AS STALEMATE CONTINUES ON DPA, MINAWI ASKS FOR

S E C R E T KHARTOUM 002029

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV SU SA LY
SUBJECT: AS STALEMATE CONTINUES ON DPA, MINAWI ASKS FOR
U.S. SUPPORT THROUGH SPLM

REF: A. KHARTOUM 02004


B. KHARTOUM 02013

Classified By: CDA Roberto Powers, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)

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Nafie Demands SLM Integration-
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1. (C) In a recent meeting with senior representatives of the
Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM),Presidential Assistant Nafie
Ali Nafie underscored that any previous timetable for
implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) agreed
between the SLM and late-Presidential Advisor Maghzoub al
Khalifa is void and that he will not discuss power or
wealth-sharing issues until the SLM integrates its military
into the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF),SLM Chairman and Senior
Assistant to the President Minni Minawi told Poloff on
December 18. Minawi, who did not attend the meeting,
explained that the SLM will not consider integration of its
forces until the Government disarms the Janjaweed; appoints
the Security Advisory Team (SAT) stipulated in the DPA,
including acceptance of a foreign general as the SAT
chairman; and the SLM role in the military High Command is
specified.


2. (C) Despite positive press reports, the meeting--pitting
Nafie and Humanitarian Affairs Commissioner Ahmed Haroun
against senior SLM officials, including chief military
commander Jumaa Hagar and Secretary General of the
Transitional Darfur Regional Authority Mohammed Soliman--was
inconclusive. According to Minawi, Nafie scoffed at the
suggestion that the Government can disarm the Janjaweed,
saying that "they are no longer under our control." His
proposal for integration rebuffed, Nafie then dismissed the
SLM's military capacity as negligible.


3. (C) By tying further implementation of the DPA to an
unreasonable demand for the SLM to integrate its
forces--contrary to the timetable set-out in the
agreement--Nafie is further negating the accord, said Minawi.
He claimed that even Vice President Ali Osman Taha had
admitted to him that NCP hardliners will never implement an
effective peace agreement for Darfur. "Even if Khalil
Ibrahim and Abdulwahid joined a peace deal, we would still
have problems because the bad guys in Khartoum will never
hold to the deal," Minawi quoted Taha as predicting.

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SLM Fighters: Top Priority
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4. (C) Minawi remains concerned, however, about the loyalty
of his forces, many of whom lack any means of sustenance.
Estimating the SLM's current force strength at between 5,000
and 6,000 fighters, Minawi said that the NCP used the SLM's
lack of resources to pressure political and military leaders
to defect from the movement, as in the case of SLM Secretary
General Mustafa Tirab (Refs. A and B). Despite Minawi's
attempts to secure financial assistance from Saudi Arabia and
Qatar, the NCP has always managed to outflank him,
dispatching Defense Minister Abdulrahim Mohammed Hussein to
Riyadh and National Intelligence and Security Service
Director General Salah Ghosh to Doha after Minawi's trips to
the Gulf to negate any inroads he had made. "You can't
depend on the Arabs," said Minawi, less enthusiastic about
the success of a trip to Libya than during an earlier
conversation (Ref. A).

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Request for Renewed U.S. Support Through SPLM
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5. (S/NF) The best way to assist the SLM would be for the
U.S. to provide financing for food and medical services
through the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) as was
done in the spring of 2007, said Minawi. "The SPLM mechanism
is our best hope," he explained. Minawi reiterated his
intention to make support for the SLM's military wing and for
the Darfur Reconstruction and Development Fund (DRDF) the
focus of his next trip to Washington, which he expects to
happen in January.


6. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.
POWERS