Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07KHARTOUM256
2007-02-20 16:02:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

UNSYG REP DISCUSSES HUMANITARIAN, PEACEKEEPING AND

Tags:  PREL PGOV KPKO AU SU CD LY UN US 
pdf how-to read a cable
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OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0256/01 0511602
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 201602Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6182
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 0070
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000256 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO AU SU CD LY UN US
SUBJECT: UNSYG REP DISCUSSES HUMANITARIAN, PEACEKEEPING AND
POLITICAL ISSUES


KHARTOUM 00000256 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: CDA Cameron Hume, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000256

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO AU SU CD LY UN US
SUBJECT: UNSYG REP DISCUSSES HUMANITARIAN, PEACEKEEPING AND
POLITICAL ISSUES


KHARTOUM 00000256 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: CDA Cameron Hume, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: In a recent meeting with CDA Hume, the acting
head of the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) described
the Sudanese government's obstruction of UN operations, the
deteriorating security environment confronting the
humanitarian community, and the difficulties in
implementation of the three-phase UN support program for the
African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) due to AU resistance
and bureaucratic disputes within the UN system. He also
noted the destabilizing influences of Chad, Libya and Eritrea
on the peace process. CDA Hume expressed USG support for the
UN's efforts and pledged to work with aid organizations and
the Government to resolve some of the most acute obstacles to
humanitarian operations. Hume also recommended that the UN,
AU, and USG dispatch a team of senior military advisors to
trouble-shoot the joint UN/AU deployement. END SUMMARY.

-------------- --------------
GOVERNMENT DIVISIONS ON UN, HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS
-------------- --------------


2. (C) In a February 14 meeting with CDA Hume and poloff,
Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary General
Taye Brooke-Zerihoun noted the divisions within the National
Congress Party (NCP) leadership on implementation of the
three-phase approach to UN support for AMIS. He said that
the hard-liners "had not been pleasant to the UN since the
beginning of 2007," and while admitting that Sudanese
government actions may not be deliberate or coordinated, the
cumulative effect was "unremitting harassment" of UN
operations. These obstacles included unwritten "regulations"
requiring 48-hours notice for UN flights and that all
personnel depart from the main terminal of Khartoum airport,
which caused delays. In addition, the Government has

required detailed manifests for all equipment imported for
the Light Support Package, ostensibly to verify that nothing
has been made in Israel.


3. (C) While noting the deteriorating security environment
within which humanitarian organizations are operating in
Darfur, Taye said that Sudanese officials had called the
recent assault on aid workers in Nyala "intolerable" and that
many elements of the Government, including Presidential
Advisor Maghzoub Al Khalifa, were embarrassed by the
incident. UN morale has further declined due to terrorist
threats against the UN in recent weeks, according to Taye.
CDA Hume sympathized with the UN for the difficulty of its
mission. He encouraged Taye to put some of the logistical
issues behind him and focus on how to implement the UN's
mandate under the Addis Ababa and Abuja agreements as soon as
possible. CDA Hume also expressed a willingness to work with
the UN and representatives of humanitarian organizations to
engage with the Sudanese government to resolve the mounting
pressures on aid operations.

--------------
STATUS OF THE THREE-PHASE PEACEKEEPING PLAN
--------------


4. (C) According to Taye, "the moment of truth is fast
approaching" on the Heavy Support Package and the UN/AU
hybrid force. He said that the UN and AU were not on the
same page on either phase, while the UN and the Sudanese
government "were not even on the same chapter." CDA Hume
relayed that President Bashir had told former President
Carter than he would accept the hybrid force if all the
"combatant troops" were African. Taye explained that of the
17,000 troops envisioned for the force, 50 percent would be
combat troops, and it would be difficult to draw these from
Africa only. He added that the Sudanese government's
condition that every UN advisor be junior to an AU officer
was also unworkable.


5. (C) Taye indicated that the AU viewed even the Light and
Heavy Support Packages as a "hostile take-over." As of
February 13, 38 of 105 military staff officers, 32 out of 33
civilian police, and four out of 48 civilian staff had
deployed to Darfur. AMIS had assigned positions to 12 staff
officers, only two of which had received taskings within the
operation. Taye said that AU Peace and Security Council (AU
PSC) Commissioner Said Djinnit, "who was the most reasonable
among them," had been "harassed" by AU Chairman Alpha Omer
Konare before the recent AU summit in Addis Ababa for trying
to push forward AU agreement to the terms of reference with
the UN. "The AU is not sold on the idea of transition," said

KHARTOUM 00000256 002.2 OF 002


Taye. He also characterized the UN's financial rules as
"intrusive," saying that the AU would find it difficult to
comply with them.


6. (C) The UN, however, faces its own constraints. "In the
end, we want to increase our presence," said Taye, "but we're
doing it by cutting bureaucratic corners and putting our
people at risk." He had sent a message to New York decrying
that UNMIS was being pulled in two directions: UN Department
of Peace-keeping Operation's (UNDPKO) desire to deploy and
the UN Department of Safety and Security's (UNDSS) stringent
security requirements. He explained that UNDSS had been held
responsible for the security lapses that led to the
destruction of the UN compound in Baghdad and was therefore
reticent to move forward with UN deployment in Sudan. The
lack of force protection units for the Darfur operation
exacerbated UNDSS' fears. Taye asked that the USG remain
aware of these "cross currents." He said that of the four
principal sites for UN deployment -- El Fasher, Nyala, El
Geneina, and Zalingei -- land for UN operations had only been
acquired in the last city. CDA Hume recommended that senior
representatives from UNDPKO, the AU, and the USG (either from
AF or IO) conduct an assessment of the deployment in Darfur
and trouble-shoot to advance the process.

--------------
OUTSIDE ACTORS' INFLUENCE POLITICAL PROCESS
--------------


7. (C) Discussing the political process in Darfur, Taye
underscored the negative effects of Chadian, Eritrean, and
Libyan intervention in the conflict. He said that the Libyan
representative in the AU PSC had admonished Chad and Sudan
for sponsoring mutually-antagonizing rebel movements during
the most recent PSC meeting on February 12, but Taye
explained that Libyan President Qaddhafi was funding the
Sudanese opposition in Chad. Taye further blamed Eritrea for
having trained and recruited Zaghawa fighters for the
rebellion in Eastern Sudan and then transporting "100 to 120"
of them to Jebel Marra to fight the Sudanese Armed Forces
(SAF). CDA Hume said that Libya had long interfered in
Darfur and had stationed two battalions in El Fasher in the
1970s and 1980s. He stated that Sudan had recently
confronted the Libyan government with evidence of its support
for Sudanese rebel groups, and the Libyan government had
responded by expelling Sudanese diplomats from Tripoli. CDA
Hume also said that Presidential Advisor Mustafa Osman Ismail
had asked the USG for assistance in limiting Libyan meddling
in the region and noted that Qaddafi had been explicit that
he did not want the UN in Africa. In the past, Qaddafi had
lost interest in Darfur after a short burst of activity,
according to Taye, who predicted the pattern would repeat
itself.


8. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.
HUME