Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07KHARTOUM1904
2007-12-03 11:23:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

MINAWI PUSHES FOR DPA IMPLEMENTATION, SUSPICIOUS

Tags:  PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO1987
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDU RUEHKUK RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #1904/01 3371123
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 031123Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9419
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001904 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU
SUBJECT: MINAWI PUSHES FOR DPA IMPLEMENTATION, SUSPICIOUS
OF GOS INTENTIONS IN CHAD

REF: A. KHARTOUM 1846


B. KHARTOUM 1131

Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001904

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU
SUBJECT: MINAWI PUSHES FOR DPA IMPLEMENTATION, SUSPICIOUS
OF GOS INTENTIONS IN CHAD

REF: A. KHARTOUM 1846


B. KHARTOUM 1131

Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Sole signatory to the Darfur Peace Agreement
(DPA) Mini Minawi told CDA Fernandez he plans to work through
regional partners and the international community to pressure
the Government to implement the agreement. Despite sitting
in a regal office on the grounds of the Presidential Palace,
Minawi can't get meetings with GOS officials and was first
told to coordinate meetings on DPA implementation with
Minister of Humanitarian Affairs (and indicted ICC suspect)
Ahmed Haroun, then told the portfolio had been moved to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Minawi is suspicious of GOS
intentions in Chad and suspects that Khartoum has supported
the current fighting just across the border to delay the
arrival of MINURCAT. End summary.


2. (C) Isolated in his gilded cage on the grounds of the
Presidential Palace (massive government-issued black Mercedes
parked outside) a frustrated SLM leader Mini Minawi told CDA
December 2 about his plans to pursue implementation of the
Darfur Peace Agreement. Despite being the Senior Advisor to
the President, Minawi said that members of the GOS
essentially have refused to meet with him, unless it is to
discuss security issues and the integration of forces. Since
the death of DPA negotiator Magzoub al-Khalifa, the NCP
doesn't even make much of an effort to hide its disinterest
in the DPA. Presidential Advisor Nafie Ali Nafie reportedly
told Minawi that he is "very busy" and Minister of
Humanitarian Affairs (and ICC indictee) Ahmed Haroun has been
"given the DPA portfolio" though the two have yet to meet.
Later, Nafie refused to meet with Minawi but passed the
message that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has
responsibility for the DPA. In a subsequent meeting with
African Union (AU) mediator Sam Ibok, Ibok reportedly told
Minawi that the GOS doesn't want to discuss DPA

implementation with him either, and told Ibok to work through
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. What little interest the
regime has on the DPA is focused on security arrangements
which have as an ultimate goal the defanging of Mini's
remaining forces, either by disarmament or incorporation in
the regular SAF.


3. (C) Minawi said his recent meetings in Qatar to seek
financial support for the Transitional Darfur Regional
Authority (TDRA) did not bear any fruit, although he was
hopeful that the Qataris would be more forthcoming than the
Saudis. (Note: Minawi sought to ensure that Arab donor funds
be funneled through the TDRA, which he said is nothing more
than an empty building at this point.) Minawi said he will
insist that the UN/AU negotiating team use the DPA as the
basis for the next Darfur agreement, and plans to publicize
how little has been implemented in the DPA. He said he had
suggested to Ibok that the AU convene a meeting of the DPA
signatories to review status of implementation of the
agreement. He asked for American help in keeping the AU
focused on DPA implementation. CDA Fernandez said a good way
to highlight lack of implementation would be to publish a
report showing which parts of the agreement had been
implemented and which parts are still outstanding - which
would be instructive for the next round of talks and shine a
light on the NCP's broken promises.


4. (C) Since few of the decrees have been passed to implement
the DPA (except those appointing SLM members to government
jobs),Minawi plans to attend the next round of Darfur talks
separately from the government and has prepared a legal
document to justify this position (Note: The AU/UN team
suggested this approach and Embassy Khartoum has provided
Minawi with advice on the document.) CDA Fernandez noted
that when the SPLM refused to sit with the GOS delegation at
the Sirte talks, the GOS initially threatened to walk out of
the talks if the SPLM was not with them, but was obviously
bluffing because the talks went forward anyway and it is in
the interests of the GOS not to be viewed as blocking the
talks.


5. (C) At times distracted during the meeting by news
highlights of the ongoing battles in Chad between President
Deby and Chadian rebel groups based in Darfur, Minawi said he
is suspicious of GOS intentions in Chad and believes that the
NCP is pushing these attacks to delay the arrival of the

KHARTOUM 00001904 002 OF 002


European Union peacekeeping force (MINURCAT). Minawi said
the GOS fears having the EU force on its border, just as it
does not want European forces in UNAMID. He suggested this
is possibly to avoid intervention by forces who could bring
Sudanese war criminals to the ICC. He expected that the Chad
fighting could lead to an up-tick in fighting inside Darfur
in the next few weeks.


6. (C) Comment: Minawi's objective is to ensure that the DPA
be the basis for the next Darfur peace agreement, and to be a
player at the next round of peace talks. Whether he will be
able to achieve this depends on where the talks are held and
if the AU/UN team is willing to publicly support his
position. It is unlikely that a distracted and overwhelmed
AU/UN team can do that. Libya would not issue a visa to
Minawi (presumably at the request of the GOS) once he said he
wanted to be represented separately at the talks in Sirte.
We will continue to support Minawi whenever possible,
recognizing the pressure that the U.S. placed on him to sign
the DPA in the first place but it is clear that, having
gained whatever benefit there was from his participation, the
NCP is focused on other matters now. End comment.
FERNANDEZ