participants on possible ways forward - including reducing
MSA, changing the number of representatives per sector or
re-distributing representatives based on the presence of their
forces - and acknowledged that step one is gaining Government of
Sudan agreement to allow the deployment of non-signatories to
Sectors, followed by coordination with the international community
to fund MSA. The FC remarked that he would go to Khartoum February
15-18 to meet senior GoS military officers and other officials to
press his case.


7. (SBU) Non-signatory representatives from JEM and SLA/NSF attended
the CFC Second Chamber but only "to make their final statements of
grievance." Substantive agenda items were not addressed. The Force
Commander briefed JEM and SLA/NSF on the results of the JC and his
intention to pursue the Second Chamber issue directly with the
Government of Sudan and international partners. He expressed
confidence that the Government of Sudan would eventually relent but
that the issue of funding was in the political sphere and largely
out of his control.


8. (SBU) The non-signatory representatives, for their part, remained
unconvinced by the FC's statements. JEM representative General
Bashir declared that they were "fed up" with AMIS' ambiguous
pronouncements and impotent efforts to gain any traction on this
issue at the political level. Both Bashir and SLA/NSF
representative Colonel Abdou Ismael voiced extreme frustration with
the perpetual delays in the resolution of their status, pay,
facilitation of communications and inclusion in the information
chain. They asserted that they would no longer attend Second
Chamber meetings until these issues were addressed. On February 13,
JEM and SLA/NSF delivered a joint letter officially informing AMIS
of their decision to cease participation in the Second Chamber.

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COMMENT
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9. (SBU) The establishment of effective sector-level CFC Second
Chambers is an important step in facilitating humanitarian access to
non-signatory-controlled areas and in encouraging non-signatory
cooperation on potential ceasefire violations. The Government of
Sudan claims that they are unable to assure the security of the
non-signatories in the field but, in reality it believes the
representatives will act as spies. The international community can
play a constructive role in this effort by continuing to urge the
Government of Sudan to accept the sector-level Second Chamber
concept and in following through with sufficient funding. END
COMMENT.

HUME