STATE OF DARFUR: HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000280

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO AU UN SU US EUN
SUBJECT: STATE OF DARFUR: HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

REF: KHARTOUM 00098

Classified By: CDA Cameron Hume, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: From February 19-21, CDA Hume visited Nyala,
Zalingei, El Geneina, and El Fasher to meet with Sudanese
government officials, UN agency heads, and representatives of
international non-governmental organizations (INGOs). In
North, South, and West Darfur, INGO and UN agencies'
operations suffer from the proliferation of rebel movements,
loosely-controlled security forces, and bureaucratic
impediments. However, the failure of the Sudanese
government's military campaign has opened political space to
address some of the humanitarian obstacles. The UN has
proposed a plan for a separate meeting to precede the Sudan
Consortium to address the humanitarian situation in Darfur
and to resolve the four issues of most concern to the
humanitarian community: 1) assistance in obtaining a
collective extension for residency, work, and travel permits
until January 31, 2008; 2) a waiver of the numerous fees
currently levied on INGO operations; 3) the immediate release
of Darfur assets from Sudanese customs; and 4) Re-affirmation
of 48-hour visa issuances for Darfur humanitarian workers.
End summary.

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South Darfur
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2. (C) In meetings with CDA Hume and USAID Mission Director
in South Darfur on February 19, INGO and UN representatives
described the lingering psychological effects of the arrest
and subsequent assault on humanitarian workers in Nyala in
January (reftel)--perpetrated by local security forces--and
the narrowing space for humanitarian operations due to
government harassment and the deteriorating security
environment. They pointed to a January ambush of an INGO
vehicle in Garsila as the first example of a bandit attack
designed to kill humanitarian workers rather than hijack
their car. Facing rapidly shifting zones of control, aid
workers said it had become difficult to obtain sustained
security guarantees from rebel groups. In January, a
simultaneous rebel attack on eight INGOs in Graida, which
included a sexual assault on a humanitarian worker and the
theft of numerous vehicles, led the INGOs to withdraw and
left 130,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) without
services. In addition, many Government agencies appear to be
"operating outside of the system," according to the local
head of the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs (UN OCHA). "Who controls national security, the
police?" he said. The International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) intervened in February, but it is unclear if
their work will continue in March.


3. (C) By contrast, Acting South Darfur Wali Farah Mustafa
called the humanitarian situation "stable" and emphasized the
successful, weekly coordination meetings between the INGOs,
the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS),the UN, and the
Sudanese government. He denied the allegations of sexual
assault and physical abuse against INGO workers in Nyala in
January. A representative from the Prosecutor General's
office noted that the January arrests associated with the
incident resulted from the aid workers' "bad habits and
practices"--inferring that they had been drinking
alcohol--and said that they had told a judge they had not
been abused.


4. (C) CDA Hume said that President Bush and the USG's
principal interest in Sudan was humanitarian and told the
Wali that the state was responsible for improving the
security situation. He said that two presidential advisors
in Khartoum had asked to meet him after his trip and to work
through some of the issues affecting INGOs. He advised
Mustafa that the humanitarian workers were considering
withdrawal and said, "you will be responsible--you and your
colleagues--when this happens." He asked that the
Government: 1) End the judicial proceedings resulting from
the January incident in Nyala and take appropriate
disciplinary action against the security and police officials
involved, and 2) Improve the working conditions for
humanitarian organizations. On February 20, the OCHA head in
Nyala informed CDA Hume that the Wali had offered to drop the
charges against the INGO employees. (Note: In a subsequent
meeting in Khartoum on February 22 with CDA Hume, UNSYG
Deputy Special Representative for Humanitarian Affairs Manuel
da Silva said that it would be "adding insult to injury" if
the perpetrators of the January assault were not at least
removed from their positions and if Sudan did not issue a

KHARTOUM 00000280 002 OF 003


clear statement that the incident was not government policy.
End note)

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West Darfur
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5. (C) In discussions with CDA Hume and USAID Mission
Director on February 20, humanitarian workers and UN
officials in Zalingei and El Geneina expressed despair
similar to their Nyala counterparts. However, they
attributed many of the problems, including banditry and a
build-up in military force, to the spill-over from the
Chad-Sudan conflict. Many programs that had been operating
since 2004 have ceased along the border between Beida in the
south and Kulbus in the North. The humanitarian workers said
that the rebels' aims were to seize logistical items, not to
menace the international community, and that seven INGO
vehicles had been hijacked and taken across the border in as
many weeks. In spite of these difficulties, the workers
remained measured in their outlook. "We have to come to a
realistic acknowledgment that there may be no immediate
solution," said one INGO employee, adding that the
North-South war had endured for "20 to 30 years." Another
aid worker suggested, "Rather than looking at when to
withdraw, let's look at ways to improve the situation...the
goal is to deliver aid safely."


6. (C) CDA Hume noted that there were two camps in the
National Congress Party (NCP) regime: one that did not want
foreigners in Darfur and another that recognized humanitarian
operations as essential. He said that though he could not
have engaged with this second element two months ago, the
space now existed to address some restrictions on aid
programs because the hard-liners' plan for a military
solution to the conflict had failed. The UN and INGO
representatives recommended a focus on eliminating the
"inordinate amount of energy spent on visas, exit/re-entry
permits, and paperwork," in the words of one humanitarian
worker. (Note: West Darfur Wali Jaffar Al Hakam, on the cusp
of being replaced as governor by Sudan Liberation Movement
(SLM)/Free Will leader Abdulgassem Imam, declined to meet
with CDA Hume. End note)

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North Darfur
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7. (C) INGO and UN officials in El Fasher focused on the
bureaucratic obstacles to humanitarian operations during
their meetings with CDA Hume and USAID Mission Director on
February 21. They said that many of these obstacles were at
the "Khartoum level," such as work permit extensions that
were scheduled to expire on February 21. The Sudanese
government had blocked six UN human rights monitoring
missions in the last six weeks. UN officials considered some
local issues--such as checkpoints and delays at the airport
caused by the Humanitarian Affairs Commission (HAC)--as
violations of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the
Sudanese government. According to UN representatives, some
Sudanese officials were now indicating that the SOFA only
applied to UN operations in the South. UN agency heads
noted, however, that despite these problems, a recent
household survey showed that humanitarian indicators had
improved in North Darfur, shifting its ranking among Sudan's
25 states from fifteenth to seventh.


8. (C) Meeting with North Darfur Wali Yousef Kibbir, CDA Hume
emphasized that the lack of road security and cumbersome
bureaucratic processes were hindering humanitarian
operations. Kibbir denied many of the INGOs' security
concerns and blamed the humanitarian organizations for not
notifying the government of vehicle hijackings in a timely
fashion. He complained that when the Government attempted to
recover stolen vehicles, it was accused of cease-fire
violations. CDA Hume asked for a meeting during the week of
February 26 to discuss specific humanitarian issues, to which
Kibbir agreed.

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Khartoum Follow-up
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9. (C) On February 22, CDA Hume and USAID Mission Director
met in Khartoum with INGO representatives from World Vision,
Oxfam and CARE. The representatives asked for CDA Hume's
intervention in resolving a number of issues affecting their
work in Darfur. The INGOs were hesitant to meet directly

KHARTOUM 00000280 003 OF 003


with high-level Sudanese officials outside of the Ministry of
Humanitarian Affairs, asserting that large donors such as the
U.S. and EU would be more effective. They specifically asked
for: 1) assistance in obtaining a collective extension for
residency, work, and travel permits until January 31, 2008;
2) a waiver of the numerous fees currently levied on INGO
operations; 3) the immediate release of Darfur assets from
Sudanese customs; and 4) 48-hour visa issuances for Darfur
humanitarian workers.


10. (C) CDA Hume raised these concerns in a follow-on meeting
with Sudanese presidential advisor Ghazi Salaheddin, also on
February 22. Salaheddin, who had recently met with State
Minister for Humanitarian Affairs Ahmed Haroun, said that he
thought some of the issues had already been resolved. He
suggested arranging a small informal meeting between his
office, INGO representatives, and two to three ambassadors.


11. (C) In a separate meeting on February 22, da Silva said
he would encourage such an informal meeting, noting that INGO
representatives might be more willing to attend if they
participated in their personal capacities but not formally
represent their organizations. Da Silva said that many in
the National Congress Party (NCP) were worried about a
building confrontation with the international community and
were interested in finding one area of common ground. He
proposed that the UN and the Sudanese government co-host a
parallel meeting on the humanitarian situation in Darfur
which would precede the Sudan Consortium in late March. The
meeting would allow high level donor engagement with the
Government outside the Consortium itself and provide an
occasion to announce the resolution of the four issues of
most concern to the INGOs.

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Comment
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12. (C) Working with the UN, we will try to arrange a meeting
with the Sudanese government and the INGOs by February 28 and
to encourage support by donor ambassadors for the UN proposal
for a separate meeting on Darfur on March 19. End comment.
HUME