MILITANT DARFUR IDP LEADERS: NO CHINESE, ARABS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001989

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, SE NATSIOS, NSC FOR
PITTMAN AND HUDSON, ADDIS ABABA PLEASE PASS TO USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2017
TAGS: EAID KPKO PGOV PHUM PREF PREL UN AU SU
SUBJECT: MILITANT DARFUR IDP LEADERS: NO CHINESE, ARABS
NEED APPLY FOR UNAMID

REF: A. KHARTOUM 1970

B. KHARTOUM 1888

C. KHARTOUM 1795

D. KHARTOUM 1680

Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Leaders of Kalma IDP camp disavow having any
weapons while at the same time admitting that they
successfully drove out thousands of fellow IDPs in an October
uprising. The Kalma sheikhs claimed AMIS was a failure and
UNAMID would also fail if it consisted only of African, Arab
and Chinese units, claiming the Chinese were as bad as the
ruling National Congress Party (NCP) in Khartoum. They asked
for increased international help on educational opportunities
for the camp and pleaded that, if the international community
cannot solve Darfur, that IDPs in Darfur be moved safely to a
neighboring country as refugees. End summary.

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THE OCTOBER 2007 INTIFADA
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2. (C) CDA Fernandez and USAID/POL colleagues spent four
hours at Kalma Internally Displaced Person (IDP) Camp on
December 11, a few days after UN SE Jan Eliasson was
prevented from visited the same site which is one of the most
organized and radicalized camps in Darfur. The highlight of
the visit was a frank discussion in Arabic between the Charge
and 50-60 camp leaders and elders. The leaders were
unapologetic about what they called the October 18 "Intifada"
(Uprising) that drove out thousands of fellow IDPs, mostly
ethnic Zaghawa (some allied to the SLM-Mini Minawi faction).
The camp leaders (who are mostly Fur like the camp population
as a whole) said that the clashes had been instigated by the
Sudanese regime (especially the NISS - Sudanese Intelligence)
who had planted and recruited agents to commit criminal acts
in the camp, serving as "agents provocateurs" and brandishing
weapons. They had even stolen camels from passing Arab tribes
to incite hatred against Kalma.


3. (C) The elders said that the uprising was directed against
four categories of "criminals": SLM-Minawi members, agents
from the JEM (Justice and Equality Movement, also a largely
Zaghawa-based rebel group),common "mercenaries and
criminals" and GOS spies. The camp leaders had formed a
committee to exclude weapons from the camp and the people had
risen up and expelled the troublemakers. The elders insisted
that the clash had not been ethnically based, noting that
there are 28 different ethnic groups in the camp and that
some of those expelled had shown their true colors by
immediately going to work for the GOS police or NISS in Nyala.


4. (C) The American visitors later toured the burnt out and
desolate sectors 7 and 8 of the camp and saw hundreds of
destroyed and damaged shelters and mudbrick walls stretching
across the horizon. The well-organized uprising leaders had
also dug trenches and prepared log barriers to prevent
vehicles from entering in case outsiders had tried to
intervene (Sudanese police wanted to but were prevented by
angry IDPs). Despite the camp leaders claims of having no
firearms, "only sticks and stones," it is hard to believe
that this expulsion was accomplished without serious violence.


5. (C) The IDP leaders noted that the Sudanese regime wanted
._Qas. The GOS had kicked out the
Norwegians, and Medecins du Monde (MDM) and had recently
pressured the Sudanese Red Crescent Society to end its
contract with the Spanish Red Cross by the end of the year.
They had recently expelled the UN OCHA Director for South
Darfur. The regime also used its control over the Sudanese
media to defame IDP camps as centers for "terrorists" (rebel
groups) and criminals. There were absolutely no weapons in
the camp, this was being used as a pretext for armed
intervention by the GOS (Note: even the sympathetic, expelled
OCHA Director admitted to us - reftel b - that not only are
there arms in the camp but also informal prisons). The GOS
wanted to divide Kalma camp into 9 smaller camps but this was
totally rejected by the IDPs, "this would be like creating 9
mass graves for us." The camp was willing to accept an AU/UN
presence in their environs, for objectives such as weapons
searches, but no Sudanese police would be allowed in.


KHARTOUM 00001989 002 OF 003


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AFRICAN, CHINESE TROOPS ARE NO GOOD
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6. (C) The leaders commented on an alleged rape that had
occurred the day before, noting that they had called AMIS
civilian police to come and investigate but they had yet to
show up. "Sometimes they come 3-4 days later, or not at all,"
noted Sheikh Ali, the paramount sheikh of the camp. They
complained that they had been asking for protection for 4
years now and if the UN was incapable of protecting them, as
is their right, then the IDPs should be given safe passage to
a neighboring countries where they could become refugees
(this particular theme, a new one for us, was repeated 4 or 5
times). In their estimation, the AU was a total failure
which can't protect itself and was compromised by corruption
and payoffs from Khartoum. Chinese troops are not wanted,
"they are here either to look for oil or to serve Khartoum's
interests as spies, they are as bad as the NCP." They added
that the money from this oil is used to buy weapons which the
Sudanese Government uses to kill its own people. Troops from
Arab countries were just as bad because of their complicity
with the regime and their silence on abuses in Darfur. The
only solution was Western troops from Europe and the U.S. or
resettlement outside Sudan. Those troops should arrive today
and not tomorrow.


7. (C) CDA answered that the UNAMID troops would most
certainly not be Western, but mostly African as agreed to in
UNSCR 1769 but that everyone was very concerned about doing
what was needed to make it an effective force. Deployment was
much too slow to suit us and we are constantly pressing to
accelerate deployment. The full implementation of 1769 should
improve things in Darfur but it is not a panacea, for
example, disarmament of the janjawid is not part of the
UNAMID mandate. The camp leaders bitterly criticized both
Libyan leader Muammar Al-Qaddafi and the AU's Salim Ahmed
Salim "who is biased against us and is the executor of the
Sudanese regime's program against this silent patient people
weho are killed and raped inside the displaced camps." They
added that in their eyes, "AU troops are almost as bad as NCP
supporters."

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VOLUNTARY RETURN EQUALS INDIVIDUAL ELIMINATION
-------------- -


8. (C) CDA asked the camp leaders about the issue of
"voluntary return," a concept the GOS is now touting. The
leaders said that "voluntary return is individual
elimination," how can one hope to return when those who made
us IDPs in the first place are still out there? They noted
that Kalma is actually a "prison without walls," but it is
the only place in Darfur where they feel even remotely safe.
The sheikhs expressed their conviction that food assistance
is being stolen by the GOS to promote voluntary returns and
to further squeeze the IDP camps. No one wanted to return
home more than them but IDPs needed guarantees to do so,
these included the presence of credible international forces,
real janjawid disarmament, and the establishment of a rule of
law system in Darfur which would include compensation and
reconstruction.


9. (C) The camp elders pleaded for more schools noting that
there were only 9 primary schools (no secondary schools) for
a minimum of 30,000 children in the camp (credible camp
population estimates range from 60,000 to 90,000). The
schools were extremely modest, with no budgets, almost no
books and unpaid, volunteer teachers. Charge and USAID said
that they would look into this issue to see what is possible,
They also complained that there was not enough food in the
camp, stating that the last food distribution was five months
ago (Note: This is not true. USAID partner World Vision
completed a food distribution in Kalma camp less than a week
ago. End note.)


10. (C) Comment: Kalma camp today is an object lesson of
victims becoming victimizers. Whatever the justification or
excuse may have been, there is no doubt that the majority Fur
population drove out thousands of fellow IDPs, many of them
women and children, in October. And while the Sudanese
Government certainly has ulterior motives towards the camp
and IDPs in general (tempered right now by frequent
international monitoring),Kalma remains a highly politicized
IDP camp with vocal, savvy and aggressive community leaders,

KHARTOUM 00001989 003 OF 003


most of whom pay blind allegiance to Abdul Wahid Nur. It is
unlikely that the international community can meet the lofty
and, in some cases, very unrealistic expectations the IDPs
have of UNAMID. This is troubling because it will lead to
even greater dissatisfaction among a traumatized and
demanding IDP population, increasing tension and insecurity
in the camp.


11. (C) Comment continued: Humanitarian agencies have been
unable to provide consistent services to IDPs in Kalma due to
the Humanitarian Assistance Commission's (HAC) pattern of
arbitrarily deciding which agencies can go to the camp on
which days. While a certainly level of relief has been
maintained, full, unfettered access to the camp must be
regained in order to normalize an already volatile situation.
This requires maneuvering carefully between suspicious IDPs,
brutalized by their ordeal, and suspicious HAC officials,
fearing that Kalma is actually a dangerous and radicalized
safehaven for rebel movements. End comment.
FERNANDEZ