REBELS' DESTINY IN THEIR HANDS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000208

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL AU SU CD UN US
SUBJECT: REBELS' DESTINY IN THEIR HANDS

REF: A. NDJAMENA 00119


B. KHARTOUM 00170

Classified By: P/E Chief E. Whitaker, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) On February 7, the African Union Mission in Sudan
(AMIS) completed the airlift of many Darfur Peace Agreement
(DPA) non-signatory commanders to attend the leadership
conference in North Darfur. Some additional commanders may
move to the conference site by ground in the coming days.
Commanders allied with the Sudan Liberation Army
(SLA)-Unity/G-19, the faction allied with SLA leader Abdel
Wahid al-Nur, and the faction allied with SLA leader Ahmed
Abdul Shafi have assembled in Umm Rai, North Darfur. After
numerous delays, the organizers appear to be awaiting the
outcome of a parallel meeting in Chad, but have invited
international observers to attend the conference on February

19.


2. (C) Field reporting indicates that many of the commanders
assembled in North Darfur are frustrated with their political
leaders, are tired of the ongoing fighting, and are ripe for
pursuing political dialogue. Their destiny, however, is in
their hands. In order to move forward and participate in a
constructive political process, they need to overcome their
internal divisions, develop a common stance on the issues of
regime change and the DPA, and counter the manipulation of
their leaders, which is rooted in individual political
ambition.


3. (C) One element of the conference has said it will focus
on unification of the SLA, humanitarian affairs, legal and
security work, and native administration. A second element,
led by Abdul Shafi, has refused to renounce his goal of
regime change in Khartoum, continues to reject the DPA as a
basis for negotiation, and may use the conference to
facilitate unification of the SLM with this goal in mind (Ref
A). Also in question is the political and military strength
of a united rebel movement that might emerge from the
conference. Adam Bakhit -- who commands the largest number
of fighters in any faction -- remains in Chad with
influential non-signatory leaders Khalil Ibrahim, Khamis
Abdullah, Sharif Harir, Adam Ali Shoggar, and Ahmed Diraij
(Ref B). This third element plans to hold a separate
conference in Chad within the next week to consolidate the
NRF.


4. (C) Using the occasion of UN Special Envoy Jan Eliasson
and AU Envoy Salim Ahmed Salim's visit to Sudan from February
12-16, we can encourage the UN and AU to take a more active
and consistent role vis-a-vis the non-signatories and assist
them in developing a structure for their internal dialogue.
In addition to meeting with Sudanese officials, signatories
of the Declaration of Commitment (DOC),and representatives
of the international community in Khartoum, Eliasson and
Salim intend to travel to El Fasher for consultations with
the non-signatories.


5. (C) While the international community should support any
positive movement toward peaceful negotiation, it should be
careful not to expect either the conference in North Darfur
or the meetings in Chad to be a watershed in the political
process. The USG can continue to state our policy of support
for unification of the rebel factions and negotiation within
the framework of the DPA to demonstrate to the AU, UN, the
international community, and the Sudanese government that we
are firm in our commitment to peace.


6. (U) A statement of our policy should be based on S/E
Natsios' February 8 prepared congressional testimony to
include the following:

-- Our first objective in Darfur is to achieve a durable
peace through a political settlement that is agreed to by all
parties voluntarily, and then actually implemented. If we
achieve an agreement that is not supported by all sides, we
will see war again in a few years. Each recurrence of war
puts civilian lives in danger and causes a decline in the
already chaotic economic situation in Darfur, further
destabilizing the vulnerable populations. The Sudanese
government policy of divide and conquer cannot succeed, and
will only prolong the war. The strategy of the Khartoum
government to negotiate individually with each rebel leader
to buy their support will not create a cohesive and lasting
peace.

-- The DPA non-signatories must unify politically in order
to negotiate effectively a political settlement with the

KHARTOUM 00000208 002 OF 002


Khartoum government. Some rebels frequently appear more
focused on their political ambitions than on the well-being
of the people of Darfur. Continued fragmentation only
exacerbates the Sudanese government's efforts to exploit
pre-existing tribal divisions.

-- While the people of the United States are appalled by the
atrocities committed against the people of Darfur, the rebels
should not translate that into support for their political
movements, many of which are personality-based and the goals
of which are obscure.

-- The DPA non-signatories should renounce the violent
overthrow of the government of Sudan, which many of them have
been publicly advocating, and which is an impediment to peace
negotiations.

-- The United States believes that the United Nations and
the African Union, under Jan Eliasson and Salim Ahmed Salim,
should take the lead in mediating a political agreement
between the rebels and the Sudanese government, and that the
United States will do everything possible to support them in
this process. Use of more than one track for negotiation in
this case would be damaging and confusing for all parties; we
support join UN/AU leadership in this regard.

-- Attacks on international aid agencies have increased in
recent months with more than a dozen local Sudanese staff
killed, one expatriate woman sexually assaulted, and
approximately 113 aid vehicles stolen in 2006. We also know
that the rebel movements have been responsible for at least
some of this theft and violence, and we insist that it stop
now. The United States government pays for much of the
assistance, and we view this as tantamount to stealing
taxpayer-funded U.S. government resources. Moreover, if the
abuse on aid agencies continues, they will leave, and the
people of Darfur will suffer on an even greater scale. The
rebels are as responsible as the Government of Sudan in
ensuring the security of those delivering humanitarian
assistance.

-- The non-signatories must be flexible and practical about
their demands in any upcoming negotiations; they will not get
everything they ask for. They must be willing to compromise.

-- While the DPA has weaknesses, it cannot be abandoned; it
should be the basis of future negotiations, and addenda to
address some of the DPA's weaknesses should be offered, not
negotiation of a new agreement.

-- Finally, the U.S. will support the implementation of a
peace agreement, along with other international donors, by
providing significant reconstruction assistance to both
African and Arab tribes in Darfur so that people are able to
return home and re-establish their lives and livelihoods
successfully.
HUME