GOVERNOR RICHARDSON MEETS SUDANESE FM AKOL AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000030

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER AND AF/SE NATSIOS
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/08/2027
TAGS: PGOV PREF PHUM KPKO SU AU
SUBJECT: GOVERNOR RICHARDSON MEETS SUDANESE FM AKOL AND
PRESIDENT BASHIR

Classified By: CDA C. Hume, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: On January 8 New Mexico Governor Bill
Richardson had separate meetings with Sudanese Foreign
Minister Lam Akol and President Omar al Bashir. Richardson
asked for progress on four points: implementation of the UN's
three phase plan for peace-keeping in Darfur; a renewed
cease-fire to relaunch a peace process with non-signatory
rebels; action to reduce gender-based violence; and, improved
security for humanitarian operations. In response, Bashir
maintained his approval for UN phases one and two, but the
specifics of phase two had yet to be presented to the
tripartite committee for final review. The phase three
hybrid operation could be as large as now planned by the UN,
with no restrictions on UN support elements, but with
African-only battalions. Any renewed cease-fire and
political negotiations would have to take place within the
framework of the Darfur Peace Agreement. On gender-based
violence there will be a follow up meeting with the Ministry
of Justice, and Bashir promised improved security for
humanitarian operations. Richardson will meet Bashir again
on January 10. End Summary.


2. (C) Governor Richardson, accompanied by CDA Hume and three
representatives of the Save Darfur Coalition, met first with
Foreign Minister Lam Akol. Richardson said he wanted to use
his visit to explore several ideas for progress on Darfur.
First, he wanted explicit government agreement to implement
the UN's heavy support package (phase two) and to approve the
UN hybrid operation, potentially including peace-keeping
battalions from outside Africa. Second, he wanted to work
for a renewed cease-fire and improved security for
humanitarian operations. Third, he suggested establishing a
contact group, possibly including the UN, AU, U.S., EU, and
China, to facilitate and promote a political process. At
Richardson's invitation, representatives of the Save Darfur
Coalition (Ken Bacon of Refugees International, Michael
Bergman of the Center for Middle East Peace, and Amjad
Atallah, Strategic Assessments Initiative) elaborated on
these ideas.


3. (C) Foreign Minister Akol said Sudan's goal was peace and
security for its people. The November 16 UN/AU meeting in
Addis Ababa represented a breakthrough and a position that
the government would maintain. Although the AU and UN were
charged with leading political talks, in seven weeks they had
done nothing. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) observed a
cease-fire, except for the National Redemption Front (NRF),
which rejected the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) and a
cease-fire. So far the tripartite committee (AU, UN, and
Sudan) had no problem with the phase one package, and it had
yet to receive the phase two package from the UN. As for
phase three, the UN and AU, taking into account the situation
on the ground, would determine the size of the force, perhaps
as large as 15-20,000, and the UN could bring in whatever
logistics, command and control, medical, transport,
engineering or other support elements that were needed. Akol
suggested that the Save Darfur Coalition take a more balanced
approach to the problems of Darfur.


4. (C) Richardson said he would travel to Darfur to push the
same ideas with rebels on January 9, and Richardson and Akol
will meet again on January 10. Akol said he would like to
discuss other problems in the bilateral relationship.


5. (C) Richardson, accompanied by CDA Hume and Richardson's
Foreign Policy Advisor, Calvin Humphrey, then met President
Bashir for just over an hour. Richardson said it was
important for Sudan to resolve the problems of Darfur so that
it could go on to other more positive issues. He and Bashir
then discussed the several proposals.


6. (C) Regarding the UN Plan, Richardson noted Sudanese
approval for phase one and phase two, subject to review by
the tripartite committee. Could Bashir affirm that he would
accept a hybrid operation (phase three) as large as the
17,000 troop force proposed by the UN, including some troops
from outside Africa and a special effort to include women in
the force? Bashir said he had accepted all three phases,
although only the first phase had been reviewed by the
tripartite committee. According to the conclusions of the
Abuja meeting, phase three should be an operation with
African forces and an African commander. The UN was to
provide technical, financial, and logistic support, but not
fighting forces. It would be a hybrid operation, not a
hybrid force. As agreed with Special Envoy Natsions, they
could wear UN helmets with AU shoulder patches; the

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tripartite committee could decide on the size of the force,
perhaps 17,000; and, Sudan welcomed female troops in the
force. He described the result as AU plus.


7. (C) Next Richardson urged the need for a cease-fire and
involving the rebels in a political process. The EU, U.S.,
China, and perhaps an African country could work with the UN
and AU to relaunch talks on security in Darfur and security
along the border with Chad. President Bashir said the
international community, including the U.S., had worked to
achieve the DPA, a solid agreement that was the key element
of Sudan's policy. More pressure was needed to get rebels to
adhere to the terms of the DPA. But some members of the
international community have given non-signatory rebels arms
and political support; a negotiation aimed at producing a new
agreement would be endless. The international community
should avoid the complexity of a new contact group. The
answer is to support the DPA and pressure the rebels to
adhere to it.


8. (C) Richardson asked Bashir to announce a unilateral
cease-fire of 90 days, including the end of aerial bombing,
as a way to relaunch a political process with the rebels.
Bashir said the government wanted to go ahead with the
security arrangements contained in the DPA, including the
cease-fire, separation of forces, and inclusion of rebel
troops in the Sudanese Armed Forces and police. When Bashir
asked for the USG to put pressure on the rebel groups,
Richardson asked how Bashir would react if the UN and AU
convened a meeting with rebels to relaunch the political
process. Bashir said Sudan would agree to any meeting that
took place within the Abuja framework and took the DPA as its
starting point.


9. (C) Richardson urged Bashir to take a forward-leaning
position to counter the problem of gender-based violence,
perhaps working jointly with the United Nations. Bashir said
the only solution for Darfur was full peace and security, and
that separate programs for separate issues would not work.
His goal was security for all, with formation of the
integrated police units specified in the DPA. Despite the
many media allegations of rape in Darfur, only 64 cases had
been filed; meanwhile the UN was investigating 16 cases of
sexual violence involving its own troops in southern Sudan.
Bashir insisted that Sudanese authorities were pursuing all
cases filed, and he said he would arrange for Richardson to
meet with the Ministry of Justice on this issue on January

10.


10. (C) Finally, Richardson urged the need to improve
security for humanitarian operations. In response to his
specific points, Bashir promised to improve security in
Geneina, West Darfur (where the attacks on NGO operations
have been carried out by janjaweed militia allied to the
government),to offer security for convoys (when requested by
NGOs),and to reduce the endless red tape that hampers NGO
operations.


11. (C) Bashir agreed to meet again with Richardson, after
his visit to Darfur, on January 10. Bashir said he wanted to
solve the problem of Darfur, just as he wanted to solve the
problems of southern and eastern Sudan, and to move on to
other issues. Such issues included economic sanctions, the
inclusion of Sudan on the List of State Sponsors of
Terrorism, and development programs. In closing, he told
Richardson that the massive media problem confronting the
development of bilateral relations was caused by "his own
people," i.e. the Save Darfur Coalition.


12. (U) Governor Richardson has approved this telegram.
HUME